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 State capacity is one of the most invoked but least understood concepts in both 
international relations and comparative politics. It is linked to many important outcomes of 
interest such as economic growth, civil conflict, inter-state war, environmental management, and 
many more. Despite a large amount of informative work on the subject, previous attempts to 
measure state capacity lacked conceptual depth and often failed to account for its 
multidimensional nature. This has left observers confused about the difference between state 
capacity as an explanatory concept and the outcome of interest being explained. Moreover, poor 
specification and oversimplification make it impossible to answer the all important question 
“capacity to do what?” when utilizing state capacity in analysis. This project seeks to address 
these shortcomings in the existent literature by developing a multidimensional measure of state 
capacity. Moreover, this dissertation explores the relationship between material factors like 
resources, social capital, and geography, and institutional factors like bureaucratic quality, and 
infrastructural reach. I find that both material and institutional factors, as well as indicators of 
international power are crucial elements of state capacity. This dissertation then examines the 
link between state capacity and government respect for human rights, in an effort to show how 
governments deploy the tools of repression. To do so, the more nuanced and conceptually valid 
measure of state capacity developed herein is tested against 12 of the human rights contained in 
the CIRI database including physical integrity rights and empowerment rights. Overall, this 
project demonstrates that state capacity is a multidimensional concept, and that the presence or 
Benjamin Charles Carbonetti –University of Connecticut, 2015 
 
absence of high levels of each dimension of state capacity can help explain the strategies of 
government repression.  
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Introduction 
 
 “An empirical science cannot tell anyone what he should do – but rather that he can do.”  
“The ideal-type concept will help develop our skill in imputation in research: it is no 
‘hypothesis’ but it offers guidance to the construction of hypotheses.” 
      -Max Weber 1904|1949, 54 & 88 
  
I. Introduction  
 Max Weber made it his mission to develop a method for understanding mass social 
behavior and, in particular, the way polities develop. Weber’s work on the conceptualization of 
the state and the construction of ideal types in order to advance understandings of how states 
behave, develop, and fail, remains a benchmark in political science. This dissertation project is 
not unlike Weber’s research arc, in that it attempts to develop typologies of states, particularly 
the capacities of states, in order to better understand social phenomena. It is for the reader to 
determine the degree of success or failure achieved in that endeavor, but hopefully the pages that 
follow help illuminate how the level of a variety of capacities available to a given state can 
influence the lived experience of the citizens within that state.  
 State capacity is a fundamental concept in both international relations and comparative 
politics, often used to explain important outcomes such as war (Organski and Kugler 1980), civil 
conflict and political stability (DeRouen and Sobek 2004, Fjelde and de Soysa 2009), and 
economic development (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001, Kaufmann and Kraay 2002) 
among many others. Unsurprisingly, given the growing popularity of the concept, there are also a 
number of measures for scholars to choose from (see Hendrix 2010). While these and other 
existing studies established the importance of state capacity and greatly advanced the 
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understanding of how it might explain numerous outcomes, the concept remains incomplete, 
hindering its utility to explain a range of important phenomena. This dissertation aims to address 
the weaknesses in the current work on state capacity by offering a new conceptualization and 
national-level measure of state capacity and then applying it to patterns of state respect for a 
range of human rights.  
Developing a new and more-robust measure of state capacity is a timely goal. In 2010 the 
Journal of Peace Research commissioned a special issue exploring the relationship between state 
capacity and civil conflict to better capture the “multi-faceted” nature of the concept (Sobek 
2010, 270). Other studies have also re-invigorated the debate over which factors influence state 
performance (Arbetman-Rabinowitz, Kugler, and Abdollahian et al. 2012) or lead to “state 
failure” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Even more recently, studies have attempted to examine 
the relationship between state capacity and human rights (Cole 2015) with important 
implications for future work and policy-makers alike. Moreover, there is growing interest in 
analyzing the role political will plays in a state’s ability to address a variety of problems through 
policy initiatives and reforms (Grindle and Thomas 1991; Brinkerhoff 1996, 2000; Post, Raile, 
and Raile, 2010). Political will, not unlike state capacity, is often conceptualized in ways that 
lead to circular reasoning, and also conflate it with state capacity itself, making analysis difficult 
(see Hammergren 1998). A new, more complete, measure of state capacity will help differentiate 
when a governments fail to take effective action because they cannot (lack of capacity) or 
because they choose not to (lack of will) (Carbonetti, Pomeroy, and Richards 2014).  
 Given the broad range and scope of work invoking state capacity as an explanatory 
concept, re-conceptualizing it and developing a useful and valid measure requires the synthesis 
of many sets of literature from both international relations and comparative politics. Indeed, a 
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large portion of this dissertation, including much of the first chapter, is dedicated to making 
sense of the vast and diverse literature on state capacity.  
 
II. Dissertation Goals  
There are five main goals for this dissertation. The first goal is to develop a new 
conceptualization of state capacity. The second is to create a correspondingly valid 
operationalization that captures the multi-dimensional nature of state capacity. The third goal is 
to ensure this measure of state capacity is not “outcome based,” in other words it is not an 
attempt to ensure state capacity is represented by everything often considered normatively 
“good” for states, like economic growth and democracy. Creating a measure that exists 
independently of the outcomes scholars are trying to explain is crucial to making such a measure 
useful. The fourth goal is to demonstrate the utility of this new conceptualization and measure by 
analyzing the influence of state capacity on the level and pattern of government respect for 
human rights around the world. Finally, the fifth goal of this dissertation is to use the findings 
from the analysis of the new measure of state capacity and government respect for 12 human 
rights to better explain the strategies of repression.  
Most importantly, as chapters one and two of this dissertation show, current 
conceptualizations of state capacity fail to account for the large potential number combinations 
of state attributes influencing state capacity can take. The focus on how factors combine to form 
state capacity is an important step in developing a coherent and useful measure of state capacity. 
This approach recognizes that a state’s aggregate capacity is only determined by looking beyond 
the sum of its parts. Simply adding up the state attributes which we theorize to increase state 
capacity is not enough, since some state attributes that are positively linked to state capacity in 
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some circumstances, such as oil or other natural resources, may not be in others. The tendency to 
focus on tallying resources, or identifying the presence of certain institutions, has left current 
conceptualizations of state capacity incomplete or too narrow to explain many complex 
outcomes. That said, this approach is not meant to include every single possible indicator 
associated with state capacity, rather it is to use sound theory, and empirical analysis to distill the 
most important dimensions of state capacity. My hope is this will offer a more refined alternative 
to the large and diffuse number of current conceptualizations and operationalizations of state 
capacity.  
Put simply, current conceptualizations of state capacity suffer from being overly general 
or being too narrow. Conceptualizations that suffer from overgeneralization are not particularly 
useful in explaining outcomes or become tautological, i.e. positive outcomes like state stability, 
are a function of high state capacity and therefore prove its existence (Kocher 2010; e.g. 
Jackman 1993).1 Conversely, other conceptualizations of state capacity are overly simplistic, 
such as only using state wealth measured as gross domestic product (GDP) (e.g. Fearon and 
Laitin 2003).  
In the same vein as oversimplification of state capacity, are those conceptualizations that 
are idiosyncratic to the outcome being explained. For example, the use of resource or 
geographical factors as the key concepts related to either a weak or strong state vs. weak or 
strong rebel groups in the civil conflict literature (e.g. Lujala 2010). Beyond missing key 
dimensions of state capacity, this approach does not allow for wider applications to more 
outcomes of interest in the study of both international relations and comparative politics.  
                                                          
1 Jackman (1993) outlines his conception of “political capacity,” a similar concept to state capacity, and focuses on 
state stability, measured as years without major civil unrest, as both an outcome of high political capacity and one 
of its key components.  
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Ultimately, the biggest problem with being overly general or overly idiosyncratic in 
conceptualizing state capacity is that it leaves scholars unable to answer the question of “capacity 
to do what?” This is a crucial element to understanding the specific way outcomes of interest 
vary from state-to-state, and most importantly, what actions policy makers can take to address 
negative outcomes of differing levels and types of state capacity. This dissertation seeks to 
remedy these shortcomings by providing a better specified conceptualization and measure of 
state capacity.  
 
III. Outline of Dissertation 
 Chapter one begins by outlining the dominant point of view in the state capacity 
literature—that institutional factors, rather than material or historical factors, largely determine a 
state’s capacity (Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). This 
perspective became popular during the movement to re-invigorate research on “the state” in both 
comparative politics and international relations (Krasner 1978; Skocpol 1985; Reuschmeyer and 
Evans 1985; Migdal 1988). The emphasis on state institutions as an explanatory variable is 
important to the growth of state capacity as a popular concept because it highlights how different 
institutional arrangements such as regime type, electoral laws, the structure of the executive 
branch (O’Donnell 2004), and also the routine interactions between the state apparatus and the 
people (Evans 1995; Ostrom 1997) could influence a state’s ability to take both domestic and 
international actions it deems beneficial to its interests.  
Chapter one then moves on to discuss the importance of resources to state capacity. 
Resources are often defined broadly to include both material resources—such as mineral 
deposits, timber, and foodstuffs—and social resources, which includes an educated, adaptive, 
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and interconnected population.2 In international relations resources are thought by scholars of 
most of the major theoretical traditions to improve a state’s power which improves the ability to 
act autonomously in the international sphere. Not surprisingly, liberal and neoliberal 
international relations theorists argue that resources are pivotal in determining which states make 
and uphold the world order (Keohane and Nye 1977; Ikenberry 2001). The liberal school of 
thought also focuses on “soft power” (Nye 1990) which includes more economic and idea-based 
resources states can use to influence other states. Neomarxists argue both natural and social 
resources can be deterministic of a state’s place in the mode of production of the global economy 
and thus, its power to influence the prevailing world order in ways that benefit or harm its 
interests (Frank 1966; Wallerstein 1979; Gill and Law 1988). Similarly, realists and neo-realists 
argue that resources are crucial to state power, but focus primarily on how resources influence a 
state’s ability to wage war on its enemies and corral allies (Carr 1939; Mearsheimer 2001). 
Constructivists (Onuf 1989; Wendt 1992) on the other hand, focus primarily on social resources, 
such as a state’s cultural influence through media and personalities of leaders, to influence 
perceptions of their behavior and influence others states via their leaders’ and populations’ 
attitudes.  
In comparative politics, both natural and social resources are also thought to be crucial to 
the state’s ability to control what happens within its borders though are often not included in 
conceptions of state capacity. For example, it is hypothesized that states rich in mineral resources 
or cash crops can be vulnerable to “Dutch disease” or the “resource curse” (Karl 1997; Ross 
1999). The resource curse is the idea that too many resources produce an over-reliance on one 
sector of the economy which is easy controlled by the government or a cartel-like group of 
                                                          
2 This is discussed at much greater length in chapter two, but I am alluding here to arguments made by both Evans 
(2001) and Putnam (1994) about “state-society synergy” and “social capital” respectively.  
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individuals or corporations. This pattern makes resource rich states sensitive to price shocks and 
corrupt politicians and businessmen. Furthermore, resources that are easily captured represent a 
major incentive for rebel groups, and the presence of those resources is thought to influence civil 
conflict and thus reduce state capacity (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). So-called “blood” diamonds 
in Sierra Leone and the oil in the Sudan are examples of scenarios where resources are linked to 
conflict (Ross 2006).3 Resources are also emphasized by political economists who claim that 
they dictate the internal dynamics of a state by dividing society along urban-rural or capital-labor 
lines (Bates 1981; Rogowski 1987). 
Social resources are also important in study of comparative politics, most prominently 
through the large literature concerning the influence of social capital on the quality of 
government (Putnam 1994; Paxton 2002). Evans (1995; 1997) and Ostrom (1997) take another 
approach by emphasizing the importance of educated populations to the state’s ability to make 
effective policy. They demonstrate the importance of a state’s ability to tap local knowledge for 
both technical advancement critical to the economy and natural resource management. Adger 
(2003) incorporates these arguments into work on climate change, and argues that resources like 
social capital and educated populations are crucial to a society’s ability to adapt to changes in 
their climate.  
 Chapter one then discusses the importance of geography and climate, which some link to 
state development and prosperity (Sachs and Malaney 2002). For example, Sachs and Warner 
(2001) argue that in tropical climates the high toll of diseases such as malaria are hugely 
detrimental to economic growth. Others claim that access to navigable waterways for trade is 
                                                          
3 The role of resources in civil war is one of the most debated issues in the conflict literature (see Fearon 2005). 
However, Ross (2006) finds that countries that produce large quantities of oil, diamonds, and gas is robustly 
correlated with civil war onset. Ross establishes causality by examining the amount of these resources are sold by 
known rebel groups, presumably to fund military operations.  
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crucial to long-term economic development (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001). Chapter 
one closes with a discussion of the important step of integrating all of these social and material 
factors, such as resources, social capital, and geography, with the role of institutional factors and 
presents a conceptualization that does just that. This new conceptualization of state capacity 
forms the basis of the operationalization created in chapter two.  
 Chapter two is principally concerned with how to operationalize the new 
conceptualization of state capacity proposed at the end of chapter one. After summarizing past 
attempts to create multidimensional indicators of state capacity, factor analysis is identified as 
the method of choice for creating a new indicator of state capacity because it allows the 
researcher to use numerous variables that directly measure important state attributes to identify 
latent traits representing the essential dimensions of state capacity. Furthermore, the indicators 
that “load” on particular factors acts a theoretical test for current theories of state capacity 
discussed in chapter one. Ultimately, five essential dimensions of state capacity are identified by 
the factor analysis including 1) administrative-extractive capacity, 2) international-power 
capacity, 3) reach-coastal capacity, 4) coercive-rentier capacity, and 5) social-cohesion capacity. 
Creating an indicator that can be disaggregated into its component types allows for scholars to 
explain what aspects of state capacity are instrumental to explaining a number of outcomes of 
interest. Moreover, it allows researchers to answer the important question of “the capacity to do 
what?”  
 In chapter three, the new indicators of the dimensions of state capacity developed in 
chapter two are included in an analysis of patterns of government respect physical integrity 
rights. Physical integrity rights include the rights to no torture, political imprisonment, 
extrajudicial killings, and disappearances. The measures of these rights come from the CIRI 
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Human Rights Data Project (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). State capacity is central to 
understanding how states treat their citizens because the state is the primary entity charged with 
respecting, protecting, and fulfilling human rights. State respect for human rights is the subject of 
numerous studies that explore a number of potential explanations for the variance in state respect 
for physical integrity rights Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Fein 1995; Davenport 1995, 
2007; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Cingranelli and Richards 1999; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 
2001).  
 While others (Englehart 2009; Young 2009) have included indicators of state capacity in 
their analyses of state respect for physical integrity rights it is argued in this dissertation that 
these indicators reflect an incomplete conceptualization. Ultimately, the inclusion of state 
capacity in models of state respect for physical integrity rights illuminates numerous patterns and 
will hopefully be useful to scholars and policy-makers alike in their attempts to better understand 
why, when, and how states decide to repress their citizens.  
 Chapter four takes advantage of the breadth of measures contained in the CIRI Human 
Rights Data Project and examines the relationship between state capacity and empowerment 
rights. Empowerment rights include the rights to freedoms of association, speech, religion, 
domestic movement and foreign movement, as well as the right to electoral self-determination 
and worker rights. The causes of state respect for these rights are examined far less often in the 
human rights literature meaning this chapter fills an especially important gap in the field.4 
Repression of empowerment rights may be even more important, since their violation is often 
widespread and it deprives people of the mechanisms by which they advocate democratically for 
protections that allow them to live a life with dignity. As with physical integrity rights, all five 
                                                          
4 A notable exception includes (Cole 2015).  
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types of state capacity types are found to be statistically significant associates of the level of 
government respect for at least one (and often many) empowerment rights.  
 Finally, the conclusion distills some important lessons from the results in chapters two, 
there, and four, and offers some directions for future research. Figure A depicts the overall 
design of this dissertation which is carried through the four chapters summarized above. In the 
end the dissertation re-conceptualizes state capacity, creates a corresponding measure using 
factor analysis, and tests that measure’s ability to explain state respect for physical integrity and 
empowerment rights.  
 
  
 Ultimately, the conceptualization and accompanying multi-dimensional indicator of state 
capacity created for this dissertation are useful for explaining an important outcome of interest—
government respect for human rights. Moreover, because pains were taken to ensure this 
measurement scheme is not “outcome-based” (meaning it is not derived simply from outcomes 
that scholars argue are normatively good) the indicators of state capacity created here should be 
Geograph
y Factors 
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Figure A: Research Design for Dissertation   
Extractive 
Coercive  
Institution
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State Attributes Types of Capacity 
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useful in explaining a number of other outcomes of interest like economic growth, civil conflict 
onset, transitions to democracy, and many more.  
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Chapter One 
Conceptualizing State Capacity 
 
“Political and economic institutions, which are ultimately the choice of society, can be 
inclusive and encourage economic growth. Or they can be extractive and become 
impediments to economic growth. Nations fail when they have extractive economic 
institutions, supported by extractive political institutions that impede or even block 
economic growth.”  
 
   --Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2012).  
“There is no doubt that good institutions are important to determining a country’s wealth. 
But why have some countries ended up with good institutions, while others haven’t?”  
 
   --Jared Diamond (2012) 
 
1.1 Introduction  
What role does geography play in political development? Why do high-quality 
institutions form in some countries and not others? Why are some countries rich and others poor? 
Why do some states experience civil war while others remain relatively stable over-time. How 
come some states respect human rights while others do not? The quotes at the top of this chapter 
illustrate one of many great debates over what explains the huge variety of outcomes in different 
states around the world. On the one side are scholars like Acemoglu and Robinson who argue in 
their recent book Why Nations Fail (2012) that institutions are the result of unique historical 
legacies, and that states whose legacies produced “inclusive” economic and political institutions 
have thrived, while states whose legacies produced “extractive” economic and political 
institutions have floundered.  On the other side are geographers and economists like Jared 
Diamond and Jeffrey Sachs who, while acknowledging institutions are important, also recognize 
that geography and resources play a crucial role in shaping how “inclusive” institutions come 
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about. Furthermore, geography and resources can help explain the patterns of how institutions 
arise, their degree of effectiveness, and potential limits of their abilities to produce “good” 
outcomes that characterize thriving states.  
The institutions-versus-geography debate represents only a fraction of those academic 
arguments over how states produce “good” outcomes for their people. At the center of all of 
these debates is the concept of state capacity. State capacity has a long history as an explanatory 
variable in political science and it has changed, and still changes dramatically, depending on the 
outcome it is being used to explain. Much like the argument over the relationship between 
geography, resources, and institutions, state capacity has rotated between being thought to 
represent a country’s fungible resources or the quality of its institutions. The former is favored 
by theorists of international relations and political economists who focus on power in the 
international system. The latter is emphasized by many scholars of comparative political 
development. Today, with the end of the Cold War and less emphasis on the so-called “high 
politics” of war and peace, and the increased attention on the “third-wave” of democratization, 
state capacity has become more synonymous with institutions. Put simply, when scholars of both 
international relations and comparative politics discuss “state capacity” they tend to mean the 
quality of a state’s institutions.  
This chapter, then, focuses on how institutions and state capacity have become closely 
linked by discussing the common ways that state capacity is conceptualized and operationalized 
with an institutional focus. The chapter goes on to examine how geography, climate, and 
resources are also connected to state capacity in the existent literature. It bears emphasizing that 
one of my main contributions in this dissertation is to bring geography, resources, and climate 
into a coherent conceptualization of state capacity rather than simply treating them as intervening 
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or control variables. Finally, the chapter offers a new conceptualization that lays the foundation 
for a valid and reliable measure of state capacity. 
 The new conceptualization merges both the institutional and physical characteristics of 
states into a coherent idea of state capacity. That said, the observation that state capacity is a 
“multidimensional concept” (Sobek 2010) is not lost in this conceptualization. In fact its 
dimensions are the core elements of both the conceptualization and operationalization offered in 
this chapter and in chapter two respectively. Critically, the process of isolating the dimensions of 
state capacity helps to answer the central question of “the capacity to do what?” Answering this 
question is important because state capacity is conceived of as a set of state attributes that 
increase the probability of certain “good” or even “bad” outcomes like economic growth and 
respect for human rights, or tight control over the citizenry and rentier behavior. These outcomes 
are more likely depending on the dimension of state capacity a particular state ranks highly in, 
but not assured. State capacity, then, represents a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
certain outcomes to take place, and individual state capacities make some actions outcomes more 
likely than others.  
 
1.2 Defining States 
 Before moving forward it is important to define some terms that are used throughout this 
dissertation. The term “state” is defined in multiple ways in both comparative politics and 
international relations. These definitions range from broad and general to narrow and specific 
(Nettl 1968; Krasner 1984; Mitchell 1991). The most comprehensive meaning of “state” refers to 
the primary unit under analysis in international relations. States are political entities that possess 
a defined territory, a population, a government, and international recognition.  Put simply the 
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word “state” in this dissertation refers to all of the governmental, economic, and societal 
institutions that exist within the geographical borders of any internationally recognized country. 
This broad conception of “state” is adopted in this project because; at the most fundamental 
level, “state capacity” refers to the combination of resources and institutions that can be 
mobilized toward a particular action.  
 The word “government” is sometimes treated as interchangeable with the state. “State 
institutions” can refer specifically to the set of organs that govern a particular territory. 
Therefore, when the word government is used it is explicitly referencing the sovereign 
institutions that make the rules within a particular territory. Finally, the term “regime” is used to 
denote the political system of a particular state. Regimes are the rules and norms that govern 
action within a state. Regimes change more often than states do and most states experience 
numerous “regime changes” throughout their existence.  
 During the remainder of this chapter, sometimes the words state, government, and regime 
are all used interchangeably. The reason for this is because much of remainder of this chapter 
describes how different scholars try to analyze and study “the state.”  The way these authors used 
the word “state” is maintained when explaining their approaches. That said, once at the 
conceptualization portion of this chapter, and the results chapters, the words state, government, 
and regime are used as I described above.  
 
1.3 Studying the State 
 The current popularity of state capacity as an explanatory concept is a product of the 
movement in the late 1970s and early 1980s to “bring the state back in” as a primary unit for 
analysis in political science (Evans, Reuschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985). This movement was in 
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response to the dominance of pluralist and Marxist conceptions of the state as simply a reflection 
of the preferences of dominant societal actors (Krasner 1984). This state-centric approach argues 
that the state apparatus—made up of government institutions and the leaders who occupy 
positions of authority—represents both structural constraints on actions of society and also 
behaves as a corporate actor that develops potentially distinct interests from powerful actors in 
society (Nettl 1968). This approach focuses mostly on “state autonomy” from society as the 
ultimate indicator of state strength and capacity to govern (Kjaer, Hansen and Thomsen 2002; 
see also Migdal 1988). Put simply, strong states are those with more power than domestic actors, 
while weak states have less power relative to societal actors.5   
 The notion that the state mattered as both a structuring force and agent led scholars to 
examine what attributes held the most analytical leverage in explaining state strength and 
weakness and thus, different outcomes. Of course, the definition of state capacity arises from the 
outcomes it is used to explain. Broadly, these outcomes of interest included nearly anything, but 
focused primarily on levels of economic growth and development, domestic political stability, 
international security, and international trade. The ability to achieve these types of outcomes is 
generally thought to be the product of high state capacity. A recent article sums up the catch-all 
notion of state capacity resulting in good things by referring to the outcomes state capacity is 
linked to generally as “peace and prosperity” (McBride, Milante, and Skaperdas 2011). 
 1.2.1 Previous attempts to define state capacity 
 In much of the state capacity literature “state autonomy” or “state strength” is the most 
fundamental aspect of a state’s ability to function. In comparative politics the focus is primarily 
                                                          
5 Note, as mentioned above, throughout this section of the dissertation the word “state” often refers to the 
“government” of a particular polity. This is how the work being described use it, not necessarily how this project is 
using it.  
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on the state’s autonomy from society (Stepan 1978; Skocpol 1985; Evans 1995), while in 
international relations the focus is on a state’s ability to remain autonomous in the global 
economy, or the arena of war and peace (Weatherbee 2009; Boyer and Drache 1996). In 
comparative politics, for example, “strong states” when compared to societal actors are often the 
explanation for the “East Asian Miracle” of rapid economic development (Johnson 1982; 
Amsden 1989; Wade 1990) while “weak states” (Herbst 2000; Centeno 2002) are linked the 
economic failures in Africa and Latin America. Meanwhile in international relations scholars the 
power and autonomy held by strong states is the constant advantage and goal. Thus, the 
autonomy state capacity delivers acts as the bulwark against the constraints of international 
institutions (Mearsheimer 1996), the market (Boyer and Drache 1996), and the international 
system itself (Strange 1982) numerous other factors that potentially shackle states.  
  In both cases autonomy means the ability of the state to pursue its own interests with as 
few constraints as possible. The assumption being, that the more autonomy a state has the more 
capacity it has to act. Of course this broad definition, while being parsimonious, leaves much to 
the imagination. What are state interests? What types of autonomy deliver outcomes in the state 
interest? Is autonomy simply freedom to act or should it deliver the freedom and wisdom to 
undertake good actions? The literature is divided, with some focusing simply on autonomy to act 
toward state goals (Sikkink 1991), and others going further to define state capacity as the ability 
of a state to make and enforce policies that deliver goods to the public and firms (Besley and 
Persson 2011), or that improve the quality of life of their citizens (Acemoglu, Garcia-Jimeno, 
and Robinson 2014). In chapter two the way state capacity is defined in this project is outlined in 
detail.  
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 When attempting to conceptualize what makes a state with high capacity, most scholars 
look to Weber’s writings (1919/1958). Weber’s idea that a state must have a monopoly on the 
use of force within a given territory and have a strong rational-legal bureaucracy undergirds 
nearly all conceptions of state capacity. Skocpol (1985) builds on Weber by identifying five 
different facets of state capacity (1) sovereign integrity, (2) financial resources, (3) loyal and 
skilled officials, (4) stable administrative-military control, and (5) authority and institutional 
mechanisms to employ resources. Conceptions of state capacity generally boil down to the 
“tripartite conception” that encompass some level and combination of military or coercive 
capacity, the quality and consistency of the bureaucracy, and the state’s ability to extract 
resources from society (see Cardenas 2010; Hendrix 2008, 2010; Hanson and Seligman 2011).6 
As illustrated by Figure 1.1, all three factors are deeply inter-related. For example, without 
coercive capacity it is unlikely there is enough political stability to raise revenue. Without a 
strong high quality bureaucracy accurate revenue accounting and collection is impossible and 
coercive capacity weakens. Finally, without revenue a state is unlikely to have either coercive 
capacity or a strong bureaucracy as government employees and soldiers do not work for free.7 
All three of these factors are thought to be a function of strong, high-quality institutions, and the 
next section goes into detail about different ways they have been conceptualized and measured as 
part of state capacity.  
 
                                                          
6 Scholars combine different components in unique ways. Hendrix (2010) separates the “quality” of a bureaucracy 
from the “coherence” of the bureaucracy, and does not give extractive capacity its own category. Cardenas 
distinguishes between all four components, and Hanson and Seligman merge quality and consistency together, 
into “administrative capacity.”   
7 Adam Smith also identified three core functions of the state. These included the provisions of defense, justice, 
and public works and public institutions. He notes that providing all three was impossible without tradeoffs (1902 
volume 3 book 5).  
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1.3 Institutional Measures of State Capacity 
 Despite the observation that the different dimensions of state capacity are related, for the 
sake of parsimony or conceptual clarity scholars often try to find unidimensional measures that 
represent state capacity as a whole, or at least most of the concept. These scholars claim that one 
dimension of state capacity precedes others, and therefore can be used to represent state capacity 
as a whole (Cardenas 2010). Sometimes this is because studies are trying to explain the influence 
of a specific outcome in relation to a related dimension of state capacity such as the influence of 
low quality corrupt bureaucracy on economic growth, or the influence of a weak military on the 
likelihood of civil conflict. Other times researchers make the argument that state capacity is 
simply captured totally by one measure, such as a state’s wealth. Table 1.1 summarizes a number 
of attempts to conceptualize and operationalize state capacity using unidimensional measures 
meant to capture institutional quality. Many of these conceptualizations were used to explain 
civil conflict, which could help explain the institutional focus, since as opposed to geography and 
resources that is a changeable state attribute. That said, obviously some of the indicators are 
resource based, but they are intended to represent the quality of a state’s institutions instead of 
just the raw amount of the resource itself. In the following sub-sections these  unidimensional 
operationalizations of state capacity that emphasize institutions are explored before moving to a 
discussion of the potential role geography, climate, and resources play in conceptualizations of 
state capacity.8  
 1.3.1 Wealth 
 In their article on ethnicity and civil conflict, Fearon and Laitin (2003) explain the 
capacity of the state relative to the capacity of potential insurgents. In doing so, they use national 
                                                          
8 The following section draws heavily on literature reviews in Cardenas (2010) Hendrix (2010) and Hanson and 
Seligman (2011).  
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wealth (GDP per capita) as a proxy of state capacity. Even though this is a resource based 
indicator it is actually used in this case to capture the administrative and coercive capacity of the 
state. 
By employing GDP per capita they assume that wealth is strongly correlated with repressive 
capacity and administrative capacity: “higher per capita income should be associated with lower 
risk of civil war onset because (a) it is a proxy for a state’s overall financial, administrative, 
police, and military capabilities, and (b) it will mark more-developed countries with terrain more 
‘disciplined’ by roads and rural society more penetrated by central administration” (Fearon and 
Laitin 2003, 80). For them, wealth is a catch-all proxy able to represent all of the latent elements 
of state capacity.9  
Similarly Young (2009), in an analysis of state capacity and human rights, uses wealth as 
part of a conceptualization of state capacity. He writes, “…the government’s relative bargaining 
power is a function of the resources it controls. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the most direct 
measure of the pool of resources available for a state to extract.”10 Young does not combine this 
measure with any other dimensions of state capacity prior to his analysis on his outcomes of 
interest, human rights. This means that the way wealth combines with other dimensions of state 
capacity cannot be determined. For example, if the citizens of a state are wealthy, which could 
explain high GDP, but the government is unable to extract any revenue from that wealth then the 
bargaining position between the government and society might actually be reversed, which 
wealthy elite holding all the cards. Furthermore, using wealth as a proxy for state capacity, 
                                                          
9 From an international perspective this approach mirrors Mearsheimer (2001) who uses wealth as a proxy for 
power, which he defines as the capacity to make war.  
10 Young (2009) also uses measures of leader insecurity for leaders and election from Cheibub (1998), and 
population size to complete his conceptualization and measure of state capacity.  
 
 
21 
 
means the researcher is precluded from using state capacity as an explanatory variable for 
economic growth, or for economic development, due to concerns about endogenity.  
1.3.2 Military/Coercive Capacity 
 Similarly, many see military capacity as indicative of bureaucratic and fiscal capacity 
and, therefore a good representative measure of state capacity. For example, Cardenas argues 
that “military capacity is largely a reflection of the state’s ability to collect taxes and deliver 
public goods” (2010, 3).  
Such thinking is often justified by referring to studies showing a military build-up in 
response to both domestic (Cohen, Brown and Organski 1981) and international threats 
(Organski and Kugler 1980) is the catalyst for increased state bureaucratic and fiscal strength 
(Tilly 1978). It also references back to the original thinker of state capacity, Weber. Weber 
argued that a fundamental attribute of a state is the monopoly on the legitimate use of force 
within its borders. Therefore, for some scholars, the state’s war making ability is so intimately 
tied to its capacity to make war and use force both abroad and domestically, that a state’s 
military capabilities represents an all-encompassing proxy for state capacity as a whole.  
Of course, domestic and international coercive capacities are two fundamentally different 
things. From an international perspective and for inter-state war, the most important indicator of 
military capacity involves the size and level of sophistication of a state’s military. Mearsheimer 
(2001) includes the size of a state’s military and its potential military, as well as military 
spending as a key component of power in the international sphere. Of course in this case, the 
largest states, such as the United States, China, and Russia, with the biggest populations and 
budgets will be at the top of the list, followed by mid-sized countries that prioritize national 
defense. For understating domestic coercive capacity on the other hand, the salient piece of  
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Table 1.1: Studies Operationalizing State Capacity with Institutional Measures 
Indicator Author  Year Concept 
Outcome Being 
Explained 
GDP Per Capita Fearon and Laitin 2003 Wealth Civil Conflict 
Military Personnel Waymann et al. 1983 Coercive Civil Conflict 
Military Personnel DeRouen & Sobek 2004 Coercive Civil Conflict 
Military Personnel Walter 2006 Coercive Civil Conflict 
Military Spending Henderson & Singer 2000 Corruption Civil Conflict 
Bureaucratic Quality DeRouen & Sobek 2004 Bureaucratic Quality Civil Conflict 
Bureaucratic Quality Feaon  2005 Bureaucratic Quality Civil Conflict 
Taxes/Expected Taxes Buhaug 2010 Bureaucratic Quality Civil Conflict 
Taxes/Expected Taxes Theis  2010 Bureaucratic Quality Civil Conflict 
Prime Com Exports Collier & Hoeffler 2004 Rentier Institutions  Civil Conflict 
Oil Reserves Humphreys 2005 Rentier Institutions Civil Conflict 
Taxes Trade/GDP Baunsgaard and Keen  2010 Rentier Institutions Growth 
Oil Product/GDP Chaudry 1989 Rentier Institutions For Aid/Invest 
Oil Production/GDP Karl 1997 Rentier Institutions Pol/Econ Dev 
Expropriation Risk North 1981 Rentier Institutions Growth 
Expropriation Risk Knack & Keefer 1995 Institutions/Judiciary Growth 
Expropriation Risk Acemoglu et al. 2001 Institutions/Judiciary Growth 
Investor Confidence DiGiuseppe et al. 2012 State Capacity Civil Conflict 
Transitional Regimes Tilly  1978 Stability Civil Conflict 
Polity2Squared Hegre et al.  2001 Stability Civil Conflict 
Scalar Index of Poliites Gates et al 2006 Stability Civil Conflict 
Polity2 DeRouen & Sobek 2004 Democracy Civil Conflict 
Taxes/Expected Taxes Englehart 2009 Resources Human Rights 
Corruption Englehart 2009 Bureaucratic Qual Human Rights 
Independent Judiciary Englehart 2009 Ind. Judiciary Human Rights 
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Coercive Capacity 
Administrative Capacity Extractive Capacity 
Figure 1.1:  Tripartite Conception of State Capacity 
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information is the ratio of military personnel to the overall population, and the ratio of military 
spending to GDP or total government spending.  
The most commonly used database of military capacity is the Correlates of War (COW) 
(Singer 1987) data on military personnel per capita and military spending per capita. Numerous 
studies have employed this data to explain outcomes such as the likelihood of civil conflict, the 
likelihood, length, and duration of inter-state war, economic growth, and the ability to collect 
taxes (Mason and Fett 1996; Mason, Weingarten, and Fett 1999; Balch-Lindsey and Enterline 
2000; DeRouen and Sobek 2004; Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce 2008; Walter 2006).11  
1.3.3 Administrative/Bureaucratic Quality 
 Others argue that bureaucratic/administrative capacity encompasses all of the key 
elements of state capacity. Moreover, high quality bureaucracies are often seen as the primary 
source of state capacity because they institutionalize the “rules of the game”, a characteristic 
many identify as the most important factor for ensuring peace and prosperity (Reynolds 1983; 
Przeworski et al. 2000; Keefer 2008; and McBride et al. 2011). For example, professionalized 
bureaucracies are considered crucial to economic growth because bureaucracies are necessary to 
monitor and protect property rights and ensure credible commitments through contract 
enforcement (North 1982, 1990; Weingast 1995; Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; North and 
Weingast 2009). To operationalize bureaucratic quality, scholars have a tendency to use direct 
survey measures of bureaucratic quality and expropriation risk (DeRouen and Sobek 2004; 
Fearon 2005). From this perspective, quality bureaucracies are measured based on their 
commitment to being rational-legal bureaucracies, which is based on factors such as (1) lack of 
corruption (2) high quality independent judicial systems (3) a meritocratic civil service (4) the 
                                                          
11 Henderson and Singer (2000) argue that military spending is associated with high levels of corruption, which can 
actually lead to societal grievances and decrease political stability.  
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ability to make credible economic commitments, and (5) the risk of expropriation for private 
actors.12  
Another way of measuring the quality of a state’s bureaucracy is to examine the structure 
of a state’s economy. It is posited that states relying more heavily on natural resources, or 
primary commodity exports (PCEs), as a proportion of their economy must have a weak 
bureaucracy because it is unable or unwilling to develop a more dynamic economy (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004; Humphreys 2005; Fearon 2005).13 Over-reliance on natural resources and PCEs is 
considered indicative of rent seeking or rentier-states or states that gain all their revenue from 
resource extraction or easily taxed goods. “Rents” is an economic term for when excess returns 
are generated above and beyond what is expected by the market due to a positional advantage 
(Tollison 1982).  
One characteristic of rentier-states is political and economic stunting, sometimes referred 
to as “Dutch disease”,14 due to the state’s failure to create value-added technologically advanced 
products (Karl 1997; Ross 1999, 2004). Another problem for a state that relies on one or two 
commodities, such as oil or coffee, makes that state’s economy extremely vulnerable to the 
inevitable price shocks brought on by the global business cycle, and supply and demand. This 
means that these states are susceptible to what Gurr (1970) identified as a “relative deprivation” 
or the gap between expectations and reality. This problem leads to civil conflict which can lead 
                                                          
12 The first three factors are contained within the International Country Risk Guides (ICRG) surveys and all five are 
contained in the Political Risk Services Group (PRSG) surveys. 
13 The PCE data found in Fearon (2005) and Humphreys (2005) are based on commodities defined in the Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC): SITC 0: food and live animals which include foodstuffs such as wheat 
coffee, sugar, and livestock. SITC 1: beverages and tobacco. SITC 2: inedible crude materials which include: textiles, 
rubber, and wood products. SITC 3: mineral fuels, lubricants, and related materials which include oil, coal, natural 
gas. SITC 4: animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes. SITC 68: nonferrous metals: silver, copper, nickel, aluminum, 
lead, and tin. 
14 The term “Dutch Disease” was coined by The Economist in 1977 due to the discovery of natural gas in the North 
Sea and the subsequent decline in governmental spending in the Netherlands on the agricultural and 
manufacturing sectors (The Economist 2014).  
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to a spiral of civil conflict, poorer growth, followed by even deeper conflict.  Gurr writes, “Men 
are quick to aspire beyond their social means and quick to anger when those means prove 
inadequate, but slow to accept their limitations” (1970, 58). This observation becomes doublely 
true in the boom and bust cycles rentier states are particularly susceptible to, due to their reliance 
on one or two commodities for growth. Not adjusting to this reality is indicative of a lack of 
sophistication, and willingness amongst leaders, and the bureaucracy to invest in alternative 
sources of economic growth. Finally, an over-reliance on primary commodities can lead to civil 
conflict in another way, if these resources are easily captured they represent a tempting target for 
rebel groups who can cut of a major source of government funding while simultaneously funding 
their own rebellion (Ross 2006; Collier and Hoeffler 2004).  
To determine if a state is a rentier state or not, scholars typically use data from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) on the amount and type of goods that are exported by a given 
country and the ratio of those goods to GDP. Specifically, oil and natural gas, and diamonds are 
the most popular commodities included in studies of instability and civil conflict (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004; Fearon 2005; Humphreys 2005; Ross 2006). Fearon (2005) argues that if a state’s 
oil exports represent thirty percent or more of a state’s GDP then that state is most likely a rentier 
state others simply examine rentierness on a continuum, assuming that as these commodities 
become larger percentages of GDP their rentierness rises. Additionally, the WDI now contain a 
specific measure of oil rents which measure the revenue extracted by the state from oil 
production above and beyond the cost of producing that oil.  
1.3.4 Administrative/Bureaucratic Consistency/Coherence 
 Some scholars focus on the coherence of state institutions as an indicator of state capacity 
(Back and Hadenius 2008). It is often argued that states with a combination of democratic and 
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autocratic institutions are more unstable than states that are completely democratic or completely 
autocratic (Mansfield and Snyder 2002, 2002a). These states, termed “anocracies” (Gurr 1974), 
are the most likely to experience civil conflict (Hegre et al. 2001; Regan 2005) and to violently 
repress their citizenries (Fein 1995).15 Anocracies have these difficulties because leaders feel 
threatened by institutions that might check their power (Gates et al 2006) or empower other elites 
that could seize power (Highley and Burton 1989). Due to this infighting, leaders have a difficult 
time marshalling resources to crush rebellions, defend against outside attack, or formulate 
coherent economic policies that ultimately lead to economic growth.  
 Embedded in the importance placed on this concept in the state stability/capacity 
literature is the assumption that states are always transitioning between democracy and 
dictatorship until they reach an equilibrium, usually at either one end of the spectrum or the 
other. Similarly, as Cheibub (1998) and Young (2009) argue, elections are when leaders or the 
ruling elite are at their weakest, and in anything other than a fully consolidated democracy, 
where democracy is “the only game in town”, elections can make leaders lash out to protect their 
interests. This usually results in repression of the population which can spark unrest or full scale 
rebellion. Indeed, work by those who study post conflict resolution and state building (Toft 2008; 
Autesserre 2010) and human rights (Richards and Gelleny 2007) suggest elections bring large 
challenges for weak states. Specifically, the weakness and uncertainty elections bring means that 
partially democratic countries are weaker and less able to make and enforce policy than fully 
democratic or fully autocratic states. Scholars typically operationalize mixed regimes using 
                                                          
15 The debate about what anocracies are and how they influence civil war onset is not settled. Some scholars 
define anocracies broadly as simply having a mix of democratic and authoritarian characteristics (Fearon and Laitin 
2003). Others see anocracy as having specific institutional arrangements such as dictatorships with legislatures 
(Gandhi and Vreeland 2004). For summaries of this debate see Regan and Bell (2010).  
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databases such as Polity (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2013) or the Scalar Index of Polities (SIP) 
(Gates et al. 2006).  
1.3.5 Extractive Capacity 
One of the most popular unidimensional conceptualizations of state capacity is the state’s 
ability to collect taxes. This is often termed “extractive capacity” (Hanson and Sigman 2011) or 
“fiscal capacity” (Cardenas 2010). Collecting taxes is seen as a fundamental task of the state 
(Levi 1988). 16  North (1981, 21) even defines the state as “an organization with a comparative 
advantage in violence, extending over a geographic area whose boundaries are determined by its 
power to tax constituents.” Those scholars who argue that the ability to collect taxes is the best 
indicator of state capacity make this claim based on the fact that collecting taxes requires a 
relatively sophisticated bureaucracy; some combination of coercion, cooperation, and tax 
collection. The bureaucracy can monitor and enforce tax law through coercion, and voluntary 
action from the citizenry (Braithwaite 2010).17.  
 Attempts to operationalize extractive capacity include the ratio of taxes collected to 
overall GDP (Cheibub 1998; Fauvelle-Aymar 1999; Besley and Persson 2009; Theis 2010), the 
proportion of tax collected to total revenue (Steinmo 1993), and the ratio of taxes collected 
versus expected tax revenue (Kugler and Arbetman 1997). The ratio of collected taxes to 
expected tax revenue is known as “relative political capacity” (Arbetman-Rabinowitz and 
Johnson 2007) and attempts to deal with the problem—summarized by Lieberman (2002)—that 
                                                          
16 Levi (1988) argues that the desire of the leadership to extract revenues gives rise to the modern state, because 
the leadership is forced to build institutions to monitor and collect revenue generated in its territory. These 
institutions eventually check the power of the leadership and reduce its bargaining power vis-à-vis other societal 
actors. In the end, the apparatus originally constructed by the leader to fulfill their own designs on increased 
revenue extraction constrains them.  
17 Cheibub (1998) argues that taxation is a way to measure the ability of governments to impose unpopular 
policies.  
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revenue is much harder to raise in some countries than others due to the nature of their 
economies. Kugler and Arbetman (1997) control for this by generating an expected tax yield 
based on the proportion of a state’s GDP coming from different sectors and juxtapose this 
against the amount of taxes actually collected. The gap between the two represents the relative 
“political capacity” of the state.18 
 1.3.6 Accountability 
 Clearly, the state’s relative administrative, coercive, and extractive capacities are all 
important, but the question remains, what explains the state’s ability to effectively make and 
implement policies? One potential answer is the degree of connectivity between the state and 
society, yet another way some scholars conceptualize state capacity.  The state-society 
relationship is often thought of as crucial to a state’s ability to provide public goods necessary for 
peace and prosperity. Evans refers to this concept as “state-society synergy” (1997) which 
reflects the degree and form of the connections between the state and actors in civil society 
through formalized relationships. He argues that the level of connectivity between the state and 
civil society, and the form of those connections, aids understanding successful policy outcomes 
versus unsuccessful ones across a range of issues.19 This argument mirrors the work of Ostrom 
(1997), who argues that the government must tap into societal resources in order to solve 
collective action problems associated with resource management.   
                                                          
18 Kugler and Arbetman (1997) primarily determine the expected tax yield based on a state’s GDP plus revenue 
that comes from trade and from natural resources. They argue that these factors are much easier to tax and raise 
the expected tax yield for that state. This rationale is explained further in Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Johnson 
(2007).  
19 The nature and form of connections between the public and private sector is often hypothesized as a key 
explanatory factor in industrial and trade policy, but it is noted by many that it is still under-developed (Alt and 
Gilligan 1994; Lake 2009) 
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 Evans identifies two different types of connections that span the “public-private divide” 
and create synergy—“complementarity” and “embeddedness” (1995, 189). Both concepts are 
necessary but not sufficient conditions for synergy on their own and they make synergistic 
capacity closely linked to other forms of capacity. Complementarity reflects the conventional 
notion that the state can provide certain collective goods that private actors cannot and vice-
versa. Effective complementarity requires resources, and therefore is related most closely to the 
extractive capacity of the state (Ostrom 1997).20 The concept of embeddedness captures the 
degree that state actors and private actors work together to find solutions to problems they were 
unable to solve on their own. Embeddedness, as Evans (1995) understands it, arises when state 
institutions foster connections with society but maintain an appropriate separation to avoid 
rampant corruption and clientelism. Evans claims that productive forms of state-society relations 
as leading to “embedded autonomy” (Evans 1995).21 In this way, embeddedness is closely related 
to elements of administrative capacity that lead to coherent, corporate bureaucracies with 
meritocratic advancement and competitive salaries. However, institutional structures must also 
allow for connections that bridge the public-private divide, something rarely included in standard 
measures of administrative capacity.  
 Another related way to think about the importance of accountability is in its relationship 
to a state’s ability to adapt to changing circumstances. Many claim that accountability is an 
element of “adaptive capacity,” and without institutionalized accountability states are unable and 
                                                          
20 In an analysis of the deplorable state of the Nigerian educational system, Ostrom (1997) argues that the primary 
problem was the absence of complementarity, or the inability of the state to help communities solve the problem 
by providing resources. 
21 The importance of state society separation is noted by Wildavsky who argues, “planners begin by attempting to 
transform their environment and end by being absorbed into it” (1973, 128). Evans’ (1995) idea of embedded 
autonomy rejects that complete absorption is inevitable.  
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unwilling to tap into societal knowledge to make effective policy changes and manage common 
collective action problems (Adger 2003; Brooks, Adger, and Kelly 2005).22  
Ultimately, the prominence granted accountability in ideas like synergy and adaptive 
capacity in studies of state performance, illustrates the importance of accountability to a concept 
of state capacity. Accountability is a central component of democratic theory, which argues that 
a population’s ability to hold its leaders accountable prevents or alters disastrous policies that do 
not serve the public good (O’Donnell 1996, 2004).23 Additionally, as Evans (1995, 1997) 
suggests, accountability allows for a public process of improvement which can lead to better 
policy formulation at the outset. It is well documented that different institutional structures 
influence the relationship between society and the state, thus including measures of different 
governmental institutions are key to measuring the accountability capacity of the state (Kitschelt 
1986, 2000). Of course, by definition, more-authoritarian regimes will be less accountable and 
more-democratic regimes more accountable to society, but that conceptualization is rather crude 
and tells us little about the wide variety within types of democracies and within types of 
authoritarian regimes (Collier and Levitsky 1997). 
 
1.4 Resources, Geography, & Climate 
After the preceding section the importance of the quality and type of institutions in the 
state capacity literature should be clear. What is less clear is the role that resources—outside of 
their role in the poor institutions in rentier states—geography, and climate, play in state capacity. 
The rest of this chapter is dedicated to demonstrating the importance geography, climate, and 
                                                          
22 The concept of “adaptive capacity” is a popular explanation amongst scholars of environmental science for the 
varying ability of states to deal with climate change (Adger 2003).  
23 O’Donnell’s (1996) well known conceptual division between “horizontal” and “vertical” accountability captures 
the importance of this different forms of accountability to the state-society relationship.  
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resources play in the state capacity literature and thus in a valid conceptualization and measure 
of the concept.  
2.4.1 Geography and Climate 
The effect of geography and climate on state level outcomes is highly contested. 
Diamond (1997) popularized the argument that the relative level of development of different 
civilizations could be attributed to geographically determined resource endowments rather than 
any cultural, racial, or even institutional factors. He claimed that the historical dominance of 
Europe can be explained by its East-West axis, which makes crops easier to promulgate. Its 
abundance of large, easy to tame, animals allowing for better food production, war making, and 
germ immunization. Finally, a huge advantage is the fact that it Europe is located in a temperate 
rather than tropical climate making disease and crops easier to control. The argument that 
geography is a crucial factor in political and economic development is critiqued on two fronts. 
First, by those that claim geographical explanations are simply rationalizations for the 
dominance of Europe during the colonial and post-colonial periods (Sauer 1956, Sluyter 2001). 
Second, are those who contend that institutions trump the effect of geography in explaining 
political, economic, and social outcomes (Simon 1981, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001, 
Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004).  
To rebut these two critiques Hendrix (2008) argues that employing physical geography as 
an explanatory variable solves two key problems. First, it solves the vexing question of what 
determines existing distributions of state power and capabilities. He writes, “Institutions cannot 
provide the answer to that question because they cannot cause the circumstances that led to their 
creation” (2008, 19).  Second, he points out that it avoids potential tautological arguments that 
can arise from assuming geography exerts no influence over culture. In other words, like 
 
 
33 
 
institutions, culture must come from somewhere. For example, Moore’s seminal study of how 
political regimes arise explicitly begins with geography, climate, and resources which determines 
the primary industries in a country, and therefore its distribution of labor, capital, and agriculture 
(Moore 1966). Put simply, “agrarian cultures,” are necessarily tied to the geography and climate 
that allowed agriculture to arise just as the presence of horses on the Asian steppes produced the 
nomadic people who would become the Mongolian empire. Geography and climate were critical 
to the development of these cultures and their behavior. Therefore, following Hendrix (2008), 
this project includes indicators of geographically determined resource endowments, along with 
climate.  
Where this study differs from the work of Hendrix (2008) and others is that geography, 
climate, and resources are included in the overall conception of state capacity rather than kept as 
separate intervening or control variables. Figure 1.3 illustrates how the relationship between 
geography and state capacity is treated by much of the literature and how that contrasts with how 
the relationship is treated in this project. As is evident from the portion of 1.3 under “this 
project,” here geography, climate, and resources are treated as endogenous rather than exogenous 
to state capacity. As argued above, this is justified because structural factors such as geography 
often form the frontiers of a state’s capacity potential, and they interact with other state features 
to form new types of state capacity.  
 1.4.2 Mountainous Terrain 
The hypothesized links between geography and social & economic outcomes are numerous. 
Mountainous terrain is thought to reduce the state’s ability to administer programs and also to 
extract resources from the population (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; 
Young 2009). Additionally, more-challenging terrain is often attributed to the likelihood of 
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conflict due the ability of rebel groups to use terrain to their advantage such as to launch guerilla 
wars, and build strongholds (Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala 2009). Attempting to control these 
mountainous areas is a massive drain on state resources that could otherwise be used to more 
productive ends. Cederman (2004) offers a different take on the link between mountainous 
terrain and civil conflict arguing that mountainous terrain is simply a proxy for ethno religious 
groups that view themselves as separate from the state. These separatists often arise out of 
societies that were at one time completely cut off from the central government of the territory in 
which they live and indeed, Cederman (2004) finds that these types of groups are much more 
likely to arise in mountainous areas.  
Among the huge number and variety of indicators used in the study of civil conflict, one 
constant is that mountainous terrain is a statistically significant correlate of civil war onset. This 
is in stark contrast to another indicator that offers intuitively similar causal mechanisms, forest 
cover. Forest cover is generally not a significant predictor of civil conflict or other problems 
associated with lower state capacity (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). In a more recent test of the 
causal mechanisms above Hendrix (2011) argues that there are a number of indirect and direct 
effects that exacerbate the effect mountainous terrain on civil conflict, most notably, that 
sustainable economic activity is severely limited, and therefore drives countries into the 
compounding effect of relying on mined commodities which, as discussed in the first part of this 
chapter, leads to rentier tendencies.  
The most extensive measure of mountainous terrain is from Collier and Hoeffler 2004. 
This measure, captures “rugged terrain” rather than simply differences in elevation (2004, 570). 
For example large portions of Asia are high plateaus and therefore appear to be mountainous 
when elevation is used, but they are not rough and therefore provide little cover for rebels and  
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are not difficult to build infrastructure through compared to areas where elevation changes 
constantly. 
1.4.3 Coastal Land 
Another way geography may influence state capacity is through the state’s access to the 
ocean. Scholars dating back to Adam Smith recognized access to navigable waterways as 
important to economic growth. More recently, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005) 
demonstrate that access to the Atlantic Ocean was a pivotal factor explaining differing levels of 
development in Europe from 1500 to today. Similarly, according to Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger 
(1999), access to the ocean is important to economic growth due to lower transportation costs. 
Hausman writes, “It is estimated that for every one kilometer goods are shipped over-land they 
could be shipped 7 kilometers by see for the same cost” (2001, 47). Today there is little doubt 
that navigable waterways and deep water ports are a critical component of any state’s economy. 
Several major geopolitical struggles of the 20th century often involved ocean access and the 
success of the United States is often attributed to its extensive coastlines on two major oceans 
(Rappaport and Sachs 2003).  
Additionally coastline offers natural borders and barriers to migration and invasion, two 
phenomena that can damage a state’s capacity. The United States, famously, has not endured an 
invasion of foreign troops during the twentieth or twenty-first centuries, due in large part to the 
fact that it is bordered by only two other countries and two oceans. The United States’ access to 
two oceans is also a formidable advantage in trade and economic development. Finally, the fact 
that the United States has many major ports and naval bases allows the U.S. to project power all 
over the world quickly and easily. Russia’s centuries-long struggle to control warm water ports is 
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evidence of the importance states place on ocean access for both national defense and economic 
reasons.  
1.4.4 Proximity to Major Ports 
Proximity to “core markets” as operationalized by distance to the major ports of 
Rotterdam, Tokyo, and New York is also thought to be a geographical influence on state 
capacity, particularly vis-à-vis economic growth (Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger 1999). Trade is 
crucial to economic growth for any state, and the distance to the major markets for trade has been 
shown to influence growth and the ability of the state to integrate into the international economy 
(Krugman 1991). Gallup,  Sachs, and Mellinger (1999) show that Africa, for example, in 
addition to being mostly tropical, possessing few navigable waterways, and containing a largely 
landlocked population, is at huge disadvantage because of the massive distance between its 
population centers and core markets. This causes much larger transaction costs in the production 
and transportation of goods. To a lesser extent India and South America suffer from similar 
shortcomings (1999, 182). Therefore, distance to major ports, despite technological advances in 
shipping and transportation, remains a crucial element of a state’s capacity.  
1.4.5 Climate 
Climate is also hypothesized to influence state capacity. One climate factor linked to state 
capacity is the state’s proximity to the tropics. Tropical locations are associated with many 
diseases, specifically Malaria (Sachs and Malaney 2002), that affect outcomes such as economic 
development and make providing goods and services more difficult for the government (Sachs 
and Warner 2001). Conversely, states with large amounts of land in temperate climates generally 
have more advantages when it comes to political and economic development due to the lack of 
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many tropical diseases, more predictable weather patterns, and more arable land (Gallup and 
Sachs 1999).  
Of course, a state’s climate and geography are related, but not perfectly. Geography 
captures a state’s terrain and also its geo-spatial position on the globe, while climate captures the 
state’s ability to use its land to raise beneficial crops such as cereal grains (Hibbs and Olson 
2004). Additionally, a state’s climate can be indicative of the likelihood of a state having to deal 
with environmental catastrophes such as severe drought and severe storms that can be extremely 
destabilizing (Hendrix and Salehyan 2012). Furthermore, there is little doubt today that climate 
is changing, and some have claimed that climate change may affect states in different ways 
depending on the presence or absence of a host of other factors (Adger 2003).  
Remarkably, given the importance of climate and geography to a number of outcomes of 
interest, and the growing proliferation of satellite imagery, high quality cross-national measures 
of climate and geographical features like mountainous terrain, rainfall, and climate are relatively 
scarce. One option is a general measure called the “climate scale” which is developed by Hibbs 
and Olsson (2004) and captures the favorability of a state’s climate to the production of key 
cereal grains on a 1-4 ordinal scale. Another option to capture climate volatility is to examine 
annual rainfall totals, but these are only available for a few states, Shanker (2004). Gallup, Sachs, 
and Mellinger (1999) employ a measure of the percentage of a state’s territory that is temperate-
wet and temperate-dry, as well as the percentage of a state’s land that is in tropical climes 
(located between the latitudes marked by the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic of Capricorn) to 
determine the effect of climate on economic growth. These measures are the broadest available 
and exist for most countries.   
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1.5 Material and Social Resources 
In addition to geography and climate, a number of studies show that physical and social 
resources influence state capacity. As mentioned above, particularly in the study of comparative 
political development, bountiful resources can be detriment to a state achieving political, 
economic, and social advancement because of the “resource curse” (Karl 1997, Ross 2004, 
Putnam 1994, Paxton 2002).  Yet, state power (Mearsheimer 2001), and economic growth (Sachs 
and Warner 1997) are both linked to the resources a state has at its disposal. However, similar to 
geography and climate, they are often treated as exogenous influences on state capacity rather 
than endogenous elements of state capacity itself.  
Similarly, social resources are often marginalized when it comes to explanations of state 
capacity. The term “social resources” refers to the importance of “social capital” (Putnam 1993; 
Helliwell and Putnam 1995; Woolcock 1998) and “social cohesion” (Jensen 1998; Maxwell 
1996) which helps societies cooperate and trust each other much more and therefore make more 
efficient and effective states. Social capital and cohesion represent resources for a state to tap in 
order to generate economic growth, make and enforce policy, and generally act toward state 
interests. The assumption underlying the marginalization of social resources in the state capacity 
literature—as with physical resources, geography, and climate—is that institutions can conquer 
all. Yet numerous findings point to the conclusion that when social resources are absent, 
institutions fail to materialize or when they do they operate badly (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 
1999; Easterly, Ritzan, Woolcock 2006) 
1.5.1 Material Resources  
Attention on the relationship between stocks of physical resources and state institutions is 
particularly pronounced in the study of international relations (IR) where many scholars argue 
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these two factors define a state’s power relative to other states (Snider 1987). Resources, such as 
oil, coal, natural gas, food, water, and the state’s size and population are all thought to influence 
a state’s ability to remain autonomous in a globalized economy (Keohane and Nye 1977; Gilpin 
1987; Lake 1988). For these scholars, a state’s resources, factor endowments, and the societal 
relationships they engender, change its ability to take action both domestically and 
internationally (Gourevitch 1978, 1986, 2002; Rogowski 1988), and therefore, these elements 
potentially influence state capacity.  
 Resources are also a crucial factor in determining a state’s potential capacity. Resources 
interact with characteristics of a state’s government, and according to some this relationship 
largely predicts to what extent a state’s absolute potential capacity can be realized. As Krasner 
notes,  
 
The potential or maximum international power of the state, the power that could 
be derived from all the resources controlled by its citizens relative to those of 
other societies, establishes only the outer boundaries of state power (1978, 57).  
 
For Krasner, it is the combination of domestic political structures and the convergence of private 
and public interests that allow a state to use its resources and maximize its power. Relative 
power is crucial to state capacity because it is well established in international relations 
scholarship that relative capabilities between states influence a state’s ability to remain 
autonomous on issues such as trade policy and industrial policy which, it is argued, can have a 
dramatic effect on the ability of a state to govern (Gilpin 2001, Katzenstein 1985, Lake 1988). 
Therefore, measures are included to capture the material resources of a state such as oil, natural 
gas, coal, and iron all of which are so-called “power resources” according to Krasner (1978).  
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 In addition, measures of population, internal renewable water, and agricultural land are 
included as potential power resources. Mearsheimer (2001) 24, among others argues that state 
population is important because people are potential soldiers so population will determine 
military capability. Lake (1988) stresses the importance of the size of domestic markets in 
determining the ability of a state to dictate trade terms and be powerful in the global economy. 
Of course, with large populations comes challenges, larger societies are more difficult to control 
(Bruckner 2010), can contain more social divisions, and large states are often saddled with the 
task of providing international goods such as trade regulation and international security (Lake 
1993). Nevertheless, the influence of population on state capacity needs to be considered. Water 
is another crucial resource, because of the importance in domestic food production, power 
generation, and sustenance (Brooks et al. 2005). Many states rely on water resources that span 
international borders and therefore, states with control over water resources hold distinct 
advantages in international bargaining (Khagram 2004).   
1.5.2 Social Resources 
Social resources are another factor that must be considered when conceptualizing state 
capacity. Social resources, often thought of as “human capital,” provide the raw materials in the 
form of highly educated citizens which can work in government, and the private sector to deliver 
good economic and social outcomes for a state (Grindle 2009). One important facet of social 
resources that many argue is essential to successful governance and economic growth is the 
relative stock of social capital existent in a given state (Putnam 1994, 2000). The 
conceptualization of state capacity posited here includes social capital because it undergirds all 
                                                          
24 Mearsheimer also focuses on wealth in his operationalization of a state’s potential power (2001, 56). Scholars 
often focus on “potential economic power” and employ a state’s share of world trade and worker productivity 
(Krasner 1976, Lake 1988).  
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other social resources. However, social capital is a notoriously difficult concept to measure in 
either quantitative or qualitative settings (Kubik 1998, 132). Cross-national attempts to measure 
social capital typically focus on several characteristics of the society within a state. First, a 
popular measure is the degree of societal divisions within a state. It is argued that more social 
divisions render social capital more difficult to develop and are indicative of a lack of social 
capital which binds society together. Measures of societal divisions include various measures of 
ethnic fractionalization, religious fractionalization, linguistic fractionalization, and/or some 
combination of all three (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Amorim, Neto, and Cox 1997; 
Lijphart 1999; Fearon 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003).25  
Another common way to operationalize social capital is to look directly at the 
associations believed to breed social capital. In an examination of social capital in the United 
States, Putnam (1995, 2000) examines membership numbers in churches, labor unions, parent-
teacher associations, women’s organizations, the Boy Scouts, and the Red Cross, among others. 
Sources of cross-national data on the number of associations, and their membership, respectively 
include the International Yearbook of Organizations (IYO) (Union of International Associations 
(UIA) 2011) and the World Values Survey (WVS).26 In a study of the relationship between 
democracy and social capital, Paxton (2002) operationalizes social capital using both the WVS 
and the IYO while also identifies some associations that could be detrimental to social capital by 
determining which associations tend to stay isolated from other associations.  
                                                          
25 Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994) and Amorim, Neto, and Cox (1997) focus primarily on ethnic fractionalization 
and examine the number and relative sizes of ethnic groups within a state. Lijphart (1999) expands on this by 
integrating religious and linguistic fractionalization and Fearon (2002) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) employ four 
measures including the Atlas Narovda Mira (1964) or ELF index, among others.  
26 The pertinent WVS survey question for the 2011-2012 (6th wave) asks the respondent to answer whether they 
are an active, inactive, or nonmember in a range of associations.  
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A third way to operationalize social capital is to examine the amount of non-violent elite-
challenging behavior within a particular society. Welzel, Inglehart, and Deutsch (2005) argue 
that elite-challenging behavior can have higher “civic” payoffs than voluntary associations.27 
This is because of the deeper and more complex collective action problems associated with 
actions such as protests, boycotts, and sit-ins, which are considered indicative of high levels of 
social capital and an explanation for growth of social capital. Again, this approach utilizes 
questions in the WVS to ascertain the degree of unconventional political participation. 
 In sum, the inclusion of proxies for social cohesion is important to understanding state 
capacity. WVS is only available for most countries going back to the early and mid 1990s and 
the international yearbook of organizations is extremely difficult to apply cross-nationally. 
Ethnic and religious fractionalization measures are available for most countries and are largely 
static over-time so they can be used for most country years.  
 
1.6 A New Conceptualization of State Capacity 
 By now it should be clear that for one developing a new conceptualization of state 
capacity there is no shortage of potential ingredients to add and subtract. There are numerous 
institutional, social, and physical characteristics of states that are all linked to state capacity in 
many literatures. Moreover, these literatures stem from both the studies of international relations 
and comparative politics with each set of scholars focusing on different sets of indicators. The 
new conceptualization offered below represents the best attempt to combine previous attempts 
into a coherent idea of state capacity. As any effort to conceptualize a complex concept, striking 
                                                          
27 See also Inglehart and Caterberg (2002) who argue that non-violent elite-challenging behavior such as protests, 
petitions, and boycotts, is a symptom of and a cause of a deepening of democracy and thus a greater civic culture. 
See Stockemer and Carbonetti (2010) for a critique of this argument.  
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a balance between being overly abstract and overly specific is an important step. Being overly 
abstract makes creating a valid and reliable measure extremely difficult, since the temptation to 
include too much is high and the concept becomes “stretched” (Sartori 1970). Overly specific 
conceptualizations, however, have limited utility across a variety of studies, and are difficult to 
generalize from. Therefore, given the broad range of outcomes of interest where state capacity is 
used, this project errs on the side of abstract, while also allowing for greater refinement without 
losing the core concept. In the following chapter (chapter 2), however, the underlying theories 
about the relationship between the different conceptual dimensions of state capacity are tested to 
ensure the dimensions proposed here reflect empirical reality.  
 1.6.1 Defining State Capacity  
To develop both a useful and also straightforward conceptualization of state capacity the 
definition needs to be broad and relatively simple. Keeping the definition broad and simple 
allows clarity while also avoiding over-determining the role state capacity plays in certain 
outcomes. As Hanson and Sigman write,  
 
In defining state capacity, “the capacity to do what?” is the first question one 
should ask. State capacity is a multidimensional concept, and the state’s 
capabilities can vary across different functions. Additionally, it is important that 
we think about state capacities as probabilistic or necessary factors, but not 
sufficient ones, for the emergence of particular outcomes. States with large 
coercive apparatuses will not necessarily repress opposition, nor will states with 
capable bureaucracies necessarily experience economic growth. Rather than asses 
state capacities in terms of outcomes, accordingly, our goal in this paper is to 
conceptualize and measure the capacities necessary to achieve certain outcomes 
(2011, 1).  
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Given the importance of allowing state capacity to be a probabilistic rather than outcome 
oriented concept, the definition of state capacity used for this project is as follows: state 
capacity represents the state’s ability to undertake a given action.  
 Based on the survey of the state capacity literature discussed previously in this 
chapter, I argue there are at least five elements that influence state capacity: 1) A state 
requires autonomy from both its people and other states, 2) resources to undertake action 
3) control in order to ensure stability, and an environment where action is possible and 
enforceable, and finally 4) expertise in the form of people within institutions with the 
skills and education to collect resources for action, formulate action, and enforce action.  
These four core elements of state capacity: autonomy, resources, control, and 
expertise, are then a function of seven state attributes including: 1) international power, 
2) social cohesion, 3) extractive capabilities, 4) institutional capabilities, 5) geography, 6) 
coercive capability, 7) rentier capability. All of these attributes are crucial to a state’s 
ability to have autonomy, accountability, resources, control, and expertise.  
The relationship between state capacity’s core elements and key state attributes 
are illustrated in Figure 1.3. Each core element forms the border of a quadrant that 
demarcates where the function of the key state attributes. Everything revolves around the 
definition of state capacity—the ability of a state to take a given action. Figure 1.4 
illustrates where countries might be situated given their state attributes. The closer a state 
is to the center the more of each state attribute they have and thus the more overall state 
capacity they have. Drifting into one quadrant versus another indicates a state has either 
an overabundance of one or two state attributes and an absence of those state attributes it 
is moving away from. 
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The, definition of state capacity and the derived core elements and state attributes 
now form the basis for a conceptualization of state capacity. This conceptualization is 
both broad enough to be useful in many areas of inquiry, but also specific enough to 
allow the researcher to determine what dimensions of state capacity are exerting the most 
influence over the outcome of interest. Moreover, as Figures 1.3 and 1.4 illustrate the list 
of necessary state attributes represents a roadmap to building an empirical measure of 
state capacity that is reliable, valid, and useful.  
 
1.7 Conclusion 
The literature on what attributes make an effective state is broad and diverse. 
Indeed, the question of what improves state capacity has occupied multiple subfields and 
specialties in political science especially the studies of comparative politics and 
international relations. The movement in the late 1970s to “bring the state back in” to the 
analysis of numerous outcomes of interest such as economic growth, civil conflict, inter-
state war, is mostly to thank for the proliferation of the state capacity literature. 
 Yet despite the abundance of research on the topic, attempts to synthesize all of the 
attributes that are thought to effect state capacity are lacking. This is mostly due to attempts to 
capture state capacity parsimoniously using a single indicator like wealth, taxation, or 
bureaucratic quality. This previous work has been very important, as it has greatly increased 
understandings of the importance of each element of state capacity. However, it has failed to 
account for the multidimensional nature of state capacity, and for the fact that all states have 
some degree of each dimension of state capacity which must be accounted for when using it as 
an explanatory variable. Shortcomings in this literature also stem from the overly optimistic 
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belief that institutions can conquer all, including a state’s lack of material and social resources, 
or poor geography and climate. Therefore, chapter two of this dissertation develops and tests the 
relationships between these different theorized dimensions of state capacity, and generates 
corresponding indicators that can be used in analyses of outcomes of interest.  
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Chapter Two 
The Dimensions of State Capacity 
“Let it be stressed, therefore, that long before having data which can speak for themselves 
the fundamental articulation of language and of thinking is obtained logically—by 
cumulative conceptual refinement and chains of coordinated definitions—not by 
measurement. Measurement of what? We cannot measure unless we know first what it is 
we are measuring.” 
     -Giovanni Sartori (1970) 
 
2. 1 Introduction 
 A multidimensional conceptualization of state capacity created in the previous chapter is 
based on the definition: state capacity represents the state’s ability to undertake a given action. I 
posit five core elements of state capacity which include: autonomy, resources, accountability, 
control, and expertise, and seven state attributes which make these five core elements possible: 
international power, social cohesion, extractive capabilities, institutional capabilities, geography, 
coercive capabilities, and rentier capabilities (see Figures 1.3 and 1.4 in the previous chapter). 
The goal of this chapter is to operationalize the conceptualization of state capacity presented in 
chapter one to develop a useful measure that can be used to examine different outcomes of 
interest.  
 
2.2 Methodology 
I argue that state capacity is a multidimensional concept, and any method of generating a 
measure of it should account for that. As explained in the previous chapter, others have theorized 
many different state attributes that are important to state capacity. Moreover, it is often argued 
that state characteristics like institutions, geographical features, and resource endowments 
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interact to form a state’s true level of capacity. However, little has been done to understand the 
relationships between all of the important elements in a state that could influence state capacity. I 
propose to do just that by using principle component factor analysis.  
Factor analysis is a method that allows the researcher to explore the relationships among 
variables, making it a useful tool for understanding, interpreting, and utilizing concepts that 
could be represented by large numbers of different indicators. Factor analysis operates on the 
assumption that “the observed variables are linear combinations of some underlying 
(hypothetical or unobservable) factors” (Kim and Mueller 1978). Put another way, the basic 
element of factor analysis is that multiple observed variables for a given sample have similar 
patterns because they are all correlated, or “load”, strongly on a latent unobservable variable, or 
“factor” (Treier and Jackson 2008; Bartholomew, Deary, and Lawn 2009). Each observation in 
the sample is given a score for each factor which can be used as independent variables in further 
analysis.  
For example, a researcher may want to try to test the relationship between an individual’s 
intelligence and their lifetime earnings. The concept of intelligence could be operationalized in 
many ways such as one’s IQ score, SAT score, grade point average, number of advanced 
degrees, or memory score. Factor analysis can reveal if all of these variables are indeed 
correlated with a latent trait, overall intelligence, or if they correlate with multiple latent traits. If 
the former is true, the researcher could simply pick the variable explaining the most variance in 
the sample of individuals and use that to proxy intelligence. However, if the latter is true it may 
mean that intelligence is multidimensional and some dimensions may be more beneficial to 
lifetime earnings than others. It also allows the researcher to include these different dimensions 
in their model of lifetime earnings without including all of the possible indicators of intelligence. 
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Thus, as illustrated by the example of operationalizing and testing theories about the 
nature of intelligence, being able to tell which “factors” are explaining the most variance in a 
given sample is useful information. The amount of variance explained by each factor is 
expressed by the reported “eigenvalue” following factor analysis. An eigenvalue above 1 
indicates that the underlying factor is explaining more variance in the data than any one variable 
does on its own. For instance an eigenvalue of 2.3 for a particular factor would mean that factor 
is explaining more variance than any two variables in the sample taken together. This is why the 
main criterion for determining when to retain a factor and when to discard it is if that factor’s 
eigenvalue is greater than 1 (Girden and Kabacoff 2010), though considerations about the 
substantive value or sense of the factor should also be incorporated into decisions. Overall 
understanding the proportion of variance each factor explains is important information because it 
can test theories about how many dimensions a concept might actually have.  
Another application of factor analysis is to analyze the validity of an existent measure. 
For example, the Human Development Index (HDI), a cross-national measure of social welfare, 
is often critiqued for being oversimplified and “conceptually weak” (Srinivasan 1994, 241). This 
measure aggregates the scores of indicators of three different indexes based on a few indicators: 
health, education, and standard of living. Among the numerous critiques is that the three 
dimensions are highly correlated, should be weighted differently (instead of equally), and do not 
adequately capture such a complex concept of “human development” (Slottje 1991). However, 
Noorkbakhsh (1998) used factor analysis to determine that the indicators used to create the HDI 
are actually multidimensional and explain approximately even levels of the variance in the data. 
Biswas and Caliendo (2001) also use factor analysis and find that each component explains a 
roughly equal proportion of the variance in the data—life expectancy 34%, education 34%, and 
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standard of living 32%. The fact that factor analysis, at least in some studies, vindicates the 
specification of HDI highlights how advantageous a method it can be for testing theories about 
the dimensionality in data and how data should be used to operationalize complex social 
concepts like human development.  
Therefore, factor analysis serves three purposes. First, it is a method to reduce a large 
number of variables into a smaller, more manageable number of variables which can be used to 
operationalize a theoretically important concept. Second, by revealing how the variables in the 
analysis “load” on different factors it exposes the latent inter-relationships that exist in one’s 
data. Third, factor analysis reveals how much variance in the data one, or a group of variables, 
are explaining relative to all the other variables. The amount of variance explained by each factor 
is expressed by the reported eigenvalue.  
Operationalizing state capacity, then, is an ideal application for factor analysis for several 
reasons. First, state capacity is often called a multidimensional concept (Sobek 2004) and in 
chapter one I argued the same, but that should not be taken for granted. Each factor produced by 
the factor analysis also captures a certain amount of the variance between all of the variables 
included in said analysis. If only one factor explains the majority of the variance it is safe to say 
that the proposition that it is a truly a multidimensional concept is incorrect and it can indeed be 
operationalized by one or two key variables. On the other hand, if there are two or more factors 
that explain significant variance between the variables in the analysis then the idea that state 
capacity is multidimensional is vindicated.  
If state capacity is found to be multidimensional, it bears repeating that another advantage 
of factor analysis is that it reduces the large number of indicators required to capture all of the 
key elements related to state capacity, into a smaller, more useful set of latent variables that 
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capture the conceptual essence of state capacity. In doing so, factor analysis reveals the hidden 
relationships of the indicators that are important to state capacity, and produces variables that 
represent the different “dimensions” of state capacity. These variables can then be used to 
understand how high or low levels of different types of state capacity cause states to vary in their 
ability to take action.  
Given the inherent advantages of using factor analysis to operationalize multidimensional 
concepts, it is unsurprising that it has been applied to state capacity by both Hendrix (2010) and 
Hanson and Seligman (2011). Both studies use factor analysis to determine how many 
dimensions exist in commonly used indicators of state capacity. Table 2.1 illustrates the different 
indicators Hendrix and Hanson and Sigman choose for their analyses and the factors they find 
and what dimensions of state capacity they think those factors represent. As shown in the left-
hand column of Table 2.1, Hendrix uses a list of variables he argues relate to a state’s level of 
development, regime type and institutional quality three elements he considers fundamental to 
state capacity. Level of development is captured by a state’s GDP per capita and the investment 
profile. Quality of institutions is captured by the Political Risk Services (PRS) index of 
bureaucratic quality and a ratio of taxes collected to GDP. He posits both of these variables 
indicate effective institutions within a state. He measures institutional quality with the ratio of 
primary commodity exports to overall exports, the amount of military spending and personnel 
per capita, all of which Hendrix argues can proxy corruption in government. Finally, he 
measures regime type using several different forms of the Polity2 (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 
2013) index as well as the Scalar index of Polities (Gates et al. 2001). Despite his factor analysis 
producing three different dimensions, Hendrix notes that the first factor, which he calls the 
“rational-legal” aspect of state capacity because the measures of regime type and bureaucratic 
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quality correlate strongly with it, accounts for most of the variance in the data. His argument, 
then, is “all good things go together” and that state capacity is mostly a unidimensional concept 
(2010, 283) and should be treated as such.  
As shown in the center column of Table 2.1, Hanson and Sigman, like Hendrix, use 
indicators of institutional quality, but they also include variables that capture how extensive a 
state’s infrastructure is by using data on road density. They also include a measure of a state’s 
historical continuity using the State Antiquity Index from Bockstette et al. (2002), arguing that 
populations that have long occupied a set territory are more likely to view their government as 
legitimate. Additionally, they drop measures of regime type because following the work of Linz 
and Steppan (1996) they argue that state capacity is more likely a cause democratization rather 
than vice versa and therefore measures of democracy should be kept separate from measures of 
state capacity. Ultimately, contra Hendrix, they find state capacity is multidimensional, and 
argue theirs is a more accurate operationalization because they account for the diversity of 
factors that makeup state capacity (2011, 23).  
The divergent findings in these studies highlight how choices about which indicators to 
include can lead to very different ideas about the nature of state capacity. Hendrix (2010) 
emphasized indicators that focused on regime type and quality to represent state capacity. He 
only chose one variable (GDP per capita) to capture something else—level of development. 
Hanson and Sigman (2011) go further than Hendrix, because they attempt to avoid focusing  
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Table 2.1 Comparison of Hendrix 2010 and Hanson and Sigman 2011 
 Hendrix 2010 Hanson and Sigman 2011 
 Wealth Rule of Law (PRS) 
 Bureaucratic Quality  Bureaucratic Quality 
 Investment Profile Military in Politics  
 Primary Commodity Exports Road Density 
 Fuel Exports/Exports State Antiquity 
 Tax Revenue/GDP Census Frequency 
 Military Personnel/Per Capita Tax Revenue 
 Mil Spending/Per Capita Tax on Goods and Services 
 Regime Type¹ Tax on Trade 
 Regime Coherence Military Personnel/Per Capita 
 Regime Type Military Spending/Gov. Expenditures 
 Regime Coherence  
 Regime Type   
Retained² Rational-Legal³ Administrative 
Factor Rentier-Autocraticness  Reach 
Names Neopratrimonial  Trade Tax 
  Income Tax 
  Goods Tax 
  Coercive 
N 1408 1562 
Countries 101 116 
Note (1): Regime Type and Coherence Indicators used by Hendrix are: Polity2, Polity2squared, Xpolity, 
XpolitySquared, and the Scalar Index of Polities. 
Note (2): Retained factors listed in order of the proportion of variance they explain in each respective 
analysis. 
Note (3): Hendrix argues that because this factor explains 53% of the variance in the data and over twice 
as much variance as the next factor state capacity is mostly produced by rational-legal institutions. 
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wholly on institutions, and instead include indicators like road density and census frequency 
which capture how much penetration governmental institutions actually have in society.  
They also interpret military personnel per capita and military expenditures as a ratio of 
GDP differently than Hendrix. Hanson and Sigman instead think of them as the coercive 
capacity of the state rather than indicative of low quality (corrupt) institutions. As explained in 
the next section I explain my operationalization of state capacity. While it has overlap with those 
used by both Hendrix and Hanson and Sigman it is more similar to the latter’s operationalization. 
Moreover, it goes further in an attempt to capture all of the key elements of this 
multidimensional concept.  
 
2.3 Operationalizing State Capacity 
Selecting which observable indicators to include in the factor analysis is where the 
majority of the theoretical and practical decisions are made by the researcher. Theory is crucial 
because it dictates the link between the conceptualization and operationalization. Choosing what 
indicators to include in the factor analysis is based on a theoretical reason linking each of those 
indicators to a component of the conceptualization. Recall that in chapter one I posit seven key 
state components that make up state capacity: 1) international power, 2) social cohesion, 3) 
extractive capabilities, 4) institutional capabilities, 5) geography, 6) coercive capability, 7) 
rentier capability. Each of these seven components has at least one indicator included in the 
factor analysis. Some of the seven, like institutional capabilities and geography, required several 
indicators to be adequately represented because they are more complex components of state 
capacity. Others, like resources related to state capacity, are captured sufficiently by just one 
indicator.  
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 2.3.1 Data 
Table 2.2 contains the name of each indicator used, its source, the component of state 
capacity in my conception it relates to and the number of years and observations available for 
that indicator from the source. During the process of selecting indicators and sources for this 
analysis there are multiple things to consider. First, a large coverage of countries and years is 
preferable to avoid systematic bias due to missing data. Missing data is a problem for most cross-
national indexes. Returning to the example of the Human Development Index (HDI), its creators 
are often criticized for not adequately dealing with either missing or inaccurate data that can 
artificially lower the rankings (Srinivasan 1994; Ogwang 1994) of poorer countries that do not 
have accurate census data or other important demographic information. In order to avoid missing 
data, indicators that are widely available and cover large samples of countries and years are 
selected. Ultimately, the dataset used for the complete factor analysis below includes 102 
countries containing roughly 6 billion people, or 85% of the world’s population. A list of 
countries included in the factor analysis is available in Table 2.1A of Chapter 2 Appendix. 
The second and more important criterion for selecting indicators to operationalize the 
different components of state capacity, is how closely they are related to my conceptualization of 
each component as described in chapter one. Based on the large literature on the antecedents of 
state capacity described in chapter one, it is clear that some components are more conceptually 
complex than others, and therefore need more indicators to operationalize them satisfactorily. 
For institutional capacity, my conceptualization focuses on the efficiency and technical abilities 
of state institutions, rather than on type or arrangement like whether institutions are explicitly 
democratic or have institutional checks and balances. That means finding indicators that a state’s 
institutions can undertake large technically difficult challenges and complete them successfully 
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all while respecting rules and order enough to gain the trust of the population and outside 
investors. Thus, institutional capacity is operationalized using the amount of contract intensive 
money (CIM) in the economy, the level of investor confidence, and census frequency. CIM is 
calculated from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators using Clague et al.’s (1999) 
method.28 Investor confidence is from DiGuiseppi, Barry, and Frank (2012) who utilize bi-yearly 
investor rating scores from the Institutional Investor magazine (Institutional Investor, Various Years). 
Census frequency is calculated using the World Heath Organization data on censuses overtime 
(World Health Organization, 2013).  
The power component of state capacity is conceptualized as the international power of 
each state. IR scholars, particularly Realists, tend to focus on military might as the most 
important indicator of international power (Morgenthau 1948; Mearsheimer 2001) thought it is 
important to note that so-called “soft” power, revolving around diplomacy, economic 
interdependence, and cultural influence is also often thought to be an important (Keohane and 
Nye 1977; Nye 1990) component of power generally. That said, as discussed in chapter one, 
given the difficulty of incorporating all indicators of each theoretical dimension of state capacity 
into one operationalization, I use my conceptualization to guide my selection of the most 
important elements, and the observation that military might is the ultimate arbiter of international 
disputes makes it crucial to state autonomy, thus expanding a government’s options and thus 
increasing state capacity.   
                                                          
28 Clague et al. (1999) measure CIM using the ratio of non-currency money to the overall currency supply. The 
formula is (M2-C)/M2 where M2 is the overall money supply and C is the currency held outside of banks. They 
argue high levels of CIM indicate large numbers of transactions that require third-party enforcement and that they 
will be a good indicator that the population has faith in the financial institutions in a state.  non-currency money to 
the total money supply 
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As shown in Table 2.2, international power is operationalized using the level of military 
spending and military personnel. The indicators are from the Correlates of War (COW) National 
Material Capabilities dataset (Singer 1987). The natural logs of both indicators are used. Logged 
measures are preferred in this case because it is assumed there is an exponential, rather than 
linear progression in how the values of these indicators change overtime which can lead to a 
skewed distribution which can bias results, taking the natural log solves this problem (Tufte 
1974, 109). The practical outcome of using logged versus unlogged variables is to reduce the 
outsized effects large rich, oil producing countries might exert on the analysis.  
Coercive capacity is conceptualized as the ability of a government to force its citizens to 
behave a certain way. This could include the government’s ability to repress the population by 
breaking up protests, repelling civil violence, or rounding up mass law breakers. Indicators of 
this type of capacity include the same COW indicators of military spending and military 
personnel, but taken as a ratio of GDP and population respectively (Singer and Small 2008). 
These indicators capture not the overall size and capability of the military, but the size and 
capability of the military relative to the resources and citizens of the state.  
Social cohesion is conceptualized as the ethnic and religious unity within a country.  
Indicators of this are taken by reversing the measures of ethnic and religious fractionalization 
from Fearon and Laitin (2003) to instead capture ethnic and religious cohesion. Fearon and Latin 
created these measures by using the Atlas Narovdov Mira, which lists the probability that two 
random individuals selected in a country will be from two different ethno-linguistic or religious 
groups and extended them using the CIA World Fact Book data. Although some might argue this 
is a blunt instrument for capturing social cohesion, it is chosen because high levels of ethnic and  
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics For Indicators of State Capacity 
Variable Source Component Ctrys Years Obs 
(ln) Military personnel¹ COW: National Material Capabilities v.3.02 Power 190 1816-2007 4109 
(ln) Military Spending COW: National Material Capabilities v.3.02 Power 189 1816-2007 4045 
(ln) Oil Production U.S. Energy Information Administration Resources 193 1962-2013 5183 
Ethnic Fractionalization Fearon and Laitin (2003) Social Coh. 150 N.A. 4230 
Religious Fractionalization Fearon and Laitin (2003) Social Coh. 153 N.A.  4305 
Oil Rents/GDP World Development Indicators  Rentier 140 1962-2012 3723 
Contract Intensive Money World Development Indicators  Institution 180 1962-2012 4615 
Coastal Land Gallup and Sachs 1999 Geography 147 N.A. 4408 
Domestic Taxes/Total Revenue Baunsgaard and Keen (2010)/IMF/WDI Extractive 167 1981-2010 3567 
Trade Taxes/Total Revenue Baunsgaard and Keen (2010)/IMF/WDI Rentier 169 1981-2010 3501 
(ln) Distance to Nearest Port Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999) Geography 147 N.A. 4408 
Temperate Land Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999) Geography 147 N.A. 4408 
Investor Confidence DiGuiseppi, Barry, and Frank (2012) Institution 142 1981-2007 2872 
Census Frequency United Nations Statistics (2012) Institution 193 1981-2010 5700 
(ln) Mountainous Terrain Fearon and Laitin (2003) Geography 156 1981-2010 4538 
Military Personnel/ Per Capita COW: National Material Capabilities v.3.02 Coercive 190 1816-2007 4597 
Military Expenditures/GDP COW: National Material Capabilities v.3.02 Coercive 189 1816-2007 4201 
Note (1): (ln) = Natural Logarithm 
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religious fractionalization are the most commonly used proxy of social cohesion in both the 
economic growth and civil conflict literature (Easterly, Ritzan, and Woolcock 2006).29  
The rentier component of state capacity is conceptualized as the ability of a state to 
extract value from domestic natural resources and trade. Therefore, this component is 
operationalized using the oil rents as a percentage of GDP from the World Bank World 
Development Indicators and a measure of taxes from trade as ratio of total revenue from 
Baunsgaard and Keen (2010). The resources component of state capacity is conceptualized as 
those resources that are crucial to a country’s economic development and is operationalized 
using the natural log of average oil production per day in thousands of barrels from the Energy 
Information Agency (2012).  
The geography component of state capacity is conceptualized as those geographical 
features that influence a state’s ability to control its territory, maintain a healthy population, and 
interact with the developed world. This component is operationalized using indicators of 
temperate climate, the natural log of mountainous terrain, the natural log of distance from the 
major ports of Rotterdam, New York, and Tokyo, and the percentage of land within 100km of 
the coast from Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999).  
                                                          
29 Of course, this is not the only available indicator of social cohesion or even of ethnic heterogeneity. Putnam 
(2000), famously, uses membership in civic organizations, but that type of micro analysis is impractical here as this 
study is cross-national over time. Others have used the GINI coefficient to capture the economic dimension of 
social cohesion (Rodrik 1999; Easterly 2001), though that data is often missing and does not capture the ethnic 
component, which I argue is more important for social cohesion and state capacity. Yet another proxy for social 
cohesion can be civil society organizations such as NGOs (Paxton 2002). Measures of this can be obtained from the 
International Yearbook of Organizations (IYO) (Union of International Associations 2014-2015) but this data is 
unwieldy and does not include numerous other types of domestic organizations that are likely more important to 
social cohesion. Finally, the Minorities at Risk (MAR) database is often seen as the standard for understanding how 
ethnic, racial, religious, and linguistic minorities are distributed across most states (Minorities at Risk 2009; Fox 
2002), however, this is not necessarily a measure of the overall “fractionalization” in a society, though the MAR 
data could be used for such purposes. In expanded versions of the analysis in this dissertation I plan to further 
explore the potential of the MAR data to capture the social cohesion dimension of state capacity.  
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Finally, the extractive component of state capacity is conceptualized as the ability of the 
state to raise revenue from domestic sources. This component is operationalized using 
information on taxes from domestic sources, such as transactions, income tax, and property 
taxes, as a ratio of total revenue from Baunsgaard and Keen (2010).   
 
2.4 Factor Analysis Results  
The results of the factor analysis performed on the indicators described above suggest 
strong support for the theory that state capacity is a multidimensional concept. Table 2.3 contains 
the eigenvalues for each factor. Recall that eigenvalues relate to the proportion of the variance 
explained in the sample each factor explains. If an eigenvalue is above 1 it means that factor is 
explaining more variance than one variable could on its own. Factor 1, for example, explains the 
amount of variance equal to nearly 4 variables in the sample taken together. Factor 5 on the other 
hand explains an amount of variance of roughly 1.5 variables. One can also look at the direct 
proportion of variance explained in column 3 of Table 2.3. No factor dominates, with the highest 
proportion of the variance explained by factor one at 23% and the lowest being factor 5 at 8%. 
The five factors taken together explain 73% of the variance in the data with the final 27% being 
explained by factors smaller than threshold (eigenvalue above 1) to be retained.   
Also shown in Table 2.3, are the names I give to each factor. These names are based on 
the factor loadings of each indicator on each factor and attempt to capture what I feel is the 
conceptual component or components of state capacity they most closely capture. They are in 
order of the variance they explain: administrative-extractive, international-power, reach-coastal, 
coercive-rentier, and social-cohesion. The indicator loadings are presented in Table 2.4. Only 
those factors that load at either positive or negative .3 or higher are considered significant to that 
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particular factor. Using this cutoff is based on the argument that with a sample size greater than 
350 (my sample size is 1526) .3 represents “practical significance,” which means that by a 
conservative estimate, those positive and negative loadings above .3 and below -.3 are important 
in determining that factor’s makeup (Hair et al. 2009, 112).  
 
Table 2.3: Eigenvalues For Factor Analysis  
Factor Eigenvalues Proportion Capacity Type 
1 3.999 0.235 Administrative -Extractive 
2 2.776 0.163 International - Power 
3 2.288 0.134 Coercive-Rentier 
4 1.986 0.117 Reach-Coastal 
5 1.473 0.087 Social-Cohesion 
N = 1526 
Countries = 102 
 
The higher the positive or negative number is for a variable in each column of Table 2.4, 
the more strongly that variable loads or does not load on that factor and the more important it is 
to determining the core makeup of that factor. The administrative-extractive factor is a perfect 
example of the advantages of using factor analysis to operationalize state capacity discussed 
above. First, the results for the administrative-extractive factor are presented in the first column 
of Table 2.4 demonstrate that a number of theoretical relationships between different indicators 
can be tested using this analysis. Both indicators of high quality institutions (domestic 
taxes/GDP, investor confidence) and geographical conditions thought to be favorable to the 
development of high quality institutions (temperate climate and proximity to major ports) load 
strongly, on this factor. This suggests a positive relationship between geographical factors and 
high quality institutions that prominent studies have doubted or minimized (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2012). While this is not proof of causality between geography and institutions it offers 
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support for my argument that the factors that states can change (institutions) and cannot change 
(geographical features) interact and influence state capacity.  
Furthermore, the results across all five factors presented in Table 2.4 show that the 
indicators used in the analysis to represent the seven key components of state capacity collapse 
into coherent dimensions or “types” of state capacity. I argue they are coherent because they fit 
with many existing theories about what makes states able to take action. That the indicators of 
institutional quality (investor confidence, domestic/taxes), advantageous geography (temperate 
climate, less mountainous terrain, and closer proximity to major ports), low levels of rentier 
tendencies (low taxes from trade) and even a technologically well-equipped military (military 
spending), all load on one unobservable factor, which I call administrative extractive capacity, 
supports existing theories about how states institutions and geography, cause states and 
economies to develop in a positive way (Diamond 1997; Ross 2006; Karl 1997; Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2001; Krugman 1991).  
The second factor, depicted in column three of Table 2.4, which I call international-
power, has indicators of overall military size and scale (military personnel and military 
expenditures) plus the presence of the most important natural resource to both military and 
economic might, oil (oil production), and one of the most historically important aspects of 
defense (mountainous terrain). 
These state attributes are often linked to power in the international realm by numerous 
studies (Krasner 1978; Mearsheimer 2001). That the results indicate this is its own dimension of 
state capacity supports the idea that power and regime type or institutions not necessarily 
dependent on one another, and states with international power potentially behave as their own 
class of actors.  
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Table 2.4 Factor Analysis Results of Indicators of State Capacity² 
Capacity Type 
Administrative 
Extractive 
International 
Power 
Reach 
Coastal 
Coercive 
Rentier 
Divided 
Rentier  
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Unique 
(ln) Military Personnel¹  0.0903 *0.8389 -0.1124 0.2168 0.2199 0.2023 
(ln) Military Expenditures *0.4637 *0.7024 0.0609 0.2053 -0.0315 0.1111 
(ln) Oil Production 0.1013 *0.6842 -0.0723 -0.0036 -0.2814 0.4177 
Ethnic Cohesion *0.5064 0.0832 -0.2363 -0.1269 *0.5689 0.271 
Religious Cohesion 0.1984 -0.1372 -0.0722 -0.1237 *0.7931 0.334 
Oil Rents/GDP -0.2389 0.0049 0.0638 *0.5064 *-0.3991 0.4967 
Contract Intensive Money 0.2028 0.0894 *0.6652 -0.0577 0.0003 0.3922 
Coastal Land  -0.0441 -0.3416 *0.7673 0.0767 0.1664 0.3373 
Domestic Taxes/Total Rev *0.7515 -0.1036 0.1915 0.0193 -0.1596 0.3127 
Trade Taxes/Total Rev *-0.5874 -0.1818 -0.0056 0.0941 0.0913 0.5695 
Distance to Nearest Port *-0.6955 -0.2363 0.0434 0.0475 -0.1372 0.4031 
Temperate Land *0.8507 -0.0188 -0.2651 -0.1179 0.1441 0.3137 
Investor Confidence *0.6943 0.2413 0.2612 0.0178 -0.1831 0.1822 
Census Frequency -0.0093 0.2967 *0.6025 -0.2071 0.0638 0.4361 
(ln) Mountainous Terrain *-0.4379 *0.6371 0.048 -0.2177 0.1777 0.4256 
Military Personnel Per 0.0882 0.099 0.0154 *0.8665 0.1922 0.2223 
Military Expenditure/GDP -0.1034 0.1905 -0.0885 *0.8405 0.0178 0.2271 
Note (1): (ln) = Natural Logarithm 
Note (2): *Bolded indicates loadings above .3 or below -.3 
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Results for the third factor, which I call the reach-coastal factor, is shown in column four 
of Table 2.4, and has three indicators that load strongly on it. These include census frequency, 
contract intensive money (CIM), and coastal land. This most closely approximates the idea of 
“infrastructural power” within the IR and state capacity literature (Mann 1993; Fortin 2012). 
Infrastructural power is the ability of the government to “reach” all the areas of the territory it 
controls with diverse and complex policy implantation and enforcement. Mann (1993) used CIM 
as a key component of his operationalization of infrastructural power, and the ability to 
administer a regular census along with clearly defined borders via coastal land, fits with this 
overall conception. As explained in the previous chapter, CIM in particular is thought to indicate 
high levels of trust in the government and that government regulation and enforcement is of a 
high quality and is far reaching (Clague et al. 1999).  
The fourth factor, I name the coercive-rentier factor, also has three indicators that load 
strongly on it, as depicted in column five of Table 2.4. The variables of military personnel per 
capita, military expenditures as a ratio to GDP, and oil rents as a percent of GDP are all strongly 
associated with this factor. Recall Table 2.2, following the work of others (Hendrix 2010) the 
first two military variables, were included explicitly to capture the coercive component of state 
capacity described in my conceptualization in chapter one. While overall military might is a 
good measure of international power, military personnel and expenditures as ratios of domestic 
population and resources indicates that the state might be worried about dissent or, in extreme 
cases, revolt from its population. Therefore, it spends a disproportionate amount of resources on 
its military. That this is coupled with the most explicit rentier indicator, oil rents as a percentage 
of GDP, supports theories that rentier states are their own class of polity, and that they rely on 
coercive behavior to maintain control and power (Karl 1997; Ross 2004, 2006). As with the 
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other factors, that this pattern holds despite its inclusion with all the other variables in the factor 
analysis, highlights it as a distinct “type” of state capacity, that most-likely empowers different 
sorts of state behaviors.  
Finally, the fifth factor, I call the social-cohesion factor, has the measures of ethnic and 
religious fractionalization load positively on it, and the measure of oil rents load negatively on it. 
The fact that these two variables only correlate at .37 percent in isolation, but in the factor 
analysis load strongly on the same factor indicates that both types of fractionalization, or 
cohesion, occur in certain types of states at high rates. That rentierism is low in highly cohesive 
states is doubly interesting, and either says something about how cohesive states extract oil, or 
about how states with oil attract diverse and divided ethnic and religious groups. Either way this 
is an interesting relationship worth exploring, and it supports my original notion that social 
cohesion was an important and distinct aspect of state capacity.  
Table 2.5 depicts results for individual factor analysis on only those variables that loaded 
above .3 or below -.3 for each factor. This extra step is important because it tests whether or not 
it was the idiosyncratic nature of the data, caused by either the list-wise deletion of certain 
countries on some variables, or that one or two variables were driving the relationships between 
all five of the factors, rather than just the individual factors they loaded strongly on. As 
evidenced by the different number of observations for each factor analysis shown in Table 2.5, 
when the number of variables is reduced, many countries are included that were deleted in the 
full factor analysis. Only one variable that loaded strongly on a factor drops below the .3 cutoff 
and that is the indicator of mountainous terrain for the administrative-extractive factor. This 
means that the results in the full factor analysis are not particularly susceptible to changes in  
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Table 2.5: Results of Separate Factor Analyses 
Administrative-Extractive International-Power 
(ln) Military Expenditures¹ 0.78 (ln) Military Personnel 0.90 
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.63 (ln) Military Expenditures 0.90 
Domestic Taxes/GDP 0.81 (ln) Oil Production 0.65 
Trade Taxes/GDP -0.67 (ln) Mountainous Terrain 0.40 
Temperate Land 0.74   
Investor Confidence 0.88   
(ln) Distance to Nearest Port -0.81   
(ln) Mountainous Terrain² -0.05   
N 1795  3668 
Reach-Coastal  Coercive- Rentier  
Census Frequency 0.71 Oil Rents %GDP 0.63 
Coastal Land 0.70 Military Personnel Per Capita 0.62 
Contract Intensive Money 0.83 Military Expenditures/GDP 0.72 
N 3635 N 2948 
Social Cohesion    
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.73   
Religious Fractionalization 0.54   
Oil Rents/GDP 0.69   
N 3267   
Note (1): (ln) = Natural Logarithm 
Note (2): The indicator of mountainous terrain drops out of the administrative-extractive factor 
when examining each in isolation. It is the only indicator to change between the full factor analysis 
and the individual factor analysis.  
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the countries that are included in the sample and one can be more confident in those results 
presented in Table 2.4. Indeed, the fact that most factor loadings become stronger also inspires 
confidence in the results from the full factor analysis. It is these individual factor analyses that 
are used to produce the “factor scores” or variables that represent each dimension of state 
capacity in further analysis. These are discussed at greater length in the next section.  
In sum, the factor analysis results presented in Table 2.4 and 2.5 demonstrate several 
important things. First, they show that indicators commonly linked to state capacity can be 
divided into multiple and distinct dimensions. This strongly supports the theory that state 
capacity is a multidimensional concept and should be operationalized accordingly. Second, it 
highlights the advantages of using factor analysis on many indicators used to operationalize a 
concept, in order to reduce the number of variables into the core components that capture a 
complex concept. This makes that concept more amenable to analysis in quantitative models of 
numerous outcomes of interest. Finally, the results in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 illustrate the utility of 
factor analysis as a tool to test the theories about the relationship between different indicators 
related to state capacity. That advantageous geography and institutions are related in the factor 
analysis supports the work of many on this subject. Similarly the links between rentierism and 
coercive elements within a state revealed by the factor analysis aligns with long-standing ideas 
about how rentier-states might operate. This is all important information that helps continue to 
build theories about how and why states behave the way they do.  
 
2.5 Factor Analysis Results and Countries  
 Another important result of the factor analysis described above is to produce variables 
that contain scores for each country, in each year data is available, for each factor. These 
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variables can then be used to understand where countries are relative to each other on each 
dimension of state capacity exposed by the factor analysis. This makes further research 
comparative analysis of how the level and type of state capacity influences state behavior easier. 
States with similar levels of capacity on some dimensions but not on others, and with divergent 
outcomes, could make ripe candidates for in depth study. Moreover international policy makers 
could use this information to better assess what areas of a state need more focused help to make 
them more stable and/or functional.  
Table 2.6 provides the descriptive statistics for the “factor scores” that correspond to each 
state capacity type. These scores can be used as variables, representing each dimension or “type” 
of state capacity described above. Because these cores are produced by a procedure attempting to 
find hidden relationships between the indicators that explain the largest amount of variance in the 
data possible it should produce relatively standard scores for each factor. The reason for this is to 
standardize the values of each factor according to the proportion of the variance it explains. Put 
simply, the factors should have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1 (Grice 2001). Table 
2.6 illustrates that this is the case. That said it is common when using factor scores from a full 
factor analysis for the ranges of those scores to be relatively equal. Because these variables are 
produced by individual factor analyses for each dimension of state capacity that only include the 
variables that load above .3 or below -.3 in the full factor analysis, a broader range of values is 
possible on some of the variables. Though at first this might seem problematic, the fact that these 
variables are not standardized to roughly the same range is actually helpful because they 
maintain the information about countries existing at the bottom and top limits of each factor 
score.  
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For example, Table 2.6 shows that the coercive-rentier factor has a much larger 
maximum (13.73) value than the scores for the other factors. This is because a handful of 
countries for several years, including Kuwait in the early 90s, Bosnia Hercegovina in the middle 
90s, Eritrea in the late 90s and early 2000s, Isreal in the early 80s, and Syria in the late 80s, were 
all given high scores on this factor. This is caused by each of these countries, for those years, 
having high values for the three indicators that load strongly on this factor: military expenditures 
relative to GDP, military personnel per capita, and oil rents as a percentage of GDP. Kuwait in 
the early 90s represents the extreme value. This is most likely due to the fact that immediately 
following the removal of Iraqi invaders from their territory they ramped up oil production and 
used rents from it to fund an exceptionally large military expansion (Al-Zumai 2013). Despite 
representing an extreme case, this could be indicative of states that emerge from conflict, making 
it useful information that animates how the type of state capacity a state has influences how it 
behaves in different circumstances.  
Table 2.6 Descriptive Statistics of State Capacity Types 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Range 
Administrative-extractive 1804 -4.38E-10 1 -2.062 2.234 
International-power 3668 -3.31E-10 1 -2.522 4.571 
Coercive-rentier 3134 4.87E-11 1 -0.996 13.73 
Reach-coastal 3635 -7.00E-10 1 -2.541 2.871 
Divided-rentier 3267 4.97E-10 1 -3.344 1.738 
 
Overall, then, the fact that the factor score ranges depicted in Table 2.6 are uneven, 
represents an advantage of generating the factor scores from only those indicators linked to each 
factor in the full analysis. The following sub sections examine how countries rank relative to 
each other based on their scores for each factor. This helps illuminate what these scores mean in 
the real world. It also helps act as a check on the validity of this analysis, because if country 
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scores on each of the factors, which I argue represent dimensions of state capacity, do not make 
sense then the analysis may be flawed and require further refinement.  
2.5.1 Countries and Administrative-Extractive Capacity 
Figure 2.1 illustrates scores on the administrative-extractive dimension of state capacity 
for five of the top ten scoring countries over time. Despite the fact that there is still variety 
between how these countries organize their institutions, their historical legacies, and even their 
individual cultures, the high scores on this factor indicate there is something similar about them 
related their relatively stable governments, temperate climates, close proximity to other 
developed economies, low levels of rentierism, and high levels of ethnic cohesion.  
The Figure 2.1 also illustrates five of the bottom ten scoring countries on this dimension 
of state capacity over time. They are all countries in Africa, mostly sub-Saharan Africa, a hotbed 
of internal strife, poor geographical conditions, such as a tropical climate, low proximity to 
developed economies, and low quality institutions. Again, these countries all represent enormous 
diversity in their institutional designs, culture, and size, but there is an essential quality they all 
share, and that is low levels of administrative-extractive capacity. The identification of these 
patterns is a major advantage of using factor analysis to operationalize state capacity because it 
highlights how essential qualities at the low and high end in these states could explain the 
different outcomes within them.  
In addition to illustrating how countries change relative to each other, the results 
presented in Figure 2.1 show what years states were either at their best or worst for 
administrative-extractive capacity. This is useful information because the yearly scores for states 
can act like the rings of a tree, indicating relative stability over time or pointing to when a state 
may have gone through some internal or external shock that affected a state’s factor score, and 
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thus level and type of capacity. Japan is represented by the top line in Figure 2.1. It reached its 
peak level of administrative-extractive capacity in the late 80s, immediately before its economy 
declined substantially. The resulting so-called “lost decade” (Economist 2012) resulted in a 
steady decline in administrative-extractive capacity and could warrant further in-depth 
investigation.  
Another important point highlighted by Figure 2.1 is that the top scoring countries on 
administrative-extractive capacity all have high scores throughout the time period under 
examination. Recall scores for the administrative-extractive factor range from 2.2 to -2. This is 
true for all of the top 10 countries, which take up 166 of the possible 240 year-country parings at  
the top of the rankings for administrative-extractive capacity, suggesting that there are positive 
feedback loops to high levels of this form of capacity that keep countries high on this dimension 
of state capacity.  
 Turning to the bottom of Figure 2.1, countries at the bottom of the rankings for 
administrative-extractive capacity there may also be a feedback loop, but with opposite 
consequences. All of these countries, despite marginal changes over time, remain in the bottom 
third of the rankings for administrative-extractive capacity. The stability of countries at both the 
top and bottom may also be a function of their unchanging geographies, which are factored into 
their scores. That said marginal changes are not insignificant and could highlight states who are 
successfully overcoming their unfortunate geographical luck. Mauritius, for example, is 
represented by the dark solid grey line. It was still emerging from colonialism in the late 70s, in 
the early 80s there was minor political strife, followed by a period of modest economic growth, 
political stability, and expanding social safety net (Stiglitz 2011). Mauritius’ administrative-
extractive capacity appears to match the story of its development, hiccups and all.  
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Another pattern is that the levels of administrative-extractive capacity as depicted in 
Figure 2.1 appear much less stable over time than the levels in high scoring countries shown in. 
Perhaps this is because states with low levels of stability, or poor geographic circumstances, 
cannot improve the quality of their institutions in a sustainable way. Although the investigation 
of these precise causal mechanisms are beyond the scope of this analysis, the patterns revealed 
by looking where countries rank on the administrative-extractive dimension of state capacity 
raise important questions about the role shocks play in effecting state capacity, and what makes 
some states able to improve despite a worse starting position relative to other states.  
2.5.2 Countries and International-Power Capacity 
Figures 2.2 depicts six of the top and bottom ten ranking countries for factor two, which I 
call the international-power dimension of state capacity. Given this dimension of state capacity’s 
inclusion of the overall size and scale of a state’s military and resources, countries with large 
territories and populations dominate the top ten. That said, population and country size do not 
determine the rank order, since China is not first—as it is in population—but third, and Saudi 
Arabia, France, and Iran all have larger militaries and more oil resources than does the second 
most populous country, India. The reverse pattern, that the smallest countries would be at the 
bottom of international-power rankings, is mostly true as well, given that these countries are 
mostly small African or Eastern European countries. That said, however, the bottom is not 
simply a list of the smallest countries in the dataset, as that would mean Botswana should be 
third from the bottom rather than seventh, and the list should include the United Arab Emirates, 
Lesotho, and Namibia. 
As discussed in the previous section, the advantage of this analysis is that countries 
receive a score for each year, so it is possible to see how states change overtime. It also helps to 
 
 
77 
 
 
 
 
78 
 
see how patterns linking both external and internal circumstances, like threats from a neighbor or 
from within, changes in the global economy, or a discovery of oil to international power. For 
example, Saudi Arabia experiences a sharp rise during the years of the first Gulf War, but it 
never declines again. Clearly this period represented a new military reality for Saudi Arabia.    
Figure 2.2 also puts patterns of pre vs. post-Cold War into context. China and Saudi 
Arabia engage in military buildups starting in 1990, while the United States continues its general 
pattern despite the demise of its main adversary, the Soviet Union. Russia, illustrated by the light 
grey dotted line whose data starts with the collapse of the Soviet Union, experiences an initial 
decline which corresponds to the problems they experienced with transitioning away from 
communism, and the economic shocks associated with that, before steadily rising again due to 
discoveries of large oil reserves and an improving economy. France, shown by the dark thin line 
in the middle of the chart, stays more stable overtime indicating perhaps that they are less 
influenced by changing international landscapes than other countries.  
For the bottom scoring countries on this dimension, Figure 2.2 shows a more stable story. 
While there are minor variations, the scores constrained to a smaller range than for those 
countries at the top of the rankings. This is likely because without resources or population 
reserves, large buildups are impossible. What is highlighted, however, is how internal strife can 
create significant drop-offs in international-power capacity. Sierra Leone experiences a large dip 
beginning in the late 90s and continuing through the early 2000s, at the height of their civil war. 
Liberia experiences a similar dip throughout the 90s due to their first civil war (Ellis 1999). The 
second Liberian civil war lasted fewer years and thus only slowed its steady increase in 
international power throughout the early 2000s. This relationship between civil conflict and 
 
 
79 
 
international-power, is one many observable patterns available when capacity types are tracked 
over time.  
2.5.3 Countries and Reach-Coastal Capacity 
The scores for six of the top and bottom ten scoring countries for factor 3, or what I call 
the “reach-coastal” dimension of state capacity, are presented in Figure 2.3. Relatively large 
island nations such as Ireland, New Zealand, Japan, and the Philippines dominate the top of the 
rankings for this list, while land-locked African nations dominate the bottom of the list. As with 
the other factors presented above, despite the variety of differences between countries at both the 
top and bottom of the list, the result of the factor analysis shows they have some essential and 
similar qualities that allow them to have either high or low levels of contract intensive money 
(CIM) and conduct a regular census. The fact that large amounts of coastal land fit with these 
other two components is yet another interesting result from the factor analysis that fits with 
existent theory, discussed in chapter one and above, about the importance of coasts to economic 
and institutional development. The results also highlight how landlocked countries suffer when 
they have little to no access to coasts.  
The trend of the top countries staying relatively stable appears to continue for reach-
coastal capacity, though sudden drops highlight, yet again, the importance sudden internal and 
external shocks can have to an economy. For example, Ireland’s struggles, indicated by bold 
grey line, since the great recession of 2008 are indicated by the sharp drop in its reach-coastal 
capacity which perhaps caused a loss of faith in domestic institutions and international trade.   
Unlike, Ireland, New Zealand, South Korea, and the Philippines who were less integrated and 
dependent on the international financial institutions most affected by the crash bore it quite well, 
staying much more stable in the years following the crash.
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Perhaps these states were rewarded by international investors and citizens for avoiding the worst 
consequences of the 2008 recession.  
Turning to the bottom of Figure 2.3, it is notable that two countries are improving, and 
four are holding reasonably steady. Some part of the fact that there appears to be more 
improvement among the bottom ranked countries is that they have much more room to increase 
the proportion of contract intensive money and begin to issue a regular census. Strong 
performances in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and in Kazakhstan might be 
attributable to discoveries of natural resources of rare earth minerals like copper, cobalt, and 
gold, for the former and oil for the latter. It is unlikely that this increase is due to more state 
stability since the DRC especially has been embroiled in civil conflict since the Mobutu regime 
fell in the 1990s (Autesserre 2010). Thought it may also be the result of technological advances 
that allow capital to move into Africa more easily than in the past. This can include better cell 
service and internet connections (Pierskalla and Hollenbach 2013). Furthermore, the DRC and 
Afghanistan move in opposite directions despite both experiencing conflict during this period 
lending further support to the natural resources explanation. Afghanistan’s only major export is 
an illicit drug (Opium) while the DRC exports resources that often brings international 
investment and some measure of regulation. The identification of these, and other potential 
patterns, are evidence once again of the advantages inherent in using factor analysis to 
understand what indicators group together to make countries similar and different.  
2.5.4 Countries and Coercive-Rentier Capacity  
The rankings of six of the top and bottom ten countries for factor 4, which I name 
“coercive-rentier” capacity, are presented in Figure 2.4. Top scoring countries generally are 
either well-known oil producers or countries that have experienced serious internal or external 
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military threats throughout their history. Another apparent pattern, which was mentioned in an 
above section, is that countries that score highly on this dimension of state capacity often do so 
in years at the end of conflict, or immediately following conflict. Following the eviction of Iraq 
from Kuwait, for example, Kuwait’s score on this component is very high. Eritrea and Bosnia 
Herzegovina experienced similar a phenomenon at or near the end of their conflicts. This is most 
likely due to the large number of troops present in country, and the need for the governments to 
extract as much as they can from natural resources in order to pay for them. Countries at the 
bottom of the list are famous for having small to nonexistent militaries, Costa Rica for example 
was the first nation to explicitly disband their military in 1948 and have remained peaceful since 
(Barash 2013). Other countries that have experienced conflict, like Ghana, Haiti, and 
Mozambique either made decisions after to reduce their militaries (Ghana), or did not have the 
resources to have organized units fighting, but instead experienced chaotic civil violence (Haiti, 
Mozambique).  
The make-up of the countries on the bottom of this list highlights the cross-cutting nature 
of the coercive-rentier dimension of state capacity. Some countries, like Iceland, Monaco, and 
Switzerland, are highly developed and maintain order through the legitimacy their governments 
enjoy with their populations. Meanwhile other states that are low on this dimension truly require 
more coercive-rentier capacity in order to increase security and order for their citizens. Haiti in 
particular highlights this juxtaposition and illustrates why coercive-rentier capacity allows the   
government to undertake important functions, like providing stability, control, and security for 
citizens, and therefore is a key part of state capacity (Toft 2008).  
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 Figure 2.4 also highlights the extreme situation in Kuwait during and following the Iraq 
invasion. It also shows how levels of this dimension of state capacity appeared to peak in the top 
countries during the 80s and early 90s but, with the exception of in Eritrea who was under threat 
of conflict with Ethiopia and internal unrest, have declined since. One possible explanation is 
that as a new post-Cold War order stabilized states felt less pressure to maintain large militaries 
relative to their populations. Another explanation is that rent-seeking declined in  
Numerous states as governments learned about the economic pitfalls of rentierism and found 
other ways to raise revenue. An example of this is Middle-Eastern States like Saudi Arabia, who 
have attempted to diversify their economies away from oil production (Reguly 2014). 
 The coercive-rentier scores shown in Figure 2.4 illustrate that countries ranking at the 
bottom of the coercive-rentier dimension of state capacity have remained stable and low on this 
dimension over the entire sample of country-years. These states have few resources that lend 
themselves to rentierism, which may highlight the relationship between resources, rent-seeking 
behavior, and both the ability and desire to maintain large coercive apparatuses. The causal 
direction, however, is difficult to identify. The Collier and Hoeffler model of civil conflict 
(2004), for example, would suggest that the mere presence of resources will increase the 
incentives for elites and rebels to challenge the government for control over those resources. This 
would make the government feel more pressure to maintain coercive capacity to protect said 
resources. Another way it could work is that coercive regimes are so and rents only enhance that 
capacity. Specifically, I would argue that Israel is a coercive state not because of the resources it 
has, which are minimal, but because it is under constant threat from outside and within. 
Regardless of the precise reasons, the comparison of states at the top and bottom of this list helps 
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can help identify patterns that require further exploration about the relationship between rents 
and coercion in states.  
2.5.4 Countries and Social Cohesion Capacity  
 The final factor I link to a dimension of state capacity is what I call “social-cohesion” 
capacity. In some ways this is the dimension of state capacity that is under the least amount of 
control by the government because population demographics change very slowly over time. 
Nonetheless, as explained in chapter one, and earlier in this chapter, it is an important component 
of how a state functions and thus important to state capacity overall. Figure 2.5 depicts changes 
overtime for six of the top and bottom scoring countries on this dimension of state capacity. The 
top ranked countries are populated with countries from all over the world. The one commonality 
between them is that they are all states where there is a high level of overlap between the 
“nation” associated with state institutions and religion and ethnicity. Sometimes this is a result of 
their geographical isolation (Japan) or because the country is small and has existed for a long 
time on its current territory. Other countries like Armenia and Cambodia experienced genocides 
that drove minorities out.  
 Countries at the bottom of the list illustrated in Figure 2.5 are mostly newer states in the 
Middle-East or Africa notorious for their arbitrary borders. These borders were often drawn to 
divide populations rather than unite them to make colonial governance easier and have had many 
long-term consequences on the development of these states (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 
2011). These states often suffer from ethnically driven violence (Sambanis 2001; 2004) or 
simply distrust, which can have a deleterious effect almost all aspects of a state’s ability to 
function (Zak and Knack 2001).   
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Another important observation illustrated in Figure 2.5 is that since scores of ethnic and 
religious fractionalization rarely change, the changes depicted in the chart are mostly driven by 
oil rents, which associate with this factor. That rent-seeking behavior negatively associated with 
high social cohesion fits with ideas discussed above, and in chapter one, that discover of oil can 
exacerbate already simmering ethnic and religious divisions, this can push the state to use 
resources to maintain control rather than for economic development. Figure 2.5 highlights states 
that have no oil, like Portugal, represented by the flat thin black line. It also shows when oil rent-
seeking is having a deleterious effect on a highly cohesive country like Tunisia where 99% of the 
population is the same ethnicity and religion. Oil rents held Tunisia back on this dimension in the 
80s, but as oil production decreased cohesion increased. The recent events of the so-called “Arab 
Spring” which began in Tunisia map onto a decrease on this dimension of capacity due to 
increased rent-seeking behavior.  
 At the bottom end of this dimension of state capacity a different story comes to light. 
Countries with low social-cohesion capacity experience much more variability on the social-
cohesion dimension of capacity than do the top scoring states. With the exception of 
international-power, and coercive-rentier capacity, the bottom countries were on the social-
cohesion dimension of state capacity are always more volatile than the top countries which again 
emphasizes the potentially positive feedback loops associated with administrative-extractive 
capacity, reach-coastal capacity, and now social-cohesion capacity. Again what variability there 
is in the factor scores for social-cohesion shown in Figure 2.5 is driven by oil rents since ethnic 
and religious fractionalization do not change much overtime. Due to the negative loading of oil 
rents on this factor, an increase oil rents leads to a decline in social-cohesion capacity scores. 
One interesting potential pattern requiring further analysis is if, for example, in the Republic of 
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Congo, a highly divided state, anytime rent seeking occurred there was also ethnic strife. This 
fits with a key theorized causal mechanism linking ethnic and religious divisions to poor 
governance. The mechanism is that states with high levels of diversity will have higher levels of 
rent-seeking behavior because ethnic and religious groups will band together in an attempt to 
monopolize state resources (Horowitz 1985; 1993). This type of theory testing is an important 
advantage of using factor analysis on different indicators of state capacity.   
 
2.4 Conclusions 
 This chapter applied factor analysis to indicators used to operationalization each 
component of my conceptualization of state capacity outlined in chapter one. Hopefully, after 
reading this chapter, the advantages of using factor analysis to better understand what state 
capacity is and to measure it empirically are clear.   
First, it helps to reduce the number of observable indicators required to operationalize a 
complex concept like state capacity by revealing the “hidden” variables that represent core 
associations in the data. Second, it helps to test theories about the relationships between these 
indicators by showing how they are associated with each other in ways that are not directly 
observable. For example, the theorized relationship between strong, efficient institutions and the 
ability to extract resources via taxes (Kugler and Arbetmann 2007) was confirmed by this 
analysis because they loaded on the same “factor” and became what I call “administrative-
extractive capacity. Third, this analysis helped confirm the theory that state capacity is, in fact, a 
multidimensional concept by showing that there are multiple factors that explain significant 
proportions of the variance between all of the indicators for the countries and years included in 
the sample. While this is often accepted as conventional wisdom, recent work by Hendrix (2010) 
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had cast doubt on that idea, so it represents an important finding. Fourth, the scores for countries 
for each dimension of state capacity produced by the factor analysis can be charted over time and 
can help illuminate what the causes and consequences of internal and external shocks to many 
different countries. Understanding why events unfold the way they do is a primary goal in 
political science, and finding patterns between state attributes different outcomes during events 
will hopefully be an important aid to future, more in-depth research on specific countries. These 
scores can also be used as independent variables in quantitative analysis of many outcomes of 
interest. The next three chapters are focused on a quantitative analysis examining how the 
different dimensions or “types” of state capacity related to state respect for human rights.   
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Chapter Three 
State Capacity and Physical Integrity Rights 
 
Traditionally the state has been expected to provide security both internally and externally, 
and to provide for the general good of society. In an age when considerable resources are 
available for the state’s missions, it is paradoxical to find many states insecure and 
repressive.  
Conway W. Henderson (1991) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 My goal in this chapter is to use the new indicators of state capacity developed in chapter 
two to better understand patterns of state repression. Recall that in previous chapters this 
dissertation focused primarily on the development of a new conceptualization and 
operationalization of state capacity. I argue the utility of any conceptualization and 
operationalizations of state capacity should be its ability to capture the multidimensional nature 
of state capacity. Put simply, it must account for the fact that state capacity can have many 
sources, and because of this, states can have high capacity in some areas of action and low 
capacity in others. For example a government in a state with high levels of coercive-rentier 
capacity might behave differently towards a set of protesters than a government in a state with 
high levels of administrative-extractive capacity. The ultimate result—a stable government with 
control over its territory—could be the same but the pathway to get there is different depending 
on the level and type of capacity a state has.  
 As I argue in chapter two, using factor analysis to help reveal the multidimensionality of 
state capacity makes understanding how different types of capacity might lead to different state 
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outcomes or behaviors. The factor analysis on 17 indicators commonly associated with state 
capacity revealed there are five core dimensions which I named: administrative-extractive, 
international-power, reach-coastal, coercive-rentier, and social-cohesion. Furthermore, the factor 
analysis produced a score on each of the five dimensions for each country in each year from 
1981-2010. These scores can be used as independent variables to analyze a number of outcomes 
of interest, including the different levels of state respect for human rights.   
 Therefore, this chapter examines the effect of a state’s level and type of state capacity on 
the amount of respect for so-called physical integrity rights. Physical integrity rights include the 
rights prohibiting torture, political imprisonment, disappearances, and extrajudicial killing 
(Henderson 1991; Cingranelli and Richards 1999a). State respect for these four rights is one of 
the most examined topics in the study of human rights. However, measures of state capacity are 
often not included in analysis of physical integrity rights. Recently, Young (2009) and Englehart 
(2009) found state capacity did play an important role in explaining state respect for physical 
integrity rights in their analysis. This chapter builds on their work, by not only using the 
improved measures of state capacity developed in chapter two, but also by disaggregating the 
analysis of each physical integrity right to see why states might choose to respect one right more 
than another rather than using an index of respect for all four rights.  
In sum, the results presented in this chapter show the types of state capacity described in 
chapter two do influence state respect for physical integrity rights in important ways. 
Administrative-extractive capacity in particular is the most influential and positive factor in 
explaining state respect for all physical integrity rights by a wide margin. Meanwhile, other types 
of capacity linked to state attributes thought to increase the odds of repression, like coercive-
rentier capacity, international power, and social-cohesion are less influential. Moreover, when 
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measures of state capacity are included in the model with other well-established explanatory 
variables often related to state repression, like regime type, regime coherence, wealth, civil 
conflict, and population the effect of those other factors is clarified. Specifically, the level of 
democracy has a mixed relationship with physical integrity rights confirming the suspicion of 
some that democracy is no panacea for better state human rights practices (Davenport 2007). 
These findings suggest that state capacity, and particularly the type of state capacity a country 
has, is a crucial element in accounting for patterns of state respect for physical integrity rights.   
The next section of this chapter discusses general hypotheses about the relationship 
between different types of state capacity and physical integrity rights. The second section focuses 
on specific hypotheses on the influence of different types of state capacity on each individual 
physical integrity right. The third section outlines the methods used for testing these hypotheses 
statistically using the measures of different types of state capacity. Section four discusses the 
results of the statistical tests and offers some concluding thoughts on state capacity and physical 
integrity rights.  
 
3.2 State Capacity and Physical Integrity Rights: General Hypotheses  
 The state and human rights are inextricably linked. When talking about “the state” in this 
context I am really speaking of governments. Governments play a critical role both in the theory 
and practice of human rights since it is the primary actor for both the protection and violation of 
human rights throughout the world (Donnelly 2003). In some cases governments engage in direct 
violations of human rights to accomplish goals. These goals can include violent repression of the 
perceived threats to those in power (Davenport 2007) or systematic structural discrimination 
against minorities, women, and other vulnerable groups to maintain a particular social order 
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(Chapman and Carbonetti 2011). In other cases, governments simply lack the ability, or “state 
capacity” to protect their citizens from forces that conspire to violate human rights, such as 
powerful multi-national corporations, violent militias, or criminal organizations.  
 I argue that the behavior of governments is to a large degree a function of the level and 
type of state capacity the government can draw upon. By this logic, a state’s capacity to 
undertake action will necessarily affect its ability to respect, protect, and fulfill the rights of its 
citizens. For example, on the one hand governments in states with high institutional capacity may 
be in a better position to avoid violating the human rights of their citizens because they can 
provide for them, which keeps them happy, and less inclined to engage in political dissent. On 
the other hand if state has low institutional capacity, the government might not be able to provide 
for their citizens, leading to more political dissent, and more opportunities for human rights 
violations through repression.30  
 Of course, governments vary greatly in what types and levels of state capacity they have 
access to. Some states have a large coercive apparatus, some have high quality institutions, some 
have a large amount of control over their borders and territory, and some have all of the above. 
The key question of this chapter, then, becomes what types of state capacity can one expect to 
increase the government’s respect for physical integrity rights?  
 
Physical Integrity Rights H1: States with high levels of administrative-extractive capacity will 
have higher levels of governmental respect for physical integrity rights than those with low 
levels. 
                                                          
30 This example follows Gurr (1970) who argues that when people feel their government is not providing them the 
ability to realize their life expectations, whatever those may be, the resulting “grievances” will make violent 
challenges directed at the government more likely.  
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 The administrative-extractive dimension of state capacity includes indicators of high 
quality institutions that are capable of endowing the government with resources, such as tax 
revenue, it can use to take action. Indicators of investor confidence, and a high percentage of 
taxes from domestic sources like income and sales taxes, load strongly with this dimension of 
state capacity. Furthermore, indicators usually thought to suggest weak institutions like rent-
seeking behavior (Karl 1997; Ross 2004), load and negatively with this dimension of state 
capacity. A large number of studies support the idea of the positive role that institutional quality 
can play in enforcing the rule of law, fostering economic growth, attracting foreign investment, 
and in building robust democratic societies (O’Donnell 2004; Rigobon and Rodrik 2005; 
Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya 2006). All of these factors are associated with state respect for 
physical integrity rights (Poe and Tate 1994; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001). Therefore, as 
stated in PhysintH1, it is expected that high scores on this dimension of state capacity will be 
associated with higher levels of respect for all physical integrity rights.  
 
Physical Integrity Rights H2: States with high levels of international-power capacity will have 
lower governmental respect for physical integrity rights performance than those with low levels.  
 
 Recall from chapter two that large absolute numbers of both military personnel and 
expenditures, along with oil production, load strongly the international-power dimension of state 
capacity. There are several ways high levels of international-power capacity could associate with 
lower governmental respect for physical integrity rights. First, states with high levels of 
international power are more like to play power politics and therefore are more often involved in 
international conflicts (Senese and Vasquez 2008). Because of this, they often become a target, 
of domestic political dissent and international terrorism. Saudi Arabia, for example, is a state 
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with a high score on the international-power dimension of state capacity due to its large well-
funded military and massive oil reserves. As a consequence Saudi Arabia has both the means and 
the interest to become involved in other country’s affairs, as in the recent civil war in Syria 
where it was funding Sunni rebel groups (Barnard 2013). This has made the Saudis a prime 
target of terrorist groups who disagree with their actions (Hegghammer 2009). The result is a 
paranoid government that uses its power to violate the physical integrity rights of many of its 
citizens in the name of maintaining internal security.  
  Second, states with high levels of international-power are also immune to international 
pressure to change their internal practices. Despite the fact that they are taken to task for 
domestic human rights violations, it is typically the conclusion that they hold themselves above 
international norms or international law (Evans 1996; Mertus 2004; Ignatieff 2005; Walldorf 
2009). Realist international relations theory posits this is the result of the powerful “doing what 
they will” without fear of consequences (Mearsheimer 1996). Again, states like China, Iran, 
Saudi Arabia, and Russia, all have high scores on the international-power dimension of state 
capacity and all violate the physical integrity rights of their citizens with relative impunity.  
 That said, high levels of international-power capacity could cut both ways when it comes 
to respecting physical integrity rights. One way international power could be positively 
associated with physical integrity rights is that governments in these states will feel safe from 
serious threats from the population due to their large, well-equipped militaries. Davenport (1995; 
2007), for example, argues that the level of threat political elites feel from the population is a 
good predictor of the use of repression, particularly violations of physical integrity rights. On 
balance, however, the combination of using security as a pretext for rights violations, and 
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insulation from international pressure makes international power more likely to lower respect for 
physical integrity rights.  
 
Physical Integrity Rights H3: States with high levels of coercive-rentier capacity will have 
lower levels of governmental respect for physical integrity rights than those with high levels.  
  
States with high levels of coercive-rentier capacity have a high ratio of military personnel 
to the population and a high level of military expenditures relative to GDP. These states also 
extract large rents from oil production. The expected relationship between coercive-rentier 
capacity and state respect for physical integrity rights is curvilinear, where the least amount of 
respect will occur in states with the medium levels of this form of capacity. This hypothesis 
follows a similar logic of the so-called “more murder in the middle” (MMIM) theory of political 
repression (Fein 1995). The MMIM theory is that governments in states caught between being 
fully autocratic and fully democratic will be more likely to use repression because political elites 
are at their weakest but still possess enough control over state resources to engage in mass 
violations of physical integrity rights.  
 States with medium levels of coercive capacity are likely to follow a similar pattern 
because governments in states with no coercive capacity will not be able to use repression as a 
viable tool and governments in states with high levels of coercive capacity will not need to. 
When coupled with the rentier component of this dimension of capacity the odds become even 
more likely in states with medium levels of this type of capacity.31 Rentier states tend to be 
corrupt, have poor institutions, and be subject to global boom and bust cycles because of the 
                                                          
31 This, in part, follows Tilly’s (2003) argument that high capacity (which he defines as control) non-democratic 
states will be less likely to use violence against citizens than low capacity non-democratic states.  
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government’s over-reliance on one resource for its revenue (Karl 1997; Ross 2004). However, 
states which huge amounts of rentier capacity can store up revenue to use during harder times to 
control the population, or at least keep them happy. States with moderate amounts of rentier 
capacity are likely to experience all of the negative consequences, like corruption and uneven 
economic development, without many of the long-term benefits. Nigeria, Eritrea, Yemen, Iran, 
Qatar, Bahrain, and Azerbaijan, in the 80s and early 90s are all examples of states with medium 
levels of coercive-rentier capacity, and who I expect to be more likely to violate physical 
integrity rights.  
 
Physical Integrity Rights H4: States with high levels of reach-coastal capacity will have 
greater levels of governmental respect for physical integrity rights than those with low levels.  
 
 High scores on reach-coastal capacity are likely to increase state respect for physical 
integrity rights. The reach-coastal capacity dimension contains indicators that suggest strong 
penetration of governmental institutions throughout a state’s territory. These indicators include 
large amounts of contract intensive money (CIM) and the regular execution of a census. 
Furthermore, I argue that since high percentages of coastal land also load strongly on this 
dimension of capacity, that it captures states that can control their borders more easily since they 
do not share them with other states. This dimension of state capacity is similar to so-called 
“infrastructural power” concept developed by Mann (1984; 1993).32 Mann referred to this form 
of state power as being based on “territorially-centralized” organization, something made much 
easier in states with borders defined by coasts.  
                                                          
32 Mann’s (1984) concept of infrastructural power has been operationalized by subsequent studies using CIM 
(Fortin 2012).  
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 The reason the reach-coastal dimension of state capacity should increase state respect for 
physical integrity rights, then, is because it means the state is more likely to be able to provide 
public goods throughout its territory. The provision of public goods throughout a state’s territory 
by the government is crucial to avoiding serious challenges by dissidents because they help 
ameliorate grievances among the population and avoid leaving ungoverned territorial spaces 
where rebels can build power bases (Rotberg 2003).   
 
PhysintH5: States with high levels of social-cohesion capacity will have greater levels of 
governmental respect for physical integrity rights than those with low levels.  
 
That social-cohesion, meaning a population with similar ethnic and religious 
backgrounds, is related to social harmony and state effectiveness is an old idea. J.S. Mill (1861), 
argued that social homogeneity is a necessary condition for rights to be realized. More recently 
others find that high levels of ethnic fractionalization, the opposite of social cohesion, can lead to 
conditions that create human rights violations. These conditions include civil conflict (Horowitz 
1985; Sambanis 2004), poor economic growth (Keefer and Knack 2002), and weak democratic 
institutions (Dahl 1973). It is important to note that recent studies suggests ethnic and religious 
divisions are a necessary but not sufficient condition for repression (Walker and Poe 2002).33 
Despite this, however, if anything greater social-cohesion should improve respect for physical 
integrity rights by making conditions that foster repression less likely.  
 
                                                          
33 Walker and Poe (2002) find support for the link between diversity and human rights violations, but only at the 
extremes. However, they use a different measure of divided societies than this project, and also do not test this 
relationship in a multivariate model, but rather only examine the bivariate correlations between diversity and 
rights violations. Therefore, it is difficult to know if diversity interacts with other state characteristics to make 
rights violations more or less likely. 
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3.3 Right Specific Hypotheses 
 The preceding section offered some general hypotheses about the relationship between 
the different dimensions of state capacity and physical integrity rights. However, one important 
observation of a growing number of studies is that states will violate the four physical integrity 
rights in different patterns (McCormick and Mitchell 1997; Cingranelli and Richards 1999; 
1999a; 2010). It is my contention that a state’s level and type of state capacity will influence 
which physical integrity rights governments violate because their array of available policy 
options are determined by the level and type of state capacity on which they can draw. One 
advantage of using a disaggregated measure of state capacity in this analysis is it makes possible 
the exploration of these patterns in greater detail. Therefore, in this section I offer some 
hypotheses about the specific relationships between different types of state capacity and 
individual physical integrity rights. While one could find literature to justify hypotheses about 
the relationship between each state capacity type and each physical integrity right, doing so is 
beyond the scope if this chapter. Instead this section includes a description of the hypothesized 
relationship between the two state capacity types the literature suggests are most likely to 
influence each physical integrity right.34 
3.3.1 Torture 
Torture is defined by the Convention Against Torture (CAT) as,  
 
                                                          
34 It is important to note important studies linking other state capacity factors to the violation of individual physical 
integrity rights violations. Walt (2005) and O’Shaugnessy (2000) note respectively the important relationship 
between international power and the state’s coercive apparatus and torture. There is also a widespread literature 
on how a lack of social cohesion or ethnic heterogeneity might make disappearances more likely as in the so-called 
“dirty wars” in Latin America during the latter part of the 20th Century (Taylor 1997). This is only a sampling of 
studies that connect the different dimensions of state capacity to government respect for individual physical 
integrity rights. Although these are interesting relationships that deserve exploration, it is beyond the scope of this 
project to go into each in detail. The goal here is to identify initial patterns and get the lay of the land, as so few 
studies have disaggregated an analyzed the determinants of the four individual physical integrity rights.  
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“any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a 
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third 
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or 
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any 
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or 
incidental to lawful sanctions” (UN General Assembly, 1984). 
 
 The right not to be tortured may be violated by the state directly or by private actors enlisted by 
the state. Torture can also include cruel and degrading treatment carried out by police or by 
prison guards. Torture is the most persistently and widely violated physical integrity right 
(Cingranelli and Richards 2010). If there is one takeaway from the extensive analysis of why 
states torture, it is that the use of torture is also an extremely difficult habit for states to kick. 
States that use torture in a given year, even sparingly, use it the following year 93% of the time 
(Conrad and Moore 2010). As Lightcap and Pfiffner point out, “Of the three great evils that 
states can perpetrate on those they control—genocide, slavery, and torture—only one has 
positively thrived into the twenty-first century: torture” (2014, 3).  
 
Torture TH1: States with higher levels of administrative-extractive will have more 
governmental respect for the right prohibiting torture than those with lower levels.  
 
Torture TH2: States with higher levels of reach-coastal capacity will have more governmental 
respect for the right prohibiting torture than those with lower levels.  
 
 
 
101 
 
 Because of the large number and variety of countries that torture, it is difficult to identify 
what state attributes should make states less likely to do it. Even in democracies torture is often 
used, and indeed, as Rejali (2008) argues, democracies are often on the cutting edge of torture 
techniques. That said, as Cingranelli and Richards (1999) note, one of the key explanations for 
torture’s persistence is the difficulty governments have ensuring all of their agents, including 
intelligence services, police, and members of the military, do not use it. Indeed, as highlighted by 
the events at Abu Ghraib prison even low-ranking military personnel require only the subtlest of 
hints to take it upon themselves to engage in widespread and systematic torture (Fisk, Harris, 
Cuddy 2004; Dickenson 2007). Given this observation, it is likely that the administrative-
extractive, and reach-coastal dimensions will lower the likelihood of states employing torture. 
Both of these dimensions of state capacity capture different elements of a government’s ability to 
exert non-violent over control what happens within institutions and within state borders 
respectively. These dimensions of state capacity make it possible for the government to actually 
ensure the legal protections against torture are actually enforced because of increased oversight 
and training capabilities.  
3.3.2 Political Imprisonment  
Political prisoners are defined as those individuals who are imprisoned by the 
government because of their religious or political beliefs or their membership in a group, 
including ethnic or religious groups (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). Only those prisoners who 
are incarcerated for non-violent speech or practices related to their group membership or beliefs 
are covered by this definition.  
The level of state respect for the right prohibiting political imprisonment is much more 
fluid than torture. States are much more likely to change in their level of state respect for this 
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right. Cingranelli and Richards (1999) hypothesize that this is due to the fact that it is much 
easier for states to round up and also release political prisoners than it is for them to torture, kill, 
or disappear them.  
 
Police, soldiers, and prison guards, often without the permission or even 
knowledge of high government officials, usually carry out these acts [killings, 
disappearances, and torture]. Therefore making significant improvements in these 
practices requires re-socializing or replacing large number of people in the 
civilian and military bureaucracy. Ordering the release of some or all political 
prisoners, however, is a relatively easy thing to do (1999, 531).  
 
Political Imprisonment PIH1: States with higher levels of international-power capacity will 
have lower governmental respect for the right prohibiting political imprisonment than those with 
lower levels. 
 
Since it might be relatively easy for a government to control political imprisonment 
within its territory, it is less likely that dimensions of state capacity like administrative-
extractive, and reach-coastal capacity will make a large difference in determining state respect 
for the right prohibiting it. International-power capacity, on the other hand, should make states 
more likely to use political imprisonment because they are likely to become targets of dissenters, 
due to their military engagements, and they are insulated from the international consequences of 
the outcry often accompanying political prisoners due to their power. China, for example, who 
ranks fourth on the international-power dimension of state capacity, is a state that imprisons non-
violent dissenters and appears immune to international pressure to release them because of its 
economic and military power.  
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Political Imprisonment PIH2: States with higher levels of coercive-rentier capacity will have 
less governmental respect for the right prohibiting political imprisonment than those states with 
lower levels.  
 
High levels of coercive-rentier capacity in a state will also act as a catalyst for the use of 
political imprisonment by the government. Higher levels of coercive-rentier capacity might 
indicate the state is likely to have problems like corruption, weak institutions, and inequality, 
which can generate grievances and dissent among the population (Gurr 1970). Since rentier 
states tend to be non-democratic, they also lack the tools to incorporate dissent into the legitimate 
political process so they are left to use their coercive power to imprison dissenters (Tilly 2003). 
States like Kuwait, Syria, Eritrea, and Jordan are all countries with high levels of coercive-rentier 
capacity who also have either no or only partial respect for political imprisonment. Even 
relatively democratic countries such as Israel who score highly on this dimension also have 
lower levels of respect for the right prohibiting political imprisonment.  
 3.3.3 Disappearances  
The right not to be disappeared enjoys the highest level of state respect of the physical 
integrity rights. Since the famous Velasquez-Rodriguez case, heard in the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights in 1988 which held Honduras responsible for the disappearance of a political 
activist within the country, disappearances have been on a well-documented decline (Grossman 
2007).35 Disappearances were a common practice during the so-called “dirty-wars” of Latin 
                                                          
35 Grossman (2007) documents how the Velasquez-Rodriguez case tried in the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights led to a large increase in the visibility of disappearances as a problem, and helped further codify their 
prohibition in international law.  
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America in the late 1970s and 1980s.36 A disappearance occurs in those unresolved cases where 
victims are unaccounted for. Cingranelli and Richards point out they are closely related to 
killings, since once solved it is usually determined that the victims were killed (1999, 518).  
 
Disappearances DH1: States with higher levels of administrative-extractive capacity will have 
more governmental respect for no disappearances than those with lower levels.  
 
 Given the observation that disappearances are rarely used because they are costly for the 
government state capacity types that raise these costs significantly should lower the probability 
that they are used. Specifically, governments with a high degree of institutional oversight, which 
I argue is indicated by high levels of administrative-extractive capacity, are less likely to use 
disappearances than other forms of repression. Of course, an alternative story could also be the 
case, that states with greater institutional capability and resources will also be able to undertake 
the complex task of engaging in disappearances. That said, on balance the type of transparency 
that often accompanies high quality institutions should make disappearances less likely in these 
states.  
 
Disappearances DH2: States with higher levels of international-power capacity will have less 
governmental respect for no disappearances than those with lower levels. 
 
 Alternatively, since the primary hypothesized hurdle to the use of disappearances is the 
costs state attributes that lower the relative costs of using this tactic should make disappearances 
                                                          
36 Timerman (1981) chronicles the use of disappearances as a tactic of repression during the civil conflicts that 
plagued Latin America during the 70s and 80s. Disappearances were terrifying for family, friends, and supporters of 
the victims due to their suddenness and lack of resolution. 
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more common. Higher levels of international-power capacity, then, will make the use of 
disappearances by the government more likely. International-power indicates a large and well 
equipped military, which should provide the state with resources making disappearances easier 
to carry out. As with previous hypotheses, international-power capacity also makes the 
government feel insulated from the outcry that could accompany disappearances, or it could use 
ongoing military conflicts as a pretext to justify or distract from its use of disappearances. 
Countries with high levels of international-power like China, Russia, Iran, and India all have 
records of using disappearances.  
3.3.4 Extrajudicial Killings 
Extrajudicial killings are killings carried out by the state, or private actors at the behest of 
the state, without due process of law. Killings as a result of combat are excluded from the 
analysis, but those that come as a result of excessive force by police or security forces are 
counted (Cingranelli and Richards 1999, 518). The right prohibiting extrajudicial killings is the 
second most respected after the right not to be disappeared according to Cingranelli and 
Richards’ analysis (1999a, 2010). This means that in the calculation of how to repress the 
citizenry, killings are considered a cheaper or less costly method than disappearances in most 
states, but more costly than political imprisonment or torture.  
 
Extrajudicial Killings EKH1: States with higher levels of the administrative-extractive capacity 
will have less governmental respect for no killings than those with lower levels. 
 
Following the logic of Cingranelli and Richards (1999) discussed above, reducing the 
number of extrajudicial killings is probably dependent on a government’s ability to change 
ingrained cultures and norms around mistreatment of prisoners and detainees by law 
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enforcement. This ability will depend on the quality of the institutions of government to retrain 
and oversee all government agents. Therefore, states with high levels of administrative-extractive 
capacity are in the best position to ensure law enforcement and security forces avoid unnecessary 
and illegal deaths of those in custody.  
 
Extrajudicial Killings EKH2: States with higher levels of coercive-rentier capacity will have 
less governmental respect for the right prohibiting extrajudicial killings than those with lower 
levels.  
 
A characteristic that should increase the likelihood of a state using extrajudicial killings 
as a tactic of repression is coercive-rentier capacity. States with high levels of coercive power are 
likely to use lethal force against citizens because they feel they can operate with impunity. 
Additionally, a large coercive apparatus is harder to control. States with high levels of coercive-
rentier capacity have a large military relative to the population, and often use the military to 
impose domestic order. Once conditions of martial law are imposed, killing often becomes more 
likely as documented by numerous reports (Human Rights Watch 2009). Yemen, Libya, and 
Syria, are examples of countries with high levels of coercive-rentier capacity and mixed to low 
respect for most years to the right prohibiting extrajudicial killings.  
 
3.4 Alternative Hypotheses 
 In addition to state capacity, there are numerous other factors that are thought to 
influence state respect for physical integrity rights. Regime type is probably the most common 
factor hypothesized to influence physical integrity rights. Numerous studies find that the more 
democratic a state is the more likely it is to respect physical integrity rights (Henderson 1991, 
 
 
107 
 
1993; Poe and Tate 1994; Hofferbert and Cingranelli 1996; McCormick and Mitchell 1997; 
Richards 1999; Davenport 2007a). The mechanisms linking democracy to greater respect for 
physical integrity rights include 1) that repressive behavior is more costly because leaders can be 
voted out of office, 2) democratic societies are generally more accepting and tolerant which is in 
conflict with the use of repression, and 3) democracies provide citizens with the ability to engage 
in participation and contestation through legitimate pathways, thus reducing the justification for 
coercive repression (Davenport 2007a, 10-11).  
 One modification to the regime type hypothesis is that the relationship between regime 
type and state respect for physical integrity rights is not linear. Fein (1995) finds that, while high 
levels of democracy are best for improving state respect for physical integrity rights, while states 
are transitioning to democracy from dictatorship, they become more repressive. This so-called 
“more murder in the middle” theory of governmental repression posits that states with incoherent 
institutions, or a mix of both autocratic and democratic institutions are likely to be the worst 
violators of physical integrity rights (King 1998; Regan and Henderson 2002; Davenport and 
Armstrong 2004; Regan and Bell 2010; Conrad and Moore 2010) 
 Another condition strongly associated with a reduction in state respect for physical 
integrity rights is ongoing violent civil conflict or civil war. As Hafner-Burton (2014) notes, 
ongoing civil conflict is arguably one of the most well-established causes of human rights 
violations. States experiencing civil conflict tend to be at their weakest and most threatened 
creating a doubly strong incentive to violate human rights. Weak states are unable to protect their 
citizens from the harms that can occur during civil conflict by both government forces and rebel 
forces alike (Englehart 2009). 
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A state’s level of development and wealth is also closely linked to the level of state 
respect for physical integrity rights. The connections between wealth and human rights 
performance are fairly straight-forward since wealth gives the state many more resources to 
“bargain” with the population (Young 2009, 289) thus removing potential grievances. Removing 
grievances is important since a relatively content population is unlikely to require repression. 
Obviously when it comes to economic rights wealth is even more important, since many of these 
rights, like basic income guarantees, social welfare, and healthcare require a government with the 
resources to provide them.  
Finally, a state’s population is included in the analysis. Most studies of repression and 
civil conflict include some control for population since higher populations often raise the costs of 
a state taking action and can also make the government’s control over a territory more tenuous 
and repression more likely (Henderson 1993; Herbst 2000). Larger populations also often 
contain more political, ethnic, religious, and economic inequality, which are all potential causes 
of grievances that might spur state repression.37  
 
3.4 Data and Methods  
To test my hypotheses about the relationship between state capacity and state respect for 
physical integrity rights, I use the measures from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project 
(henceforth referred to simply as “CIRI”) (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). CIRI uses the State 
                                                          
37 Numerous studies control for similar alternative hypotheses across all physical integrity rights (Poe, Tate, and 
Keith 1999; Davenport 1995; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001). That said, one alternative hypotheses notable in 
its absence is the lack of controls for human rights treaty ratification, which some have argued is not an important 
factor in explaining state respect for human rights (Hathaway 2002; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007). More 
recently studies have used convincing evidence to support the idea that under limited circumstances treaty 
ratification might improve state respect for human rights (Neumayer 2005; Simmons 2009; Richards and Haglund 
2015). However, these findings remain controversial and have raised important questions about how the influence 
of treaties should be measured, that I have chosen to leave it out of this analysis.  
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Department Human Rights Reports and Amnesty International country reports, to code state 
respect for the four physical integrity rights for 202 countries from 1981-2011. The scores for 
each right range from 0-2 with 0 representing “no respect”, 1 representing “some respect”, and 2 
representing “full respect.”  
There are multiple options when it comes to measuring physical integrity rights. The 
Political Terror Scale (PTS) (Gibney et al. 2012) is the other well-known option for measuring 
state respect for physical integrity rights. Both use the U.S. State Department human rights 
reports and the Amnesty International (AI) human rights reports as the primary materials for 
coding the level of state respect. The primary difference between the two is the fact that CIRI’s 
score of state respect for physical integrity rights can be disaggregated into individual scores for 
each type of violation, whereas PTS’ scores cannot as they only offer an overall score for 
physical integrity rights taken together.38 Therefore, the data from CIRI are preferable for this 
dissertation because one goal is to examine not only how state capacity influences physical 
integrity rights generally, but also how state capacity influences each right individually.  
In addition to including the scores for each dimension of state capacity generated in the 
chapter two, some important control variables are included to account for the alternative 
hypotheses of state respect for physical integrity rights.  
The first important control is the level of respect a state has for the physical integrity right 
under investigation in the previous year. It is widely accepted that states who use repression in 
one year are very likely to use it again in the next (Gurr 1988) and presumably this translates to 
the form of repression as well. For example, a state using torture in 1981 will be more likely to 
use torture in 1982 than a state that did not use torture in 1981. Therefore one year lags of the 
                                                          
38 For a detailed discussion of the differences, advantages and disadvantages, PTS versus CIRI see Wood and 
Gibney (2010) and Cingranelli and Richards (2010).  
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dependent variable are included as independent variables. These lagged variables are dummy 
variables, for example, the lag of torture is actually three variables, each coded 0 or 1 if in the 
previous year the level of respect is “no respect”, “partial respect”, or “full respect.” The 
inclusion of the dummy variables of each score allows for the most detailed interpretation and 
analysis of why states change their level of respect for physical integrity rights.    
To control for civil conflict a measure of ongoing conflict from the PRIO/UCDP Armed 
Conflict Database (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Themnér and Wallensteen 2014) is used. An ongoing 
civil conflict is considered active within a country in UCDP/PRIO dataset when there are at least 
twenty-five battle deaths within a given year. This is a much lower threshold than the Correlates 
of War (COW) dataset on intrastate conflict which uses one-thousand battle deaths as the 
threshold for an ongoing conflict (Singer and Small 1994; Sarkees 2000). The advantage of using 
the UCDP/PRIO dataset is that the measure captures both intense large scale civil conflict, and 
also smaller scale conflict which can lead to human rights abuses as well. Typically, states 
engage in increasingly violent repression as the likelihood of greater conflict increases, not only 
once it has already reached full blown civil war (Rost 2011).  
To control for regime type the Polity IV scores for each country in each year are 
included. Polity IV Polity IV scores all regimes from 1800-2013 on a scale from +10 to -10. +10 
represent a fully consolidated democracy and -10 is a fully entrenched “autocracy”. Regimes 
between +6 and -6 are considered “anocracies” since they have some democratic and some 
autocratic characteristics. Democracies are considered those regimes where the population has 
the ability to participate in the selection of political leadership through elections, has civil 
liberties, and has institutionalized constraints on the executive. Autocracies are those where the 
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executive is chosen by the political elite and civil liberties are not respected (Marshall, Jaggers, 
and Gurr 2013). 
Furthermore, it is those regimes that are in the so-called “anocracy” or transitional phase 
that are most likely to violate human rights Fein (1995) coined the “more murder in the middle” 
theory of human rights violations, arguing that citizens are most likely to be repressed when a 
regime contains a mix of authoritarian and democratic institutions. The explanation for this is 
that these mixed regimes result in extremely weak institutions as elites struggle to hold on to 
power authoritarian power and use the democratic process to gain power in relation to each other 
and the citizenry. The precarious position of political elites makes them more likely to use 
repression against dissenters and political opponents. This variable is called regime coherence 
and is captured by using the squared version of the PolityIV measure of regime type described 
above. Squaring the measure changes it from curvilinear scale to a linear scale with higher scores 
indicating a coherent democracy or autocracy, while lower scores indicate anocracies with 
“mixed” characteristics.  
To control for the level of development and population of a country the natural log of 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and population are included in the analysis. The natural 
log of both is taken to account for the exponential nature at which GDP per capita and population 
can increase, this helps avoid distortion in the results by extreme values in large and small 
countries and is a well-established method of controlling for potential bias and making 
interpretation slightly more intuitive. 39 GDP per capita data comes from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators, and data for population is from the Correlates of War (COW) 
project.  
                                                          
39 See Tufte (1974) for an explanation of why using the logged versions of GDP and population is appropriate.  
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3.4.1 Estimation Technique  
A random-effects ordinal logistic estimation technique, with standard errors clustered by 
country, that includes lags of the dependent variables, is the most appropriate approach for this 
analysis for five reasons. First, the data under investigation are cross-national time-series panel 
data including 100 countries for the years 1981-2007, and the dependent variable is (state respect 
for the four physical integrity rights). Since the dependent variable is categorical and ordered, 
with a range of no respect = 0, some respect = 1, and full respect = 2 and ordered logistic model 
is necessary. The advantage of using a random-effect ordinal logistic estimation technique is that 
it controls for the influence of both variables that change over time and variables that do not 
change over time. In this case, my state capacity measures include indicators that do change, 
such as investor confidence, taxes collected, and military personnel and expenditures, as well as 
indicators that do not change, such as geography, mountainous terrain, and ethnic and religious 
fractionalization. Furthermore, this approach accounts for the “unobserved influence” within the 
panel data of multiple observations being from the same country. For example, this technique 
accounts for the fact that there might be some hidden commonality between all the observations 
from Saudi Arabia during 1981-2007.  
A second and third advantage of this approach is that by clustering robust standard errors 
(unexplained variance) by country this approach accounts for serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity of standard errors within observations from countries. Serial correlation is 
when the error terms from one year to the next are correlated. This is often the case in cross-
national panel data, and can bias results (Drukker 2003). Similarly heteroskedasticity is a 
problem because it means there is a systematic bias within the error terms. Put simply, this 
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approach recognizes that there could be variance within the data not accounted for by the model 
which could bias results. Clustering standard errors by country is the best way to account for this.  
The fourth and fifth advantages of this approach are, respectively, the inclusion of one-
year lags of the dependent variables coded as dummy variables and controls for violations of the 
parallel regression or proportional odds assumptions. The inclusion of dummy variable lags of 
the dependent variable in each model is the best way to account for the role the past plays in the 
present, in this case a state’s past level of repression (Hafner-Burton 2008; Peksen and Drury 
2009). The parallel regression assumption assumes that the proportion of the odds for each 
category of the dependent variable is explained equally by each independent variable. Brant tests 
reveal that several variables in my analysis violate this assumption. One potential fix for this 
problem is to use a generalized ordinal model because it estimates separate regressions for each 
outcome category (Williams 2006). However, results of generalized ordinal models are difficult 
to interpret, and after using both models results were highly similar, therefore I chose to use the 
random effects model to make the interpretation of findings easier. Ultimately, using the 
random-effects model with standard errors clustered by country and lags of each category of the 
dependent variable accounts for the most potential bias in the model, and doing so increases the 
chances of only observing significant results that are very robust.  
 
3.5 Results and Discussion 
 This section includes a description of the results of the analysis of state capacity and 
physical integrity rights. I begin by discussing the implications of the findings for the general 
hypotheses on state respect for physical integrity rights (physical integrity rights hypotheses H1-
H5).  I then move on to discuss the findings for the hypotheses of each individual physical 
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integrity rights, and how the inclusion of state capacity types in the model influences other 
common alternative hypotheses about state respect for physical integrity rights. 
 The results of the random-effects analysis of state capacity and the four physical 
integrity rights under examination are presented in Table 3.1. Recall that these rights include 
prohibitions on torture, political imprisonment, extra-judicial killings, and disappearances. The 
results for each right in Table 3.1 are depicted in each column under the right’s name. The 
number of countries listed at the bottom of each column indicates the number of country clusters 
accounted for in the analysis. The values in each column are presented as odds ratios, where 
numbers above 1 mean that a standard deviation increase in the values of the dependent variable 
increase the odds of higher state respect for each right, numbers below 1 mean a standard 
deviation increase in the dependent variable decrease the odds of higher state respect for each 
right.40  
 Table 3.2 summarizes the hypotheses by listing state capacity factors and their expected 
effects on physical integrity rights in general and individually. If higher levels of a state capacity 
dimension are hypothesized to improve state respect for a right or rights the table reads 
“positive” under “expected effect.” If it says “negative” then higher values on that state capacity 
dimension is expected to decrease respect for the right or rights under examination. If the state 
capacity dimension is statistically significant for the level of state respect for multiple rights, or 
exerts a large influence over state respect for a single right, it receives a “strong confirm.” If the 
state capacity dimension is statistically significant but works in the opposite direction of the 
expected effect, for at least one right, it may receive either a “mixed” or “weak reject” depending 
                                                          
40For a survey of the debate on using standard deviation changes for both continuous and categorical variables to 
illustrate predictive comparisons see Gelman and Pardoe (2007) 
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on the strength of the effect. Finally, if the right is only significant for state respect of one right 
and/or exerts small influence over state respect for a right then it receives a “weak confirm.”   
Table 3.3 depicts the percentage (as opposed to odds) change one standard deviation 
increase in each independent variable has for the probability of an increase in state respect for 
each physical integrity right. Figure 3.1 illustrates the relative increase in odds of a standard 
deviation increase in the statistically significant dependent variables for the level of state respect 
each physical integrity right. This figure provides an easy way to identify which independent 
variables exert the largest influence over state respect for each physical integrity right.  
 The results depicted in Table 3.1 and Table 3.3 indicate strong support for physical 
integrity rights H1, that higher levels of administrative-extractive capacity will improve state 
respect for physical integrity rights. As Table 3.1 shows, administrative-extractive capacity is 
statistically significant for each right, an increase by one standard deviation increases the odds of 
greater state respect by 2.812 times to 7.359 times. As illustrated by Figure 3.1, this is by far the 
most impactful factor when predicting state respect for all four of the physical integrity rights. To 
illustrate what this means, in the early 2000s Japan or France would be an average of 4.613 times 
more likely to respect physical integrity rights than Hungary, whose score on administrative-
extractive capacity was one standard deviation lower. Still worse was South Africa during the 
early 2000s at two standard deviations below Japan or France would be roughly an average of 9 
times more likely to have lower state respect for physical integrity rights. 
 The results in Table 3.1 and 3.3 suggest, physical integrity rights H2, that international-
power will have a negative influence on state respect for physical integrity rights, receives weak 
confirmation. International-power capacity is only statistically significant in predicting state 
respect for one physical integrity right, the prohibition on disappearances. That said, as Figure 
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3.3 shows, while the effect is small when compared to the influence of administrative-extractive 
capacity, a one standard deviation increase in international-power capacity still decreases the 
odds of respect for this right by 53.6%. This means that a state like China or Russia in the mid-
2000s with high levels of international-power is 53.6% more likely to use disappearances as a 
tool of repression than Saudi Arabia during the same period. Overall, international-power 
capacity is not an important factor for physical integrity rights in general, but it does suggest 
support for my contention that different types of state capacity will influence state respect for the 
four rights in unique ways.  
 Physical integrity rights H3, that reach-coastal capacity will have a positive influence on 
state respect for physical integrity rights, is weakly rejected by the results presented in Table 3.1 
and Figure 3.1. Reach-coastal capacity is statistically significant for three different rights, 
including the rights prohibiting torture, political imprisonment, and extrajudicial killings. Yet, 
reach-coastal capacity is only positive for the right protecting against torture. This means reach-
coastal capacity has a complex relationship with physical integrity rights. For torture, the causal 
logic proposed in hypothesis H3 seems to hold because states that have greater institutional reach 
and borders defined by coasts feel a lower urge to torture.  
  In the case of political imprisonment and disappearances the results suggest 
governments use their reach-coastal capacity to engage in repression. Disappearances might be 
more likely because reach-coastal capacity makes it easier to identify dissidents within a territory 
and spirit them away to other territories or the ocean. Political imprisonment may be more likely 
because the government uses its reach to stifle dissent or relies on the faith citizens have in 
governmental institutions to trust that political prisoners “deserve it.”  Countries with mixed to 
poor respect for both the rights prohibiting political imprisonment and disappearances, like the 
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Philippines, Dominican Republic, and Israel all score highly on the reach-coastal capacity 
dimension. These countries have in-common domestic tensions, and governments that are 
capable, and who often feel justified in dealing with dissent in repressive ways.  
 Coercive-rentier capacity is much less influential than either administrative-extractive or 
reach-coastal capacity in explaining state respect for physical integrity rights. That said, 
coercive-rentier capacity does lower state respect for the right prohibiting political imprisonment, 
with a one standard deviation increase lowering the probability of respect by 33.8. Concretely, 
this result means that a state like Greece is 33.8% more likely to have a higher level of state 
respect for the right prohibiting political imprisonment than a state like Oman. This finding 
offers weak support for Hypothesis H4, that coercive-rentier capacity will have a negative effect 
on state respect for physical integrity rights. Coercive-rentier capacity may be related to this right 
more than other rights for multiple reasons. Political imprisonment is a tool that tends to generate 
a large amount of international and domestic attention. Coercive-rentier states may feel immune 
from these pressures due to their greater power relative to society. Coercive states also may have 
the capacity to arrest political dissidents.  
 That coercive-rentier capacity is not statistically significant for more physical integrity 
rights is surprising given the number of studies that posit coercion and rentierism should lead to 
more repression bad for human rights in general (Ross 2004; Fearon 2005; Tilly 2003). One 
explanation for this non-finding is that coercive-rentier capacity cuts both ways so often that it is 
only in conjunction with other factors that it becomes bad for physical integrity rights. One 
reason it could cut both ways is that coercive-rentier capacity can dissuade political dissent and 
remove the need to violate rights in an explicit way. This so-called “tyrannical peace” theory of  
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Table 3.1: Results of the Random-Effects Model of  
State Capacity and Physical Integrity Rights¹ 
(Presented as Odds Ratios of 1 Standard Deviation Change in X)  
 
VARIABLES 
Torture Political 
Imprisonment 
Disappearances Extrajudicial 
Killings 
Past Respect = 0 0.247*** 0.233*** 0.458*** 0.313*** 
 (0.018) (0.014) (0.027) (0.020) 
Past Respect = 1 0.433*** 0.466*** 0.667*** 0.598*** 
 (0.049) (0.051) (0.075) (0.088) 
Past Respect = 2² - - - - 
     
Civil Conflict = 1 0.877 0..814** 0.563*** 0.696*** 
 (0.189) (0.160) (0.041) (0.099) 
Regime Type³ 0.822 1.851*** 0.843 0.703** 
 (0.023) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022) 
Regime Coherenceª 1.575*** 1.377*** 1.339** 1.386** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Wealth  0.584 1.242 1.402 0.482* 
 (0.165) (0.180) (0.221) (0.167) 
Population 0.213** 0.513 0.675 0.160*** 
 (0.143) (0.150) (0.169) (0.110) 
Administrative-Extractive  3.334*** 2.812*** 4.947*** 7.359*** 
 (1.263) (0.758) (1.934) (3.100) 
International-Power 1.027 0.621 0.526** 1.061 
 (0.409) (0.212) (0.154) (0.352) 
Coercive-Rentier 0.999 0.661* 0.779 0.862 
 (0.264) (0.162) (0.174) (0.201) 
Reach-Coastal 1.364* 0.804* 0.744* 1.013 
 (0.230) (0.104) (0.121) (0.151) 
Social-Cohesion 0.807 0.763** 0.877 0.928 
 (0.132) (0.094) (0.104) (0.106) 
cut1 0.000*** 0.006* 0.007* 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.018) (0.019) (0.000) 
cut2 0.001* 0.128 0.069 0.000*** 
 (0.002) (0.357) (0.204) (0.000) 
sigma2_u 3.911*** 1.622** 1.692** 2.072** 
 (1.814) (0.356) (0.402) (0.725) 
Observations 1,356 1,352 1,355 1,356 
Number of Countries 100 100 100 100 
Robust Standard Errors In Parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
¹Random-Effects Model with Standard Errors Clustered by Country 
²Dropped due to Collinearity 
³Higher values = More Democratic 
ªHigher values = More Democratic or more Autocratic 
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Table 3.2: Implications of Results for Hypotheses of 
State Capacity and Physical Integrity Rights 
HYPOTHESES 
Expected  
Effect Results¹ 
Physical Integrity Rights H1: Admin-Extractive Capacity Positive Strong Confirm 
Physical Integrity Rights H2: International-Power Capacity  Mixed Weak Confirm 
Physical Integrity Rights H3: Reach-Coastal Capacity  Positive Weak Reject 
Physical Integrity Rights H4: Coercive-Rentier Capacity Negative Weak Confirm 
Physical Integrity Rights H5: Social-Cohesion Capacity Positive Weak Reject 
Torture TH1: Administrative-Extractive  Positive Strong Confirm 
Torture TH2: Reach-Coastal   Positive Confirm 
Political Imprisonment PIH1: International-Power Negative No Effect 
Political Imprisonment PIH2: Coercive-Rentier Negative Strong Confirm 
Disappearances DH1: Administrative-Extractive  Positive Strong Confirm 
Disappearances DH2: International-Power  Negative Strong Confirm 
Extrajudicial Killings EKH1: Administrative-Extractive  Positive Strong Confirm 
Extrajudicial Killings EKH2: Coercive-Rentier Negative No Effect 
¹Strong confirm = statistically significant for multiple rights with large effect 
 Weak confirm = statistically significant for two or fewer rights with small effect  
 Mixed = statistically significant for multiple rights but expected causal direction varies equally.  
Weak Reject = statistically significant for multiple rights but with the opposite expected 
influence for a majority of them.   
 No effect = not statistically significant for any rights or for a specific right.  
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Table 3.3: Percentage Change in Odds of Greater  
Government Respect For Physical Integrity Rights¹ 
Variable Torture Political Imprisonment Disappearances Extrajudicial Killing 
Past Respect = 0 -75.32% -76.67% -93.81% -68.73% 
Past Respect = 1 -56.73% -53.42% -68.37% -40.24% 
Past Respect = 2² -- -- -- -- 
Civil Conflict = 1 
 
-18.61% -80.14% -30.41% 
Regime Type³  
 
85.11% 
 
-29.70% 
Regime Coherenceª 57.54% 37.73% 0.90% 38.58% 
Wealth (ln GDP pc)    51.80% 
Population (ln) -78.72%   83.96% 
Administrative-
Extractive 
233.44% 181.16% 394.73% 635.86% 
International-Power   -47.37% 
 
Coercive-Rentier 
 
-33.88% -22.09% 
 
Reach-Coastal 36.36% -19.56% -25.56% 
 
Social-Cohesion 
 
-23.73%   
¹Percentages based on a 1 standard deviation change in the value of the dependent variable. Values only included for 
significant variables.  
²Dropped due to Collinearity 
³Higher values = More Democratic 
ªHigher values = More Democratic or more Autocratic 
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the relationship between coercive capacity and repression is supported by the results presented 
here. States with higher levels of coercion and rentierism may offer an extreme case of 
deterrence to dissent, since the state uses its rentier capacity to build such a large coercive 
apparatus that citizens calculate engaging in political dissent makes no sense since the odds of 
success are so low. Furthermore since government revenue comes from the exploitation few 
resources the ability of the citizenry to hold the government accountable in other ways through 
economic disruption, protests, and/or boycotts, is small as well.  
 Finally, as the results in Table 3.1 show, social-cohesion is also only significant in 
explaining state respect for the right prohibiting political imprisonment. This finding contradicts 
hypothesis H5, that social cohesion will have a positive influence on state capacity. The effect is 
small when compared with the other state capacity types, with a one standard deviation increase 
in social-cohesion capacity lowering the probability of a higher level of state respect by 23.7%. 
This counter-intuitive finding is surprising given the common notion that states with divided 
societies will have more conflict than those with homogeneous societies. One optimistic 
explanation for this finding is that states with high levels of social cohesion imprison those who 
oppose state laws like requirements to serve in the military, rather than other, harsher 
punishments like killings, torture, or disappearances. If true, this finding might reflect well on 
these states rather than poorly. An alternative is that states with high levels of social cohesion are 
often intolerant of those who speak out. This finding is discussed in more detail below. 
3.5.1 Results and Discussion: Torture 
Recall that torture is the most commonly practiced violation of physical integrity rights 
and explanations rest on the idea that it is considered less costly than other forms of repression 
and ensuring it is not used by rogue law enforcement or military officials is difficult (Cingranelli 
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and Richards 1999). Both hypotheses (torture H1 and torture H2) related to torture described in 
Table 3.2 are confirmed by the results presented above because the administrative-extractive and 
reach-coastal dimensions of state capacity increase the probability that states will have a higher 
level of state respect for the right prohibiting torture. This finding captures the idea that high 
quality institutions, and institutions with high levels of reach, make it possible for the 
government to actually ensure that law enforcement and military personnel do not engage in 
torture or cruel and inhumane punishment.  
Additionally, regime coherence, an indicator of having either fully autocratic or fully 
democratic institutions is also statistically significant in predicting state respect for torture when 
state capacity is included in the model. Population is also statistically significant, and states with 
larger populations have less respect for the right prohibiting torture. This combination of findings 
provides further evidence of the importance of institutional quality, reach, and stability in 
preventing torture. Democracy, on the other hand, is not statistically significant in explaining 
state respect for torture. This suggests it is less about institutional design than institutional 
capacity and coherence when trying to explain a government’s respect for the right prohibiting 
torture.  
3.5.2 Results and Discussion: Political Imprisonment 
As shown in Table 3.2 the results presented above indicate mixed results for political 
imprisonment hypotheses PIH1 and PIH2. Turning to the first hypothesis, international-power 
capacity was not statistically significant in explaining state respect for political imprisonment. 
International-power was expected to matter to state respect for this right because political 
prisoners, particularly in an era of proliferating human rights NGOs, are highly visible and 
persistent signs of repression. Therefore, states with higher levels of international-power capacity 
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would be able to resist pressure to change their tactics. However, the results presented in Table 
3.1 suggest that international-power is not important in explaining state respect for political 
imprisonment.  
Political imprisonment hypothesis PIH2 is confirmed as coercive-rentier capacity 
increases the odds of a lower level of state respect by 33.8%. This seems to be the chosen mode 
of repression for states with coercive-rentier capacity because it is the only right where coercive-
rentier capacity is statistically significant in explaining the level of state respect. As mentioned 
above, the explanation for this is most likely that governments in states with high levels of 
coercive-rentier capacity are the least tolerant of political dissent and feel in the best position to 
imprison opponents with impunity.  
Other dimensions of state capacity that are related to state respect for political 
imprisonment include the reach-coastal and social-cohesion capacities. As illustrated by Figure 
3.1 the effects of these types of capacity are moderate compared with those of regime type, 
regime coherence and administrative-extractive capacity, but a one standard deviation increase in 
either form of capacity increases the odds of a state being in a lower category of respect by 
19.56% and 23.73% respectively. As explained above, that reach-coastal capacity is negatively 
associated with state respect for this right suggests governments in states with high levels of 
institutional reach use that capability to imprison political opponents. This is evidence of state 
attributes often associated with “good” outcomes, like the provision of important public goods 
(Rotberg 2003), can also be used for repression. This finding confirms the expectation discussed 
in chapters one and two that state capacity types may often cut both ways.  
Similarly, that social-cohesion is also negatively associated with respect for the right 
prohibiting political imprisonment is suggests again that more cohesive societies may feel more 
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comfortable imprisoning dissenters because they are unlikely to become martyrs to a large, 
disenfranchised minority group. These states also may value conformity of political opinion or 
require military service, two factors that may result in many conscientious objectors. Examples 
of states with mixed to poor records of respect for the right to political imprisonment and high 
levels of social-cohesion capacity include North African countries like Tunisia and Egypt, 
Southeast Asian countries like Bangladesh and Thailand, as well as many island nations like the 
Philippines, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. Ultimately, this finding is an example of how it 
social-cohesion is a subordinate cause of state repression and is probably triggered by the 
presence of numerous overlapping factors. This confirms much of the literature on the role ethnic 
and religiously divided states play as a necessary but not sufficient condition for human rights 
violations to occur (Walker and Poe 2002).  
Control variables that are statistically significant in explaining state respect for the right 
prohibiting political imprisonment include ongoing civil conflict, regime type, and regime 
coherence. As shown in Figure 3.1, with the exception of administrative-extractive capacity 
regime type is the second most influential statistically significant variable, with a one standard 
deviation increase in a state’s level of democracy improving the probability of being in a higher 
category of state respect by 85.11%. This highlights the importance of democracy for the right 
prohibiting political imprisonment, and is evidence of the idea that democracies are more likely 
to value and protect political dissidents. Regime coherence is also important, though less so, with 
a one standard deviation only improving the odds of a state being in a higher category of respect 
by 37.73%. Indeed this is the only physical integrity right where a state’s level of democracy 
matters more than its level of coherence when controlling for state capacity, and it indicates that 
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democracies, most likely owing to public pressure and robust legal protections, are unlikely to 
engage in political imprisonment as a tactic of repression.  
3.5.3 Results and Discussion: Disappearances 
The results presented in Table 3.1 suggest strong support for both hypotheses related to 
disappearances (DH1 and DH2). Both administrative-extractive capacity and international-power 
capacity are statistically significant in explaining state respect for the right prohibiting 
disappearances and the influence of both dimensions of capacity operate in the expected 
direction. As with all the physical integrity rights, administrative-extractive capacity is 
associated with an increase in a government not using disappearances as a form of repression. 
The effect is large, with a one standard deviation change increase in administrative-extractive 
capacity raising the probability of a state being in a higher category of respect by 394.73%. This 
finding again offers support that institutional quality is the most important element in 
determining state respect for physical integrity rights.  
The influence of international-power is smaller than administrative-extractive capacity, 
but as Figure 3.1 shows, it is still an important factor. A one standard deviation increase in 
international-power raises the probability of a state being in a lower category of respect by 
47.37%. As mentioned above, this is the only right international-power capacity is statistically 
significant in explaining and it highlights the importance of different state capabilities in how 
they choose to violate physical integrity rights. States with large militaries are often involved in 
international conflicts, such as the so-called “war on terror” and may be more prone to disappear 
their own citizens because they view home-grown terrorists as a threat, and have the capability to 
carry out the difficult task of making someone vanish.  
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Reach-coastal capacity is also statistically significant and negatively associated with state 
respect for the right prohibiting disappearances. Again this finding is surprising given the 
physical integrity rights hypothesis H3, which posits that this type of capacity would be 
positively associated with state respect for physical integrity rights. Overall, this is another 
example of how disaggregating different institutional components can shed light on how 
governments repress their citizens. For example, administrative-extractive capacity focuses on 
institutional attributes that generate high quality resources for the government, while reach-
coastal capacity captures the level of penetration a state has in society. Both are important 
elements to a state being able to take a given action, but one leads to greater respect for rights 
while the other actually lowers respect for some rights.  
Additionally, when controlling for a state’s type and level of capacity, civil conflict and 
regime coherence are also statistically significant in explaining state respect for the right 
prohibiting disappearances. The effect of civil conflict in this case is large, with ongoing civil 
conflict lowering the probability of a state being in a higher category of respect by 80%. Civil 
conflict, and the chaos it brings with it, encourages governments to engage in disappearances. 
Regime coherence is positively associated with state respect for the right prohibiting 
disappearances but the effect is small, with a one standard deviation increase in coherence only 
increasing the probability of being in a higher category of respect by .9%.  
3.5.4 Results and Discussion: Extrajudicial Killings 
The final right investigated in this chapter is the one prohibiting extrajudicial killings. 
The results presented in Table 3.1 suggest that more than for any other right, administrative-
extractive capacity is the most important dimension of state capacity in explaining when states 
use extrajudicial killings as a form of repression a finding confirms EIH1. A one standard 
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deviation increase in administrative-extractive capacity raises the probability that a state will 
have higher respect for the right against extrajudicial killings by 635.86%. Figure 3.1 illustrates 
that this is by far the largest effect of any variable for any right. In states like Japan, Denmark, 
Sweden, and Germany, all at the top of this dimension of state capacity state sanctioned killings 
outside of the legal system are non-existent, while in states like Senegal, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Zambia, and Malawi they are much more likely.  
Hypothesis EIH2 on the other hand, that states with high levels of coercive-rentier 
capacity will have lower respect for the right prohibiting extrajudicial killings, is rejected due to 
the fact that coercive-rentier capacity is not statistically significant. Once again this finding may 
offer support for the idea that a government in a state with high levels of coercive-rentier 
capacity so deter violent uprisings, that killings as a form of repression are unnecessary. These 
governments may also be brutally straightforward in their strategies of repression, focusing 
solely on political imprisonment as the primary tactic which creates living breathing reminders 
of the consequences of political dissent.  
Outside of administrative-extractive capacity, state capacity in general seems to play a 
smaller role than other factors hypothesized to influence respect for physical integrity rights. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the importance of factors such as wealth, population, regime coherence, 
regime type, past repression, and civil conflict play in explaining state respect for extrajudicial 
killings. Perhaps the most interesting result is that when controlling for the different types of 
state capacity more democratic countries are more likely to engage in extrajudicial killings. A 
one standard deviation increase in regime type (more democratic) increases the odds of a state 
being in a lower category of respect by 29.70%. Perhaps democracies this result is explained by 
the fact that democracies’ preferred form of repression is to kill citizens rather than imprison, 
 
 
129 
 
disappear, or torture them all practices that leave victims and witnesses with the ability to call 
serious attention the rights violations. This could result in negative consequences for the 
government officials who in democracies can be held accountable for their actions to a greater 
extent than officials in other regime types. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 The goal in this chapter was to examine the relationship between the different dimensions 
of state capacity identified in chapter two, and all four physical integrity rights by testing 
hypotheses using a multivariate random-effects modeling technique. Disaggregating analysis of 
the physical integrity rights helps grow the understanding of ways that different state attributes, 
namely the level of type of state capacity, influence states decision of which physical integrity 
rights to violate and which to respect. Another advantage of this approach is that other factors 
often thought to influence state respect for physical integrity rights can be examined in a 
multivariate setting while controlling for the different dimensions of state capacity.  
 Overall, several important findings emerge. First, all dimensions of state capacity are 
statistically significant in explaining state respect for at least one physical integrity right. This 
result suggests that state capacity is indeed an important element in explaining state respect for 
physical integrity rights. However, some dimensions of state capacity are more important than 
others in explaining state respect for physical integrity rights, particularly administrative-
extractive capacity which, as illustrated in Figure 3.1, is the most influential independent variable 
for all four physical integrity rights.  
 A second important finding is that another dimension of state capacity associated with 
institutional capability and quality, reach-coastal capacity, has mixed results for each physical 
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integrity right. This suggests that the type and function of institutions matter and some may 
actually make a state more able to repress the citizens in certain ways. Specifically, institutions 
that enhance a state’s reach may actually also enable that state to repress the citizenry in ways 
weaker states cannot. Reach-coastal capacity raises the odds of states using disappearances, a 
tool of repression noted for its rarity and difficulty. This finding highlights the importance of 
understanding the kaleidoscope of conditions that make higher capacity good for physical 
integrity rights in some states and bad in others.  
 A third finding is that the social-cohesion, international-power, and coercive-rentier 
capacities are less important in explaining physical integrity rights. This finding offers support to 
the large literature suggesting that the quality and capability of institutions are the most crucial 
element in explaining the human rights practices of governments. The fact that geographic 
factors such as temperate climate, proximity to developed economies, and coastal land are all 
included in the institutional dimensions of state capacity also highlights the important symbiotic 
relationship between geography and institutions, and how that relationship can influence human 
rights outcomes. Identifying this pattern, may help policy-makers work with states that are dealt 
bad geographic or resource cards overcome these problems to build stronger institutions, 
particularly those that favor higher levels of administrative-extractive capacity.  
 A fourth finding is that when state capacity is included in the model, regime coherence is 
much more important in explaining state respect for all four physical integrity rights than is 
democracy or wealth. Regime coherence is statistically significant and exerts a relatively strong 
pull in a positive direction for all four rights. Democracy, on the other hand, is only statistically 
significant for two rights, and in the case of extrajudicial killings, is negatively associated with 
state respect. This finding offers support for the so-called “more murder in the middle” 
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hypothesis (Fein 1995) and suggests that security and stability, rather than democracy might be 
the best tactic for improving state respect for physical integrity rights.  
 Due to the variety of findings in this chapter, there is a great deal of potential for future 
research. Examining the precise causal mechanisms and potential interactive effects between 
different variables could be useful in painting a more complete picture of the relationship 
between state capacity and physical integrity rights. Moreover, that each country in each year is 
given a score on each dimension of state capacity, experts in particular regions or countries can 
examine if the causal logic revealed in this macro analysis hold true at the more micro level. This 
will hopefully aid policy-makers and human rights advocates in their efforts to improve the 
human rights practices of states around the world.   
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Chapter Four 
 
State Capacity and Empowerment Rights 
 
“While it is true that countries where the institutions of democracy (polyarchy) have been 
achieved set a relatively high world standard for rights and liberties…the evidence does not 
permit the complacent conclusion that advocates of human rights living in democratic 
countries can safely turn their attention exclusively to the plight of people in non-
democratic countries.” 
 
     --Robert Dahl (1999).  
4.1 Introduction  
 Of the large number of studies on state human rights practices, the vast majority of the 
empirical examinations focus on the violation of physical integrity rights. While physical 
integrity rights are often used to measure “state repression” there are undoubtedly many more 
ways for governments to repress their citizens beyond torture, political imprisonment, 
disappearances, and killings. Although these are certainly the most dramatic of human rights 
violations, government restrictions on so-called “empowerment rights” (Cingranelli and Richards 
2010) represent another, often more widespread and insidious, form of repression.  
 There is large variation in the degree to which states respect empowerment rights, or 
those rights that protect citizens’ ability to participate equally in political and social life. These 
rights include the freedoms of religion, association, speech, foreign movement, domestic 
movement, electoral self-determination, and worker’s rights. Of course, most of these rights are 
associated with democracy, so it would be easy to dismiss states who do not respect these rights 
as simply “undemocratic”, “illiberal,” or “authoritarian.” However, for decades studies of 
democratization have emphasized the “gradual nature” of democracy. That democracy is better 
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thought of as existing on a continuum than as a dichotomous, either/or regime type (Bollen and 
Jackman 1989; Collier and Levitsky 1997; Elkins 2000; Munck and Verkuilen 2002). Dahl’s 
statement at the head of this chapter remains as true today as it was in 1999; the fulfillment of 
human rights, including empowerment rights, remains highly imperfect, even in well-established 
democracies.  
 Obviously, the degree to which a regime is democratic is important in explaining state 
respect for empowerment rights. However, one assumption undergirding the analyses presented 
in this chapter is that democracy is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the realization of 
these rights. Because democracy is necessary but not sufficient, factors such as the state capacity 
types presented in chapter two of this project should influence the degree to which even 
democracies respect empowerment rights. Moreover, as with physical integrity rights, patterns of 
how states rationally calculate the level of empowerment citizens are granted and denied could 
be associated with state characteristics. The goal in this chapter, as in the previous one, is to 
explore the degree to which the measures of the state capacity types explain state respect for a set 
of human rights—in this case empowerment rights.  
 This chapter begins with a discussion of democracy and empowerment rights. Crucially, 
the discussion on democracy emphasizes that having democracy, even consolidated democracy, 
will not automatically mean that a state will have full state respect for all of the empowerment 
rights. The chapter then offers general hypotheses of how the different types and level of state 
capacity might influence state respect for empowerment rights in general. The chapter then 
moves on to outline some specific hypotheses of how the state capacity types will influence state 
respect for each empowerment. Finally, results of the analysis are presented and discussed before 
the chapter closes with some concluding thoughts and suggestions for future research.  
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4.2 Democracy and Empowerment Rights  
 When the Cold War ended in the early 1990s it gave rise to a number of theories in 
international relations that the spread of liberal democracy and capitalism would continue 
unabated. Famously, Fukuyama (1992) proclaimed liberal democracy was the only remaining 
political system that enjoyed legitimacy, regardless of the presence of many illiberal regimes. 
Since that period of great optimism about democracy, some critics have pointed out Fukuyama’s 
failure to anticipate the many states who would settle into new political equilibriums. In some 
ways these states resemble liberal democracies, but in other ways they are highly illiberal 
(Zakaria 1997). According to some, the continued existence of illiberal regimes in both China 
and Russia exemplify these new equilibriums (Gat 2007).  
The presence and persistence of many illiberal democracies led scholars to create a whole 
new realm of investigation into so-called “hybrid-regimes,” or those regimes that are not 
“transitioning” but are instead firmly ensconced somewhere between democracy and dictatorship 
(Diamond 2002). Consequently, numerous studies investigate the degree to which the 
democratization of these hybrid regimes affects human rights. It also caused those who study 
democracy to differentiate between so-called “consolidated democracies” and all other regime 
types. Linz and Stepan describe democratic consolidation thusly,  
 
Essentially, by a "consolidated democracy" we mean a political regime in which 
democracy as a complex system of institutions, rules, and patterned incentives 
and disincentives has become, in a phrase, "the only game in town” (1996, 15).  
 
Put simply, consolidated democracies are those regimes with no chance of backsliding into 
authoritarianism, and have a deep, high quality democracy which above all respects civil rights 
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and liberties, public participation in government through free and fair elections, and the rule of 
law (O’Donnell 2004).  
 Almost by definition then, consolidated democracies have high levels of respect for 
human rights. As discussed in the last chapter, a number of studies find that fully consolidated 
democracies have higher levels of respect for physical integrity rights and conversely, 
democratizing states that fall short of consolidation often have more repressive regimes 
(Davenport 1995; Fein 1995; Arat 1999; Poe, Tate, and Keith1999; Davenport and Armstrong 
2004). The causal mechanism is consolidated democracies are inherently more likely to bargain 
and compromise with their citizens, thus reducing the need for violent dissent (Henderson 1991). 
Moreover, checks on executive powers in consolidated democracies lessen the state’s ability to 
repress the citizenry and the presence of free and fair elections create sanctions for political elites 
who engage violate the rights of citizens (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). Of course, even high-
quality democracies still do violate physical integrity rights from time to time and regimes that 
are only partially democratic are often the worst violators of them all.  
 Similarly, consolidated democracies have high levels of respect for many empowerment 
rights almost by definition since these rights are considered necessary for citizens to enjoy full 
and equal participation in public life, and are indicative of a high quality democracy. That said, 
full respect for all of the empowerment rights is still beyond many robust, long-standing 
democracies, and is certainly out of reach for many hybrid regimes. Even in high functioning 
democracies some groups are disenfranchised, others are repressed in subtle ways and not so 
subtle ways, simply due to the wishes of the majority (Donnelly 1999; Davenport 2007).  
Linz and Steppan (1996), who originally defined consolidated democracy, also 
acknowledge that democracy is important but not determinative of perfect practices when it 
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comes to practices that might influence empowerment rights. Specifically, they outline five 
characteristics that separate consolidated from non-consolidated democracies. These criteria 
include freedom of association and communication, inclusive electoral contestation, rule of law, 
Weberian rational-legal bureaucracy, and economic freedom. Significantly, they note that it is 
nearly impossible to satisfy all of these criteria, and instead argue that mostly fulfilling these 
criteria still places a state in the consolidated category.  Imperfect governmental practices in 
consolidated regimes often come during times when these states experience moments of 
widespread dissent. For example, protests in the United States during the Occupy Wall Street 
movement, or more recently in Ferguson Missouri, resulted in allegations of numerous violations 
of empowerment rights. Yet, despite these incidents, few make the case that the United States is 
not a consolidated democracy.  
In a related argument, Lijphart (1999) finds that there are many “patterns of democracy” 
depending on how institutions and elections in the country operate. In a study of thirty-six 
democracies, Lijphart makes distinctions between federal and unitary systems, majoritarian and 
proportional systems, and bicameral and unicameral systems. Crucially all of these countries are 
still considered high functioning democracies, but they deliver dramatically different experiences 
for their citizens. Specifically, Lijphart argues that some forms of democracy are “kinder” and 
“gentler” to their population than others.  
 Therefore, it is folly to expect that even in consolidated democracies empowerment 
rights will be respected by governments fully, at all times in all ways. What is more likely, is that 
consolidated democracies have higher levels of respect for empowerment rights than hybrid and 
authoritarian regimes, but will still violate rights in certain patterns based on the level and type of 
state capacity a regime can tap into to take actions. Put simply, there is still much state capacity 
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can explain about the level of respect states, including democracies, have for all of the 
empowerment rights.  
 
4.3 General Hypotheses of State Capacity and Empowerment Rights  
By now it should be clear that political democracy, while very important to state respect 
for empowerment rights, is only a necessary but not sufficient condition for governments to fully 
respect these rights. Different levels and types of state capacity should influence government 
respect for the various empowerment rights in a number of ways. Below are some general 
hypotheses about the relationship each type of state capacity should have on a government’s 
respect for empowerment rights.  
 
Empowerment Rights H1: States with higher levels of administrative-extractive capacity will 
have higher levels of governmental respect for empowerment rights than those with lower levels.   
 
Administrative-extractive capacity is important to the provision of public goods. This 
type of capacity includes a state’s ability to collect taxes from domestic sources and maintain 
high levels of investor confidence. Both of these are important factors in the level of resources 
states can spend on public goods, and thus crucial to the government undermining sources of 
grievances and dissent (Gurr 1970; Rotberg 2003; Levi 1989; Besley and Persson 2009; 2011).  
The inability of the state to provide social goods creates a perfect storm for the reduction in state 
respect for empowerment rights. A weak state, which may allow some freedoms like speech, 
association, movement, unionize, and the ability to vote, also may experience the growing voice 
of grievances from the population. Historical patterns under these circumstances are for nations 
to turn to strong men, who promise wildly during elections to win votes and then squeeze out any 
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dissent once in power—often using a combination of subtle and extreme repression in the 
process (Diamond 2010).  
Examples of this so-called “capture and corruption” (Remington 2006) process is visited 
upon weak states with disturbing frequency. The pattern takes shape in the form of leaders like 
Napoleon in France, Idi Amin in Uganda, Mugabe in Zimbabwe, Fujimori in Peru, Chavez in 
Venezuela, and Putin in Russia. All these leaders took over countries with limited capacity to 
provide social goods, and consequently with populations who were skeptical of the ability of 
democracy to solve social problems. As a consequence all of these states’ citizens experienced a 
decline in the ability to participate meaningfully in their governments, as well as the ability to 
enjoy civil liberties associated with democracy, such as empowerment rights. Therefore, the 
strong institutions and sustainable resources associated with administrative-extractive capacity 
should lead to higher levels of respect for empowerment rights.  
 
Empowerment Rights H2: States with higher levels of international-power capacity will have 
lower levels of governmental respect for empowerment rights than those with higher levels.   
 
International-power capacity also affects the government’s options when it faces dissent, 
but it often empowers the government to repress the citizenry. As argued in previous chapters 
international-power capacity may simultaneously create grievances and insulate a government 
from international pressure to avoid repression. International-power capacity can create 
grievances because governments in powerful states tend to become involved in international 
power politics which makes war more likely (Senese and Vasquez 2008). War creates grievances 
because the costs are often borne disproportionately by certain elements of the population, this is 
particularly true if the war goes poorly (Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller 1992). 
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Furthermore, times of war tend to lead to domestic crackdowns or so-called “exclusionary 
ideologies” based on national security that negatively impact government respect for 
empowerment rights like association, speech, and assembly (Cardenas 2007). The anti-sedition 
acts in the United States are examples of how a democracy can use national security as a pretext 
for violations of empowerment rights (Costa 1998).  
Another reason international-power capacity could have a negative impact on state 
respect for empowerment rights is that powerful states feel insulated from international pressure 
to change their practices. Cardenas (2007) argues that states like South Africa, that the 
international community is willing to impose immense pressure on during times of human rights 
violations, makes it them more likely they will change their behavior. China, on the other hand is 
relatively immune to pressure, and while a host of variables contribute to this, international 
power is an important factor. While this similar logic as that posited for the role international-
power capacity plays in physical integrity rights in chapter three, it could be even more important 
for violations of empowerment rights, as they are less easily hidden, making a state’s ability to 
resist pressure from the international community crucial to its decision to continue violations. 
  
Empowerment Rights H3: States with higher levels of reach-coastal capacity will have higher 
levels of governmental respect for empowerment rights than those with lower levels.  
 
Reach-coastal state capacity is closely related to the idea of “infrastructural power” 
posited by Mann (1984; 1993). 41  Both include measures of contract intensive money (CIM) and 
both attempt to capture the government’s ability to penetrate all areas of its territory in deep and 
                                                          
41 Fortin (2012) in operationalizing Mann’s (1984; 1993) conceptualization of infrastructural power also includes 
CIM. 
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meaningful ways. This type of capacity is often linked to higher levels of democracy and 
therefore should improve state respect for empowerment rights in general. For example, in a 
study of Eastern European countries, Fortin (2012) demonstrates that “infrastructural” state 
capacity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for democracy to consolidate.  Fortin argues,  
 
If there is no organization and competent state authority, even highly mobilized 
citizens cannot possibly influence policies. In such settings, the state will not be in 
a position to carry out basic policies, much less social policies that require even 
higher state capacity for effective implementation (2012, 906).  
 
The lynchpin of any conception of democracy is that leaders are accountable to the people and 
therefore deliver social goods in response to demands (Cheibub and Przeworski 1999). When 
leaders do not deliver social goods they are voted out and presumably new leaders will respond 
to the demands of the people appropriately, however, if the state is unable to deliver social goods 
to all areas of its territory certain areas may rise up and indiscriminate repression of 
empowerment rights will emerge.  
Another way reach-coastal capacity might influence the government’s respect for 
empowerment rights is that it will affect the number of options available to the government to 
cope with dissent. Numerous studies show that in the event of insurgency, or organized dissent, 
the best tactic a state can use to successfully repress the citizenry is targeted, rather than 
indiscriminate violence or intimidation (De Nardo, 1985; Mason and Krane 1989; Goodwin 
2001). Targeted tactics, however, are difficult for states with low capacity to carry out because 
they require a robust intelligence gathering state apparatus (Kalyvas 2006). Therefore greater 
amounts of reach-coastal state capacity will be beneficial to government respect for 
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empowerment rights since it allows governments to target only those citizens who are threats and 
to avoid widespread violations of empowerment rights.  
 
Empowerment Rights H4: States with higher levels of coercive-rentier capacity will have lower 
levels of governmental respect for empowerment rights than those with lower levels.  
 
 Governments in states with high levels of coercive-rentier capacity should be more 
inclined to repress empowerment rights. These states have the combination numerous grievances 
often associated with the highly unequal economies and corruption often associated with rentier 
states (Karl 1997; Ross 2004; Fearon 2005), and a large coercive apparatus to simply crush 
dissent by violating empowerment rights rather than incorporating dissent through a peaceful 
political process. Moreover, rentier states can use the revenue extracted from the export of 
primary commodities to fund ever larger coercive capability, this allows the government and 
political elites to remain immune from the consequences of failing to allow citizens a greater 
influence in the political process.  
 Overall, the one consistent observation in the literature on government repression is that 
if leaders feel repression will be costly then they avoid it until there is no alternative. If leaders 
feel it will be a relatively low-cost option with a high potential for success then it is much more 
likely (Gurr 1986; Simon 1994; Lichbach 1995; Gartner and Regan 1996; Davenport 2007; 
2007a). Coercive-rentier capacity lowers the costs of repression by divorcing the political elite 
from political consequences because they do not need to encourage robust diverse economies 
that often require respect for empowerment rights.  
 
Empowerment Rights H5: States with higher levels of social-cohesion capacity will have 
higher levels of governmental respect for empowerment rights than those with lower levels.  
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 Social-cohesion capacity should improve government respect for empowerment rights. 
Governments in states with higher levels of social cohesion should experience greater levels of 
economic growth because of the deleterious effect diversity is noted to have levels of trust 
between citizens (Easterly and Levine 1997). Furthermore, diversity tends to lower the 
government’s ability to provide social goods while simultaneously increasing rent-seeking 
behavior (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999). This is likely due to individuals using their ethnic 
or religious group membership to organize with the hope of extracting a greater share of political 
influence and resources (Horowitz 1985). While democracy, particularly respect for “political 
rights,” is seen as a panacea for these problems (Collier 1998) it is not a smooth or easy road to 
get there, empowerment rights may be severely restricted for groups not in power. Horowitz 
writes,  
Ethnically divided societies…have a special version of the usual democratic 
problem of assuring decent treatment of the opposition. Opposition to government 
is always susceptible to portrayal as resistance to popular will. An ethnically 
differentiated opposition can easily be depicted as consisting of particularly 
dangerous enemies (1993, 19).  
 
 In addition to the problems of ensuring that empowerment rights of minority or 
opposition groups are protected in diverse societies, the factor analysis in chapter two revealed 
that social-cohesion capacity also contains low levels of rentierism, which helps governments in 
these states avoid many of the pitfalls that rentier states encounter. I argued above that these 
rentier-state pitfalls make repression of empowerment rights more likely, and the fact that 
cohesive societies often have lower levels of rentierism means empowerment rights should stand 
a better chance of being respected.  
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4.4 Rights Specific Hypotheses   
 The preceding section offered some general hypotheses about the relationship between 
the different dimensions of state capacity and physical integrity rights. However, one important 
observation of a growing number of studies is that governments violate human rights in different 
patterns, which is why disaggregating the rights and evaluating them individually is an important 
step in building understandings of government respect for human rights (Cingranelli and 
Richards 2010). It is my contention that a state’s level and type of state capacity will influence 
which empowerment rights governments violate because their array of available policy options 
are determined by the level and type of state capacity on which they can draw. While one could 
find literature to justify hypotheses about the relationship between each state capacity type and 
each empowerment right, doing so is beyond the scope if this chapter. Instead this section 
includes a description of the hypothesized relationship between the two state capacity types the 
literature suggests are most likely to influence each empowerment right.42  
 4.4.1 Freedoms of Assembly and Association, Speech, and Religion 
 The rights to freedom of association, speech, and religion are perhaps the most basic 
protections prescribed by modern liberalism. A central idea of the modern liberal project is that 
rights act as a bulwark against governments, particularly those rights termed “civil rights and 
liberties,” that allow the population to participate freely in the political process (Donnelly 1999). 
These rights are also essential to a healthy civil society, which acts a check on abusive 
governmental power (Edwards 2014). A government that respects these rights is closer to the 
                                                          
42 It is important to emphasize that this list of right-specific hypotheses is in no way meant to imply that these are 
the only important potential hypotheses linking the dimensions of state capacity to each empowerment right. Only 
that these are the most examined hypotheses in the theoretical literature on each empowerment right. Another 
important observation is the fact that rights are interactive, and that is something left unexamined in this 
dissertation. Governmental respect for worker’s rights, for example, are often thought to be determined by state 
respect for the right to association, since association is the primary form of claim making (Leary 1996).  
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democratic ideal discussed by consolidation theorists who emphasize the “quality of democracy” 
over procedures like elections, in determining the level of freedom in a society (O’ Donnell 
1996). However, these rights, particularly during times of political turmoil or national security 
threats are often the first rights restricted by governments in the name of ensuring safety or 
keeping the peace.   
 Despite the fact that governments often restrict these rights, particularly when they desire 
to engage in an unpopular policy or practice, state capacity should help explain which 
governments are more or less likely to violate each of the rights to association, speech, and 
religion. Furthermore, despite the fact that these rights are related they are different enough that 
different forms of capacity should influence the level of government respect for them in unique 
ways.  
 
Association AH1: States with high levels of reach-coastal capacity will have higher levels of 
governmental respect for the right protecting freedom of association and assembly.  
 
 The right to freedom of assembly and association is fundamental to a democratic society 
because, as Soviet dissident Ludmilla Alexeeva argues, it is the right that protects the ability to 
demand all other rights (The Washington Post 2011). Because of the power of this right, weak 
governments are the first to violate it, and governments that lack control over large swaths of 
territory are the first to attempt to do so. Governments that lack control over areas live in fear 
that dissidents will gain territorial footholds in areas where the government’s penetration is 
weakest (Buhaug and Gates 2002).  Therefore, reach-coastal capacity should increase state 
respect for this right because it is the dimension of state capacity that most closely captures the 
reach of governmental control.  
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Association AH2: States with high levels of coercive-rentier capacity will have lower levels of 
governmental respect for the right protecting freedom of association and assembly.  
 
 As I have argued throughout this dissertation coercive-rentier capacity is the dimension 
of state capacity that most enables governments to engage in repression. It does this by lowering 
the costs of the government violating rights because it insulates the government from reprisals 
from the population. Particularly, the combination of coercive-rentier capacity creates grievances 
from the population due to the corruption and inequality that accompanies rentierism and the 
subsequent coercive crackdowns. Governments in states with high levels of the coercive-rentier 
dimension of capacity, then, will feel empowered to restrict the freedom of association and 
assembly to a greater extent than governments in states with low levels of this form of capacity.  
 
Speech SH1: States with high levels of administrative-extractive capacity will have higher levels 
of governmental respect for the right protecting freedom of association and assembly.  
  
 The right protecting freedom of speech is different from the freedom assembly and 
association because one person can engage in speech the government does not like whereas with 
assembly and association requires that multiple people engage in action for the right to be 
enjoyed.43 Freedom of expression is often restricted in the form of crackdowns on members of 
the press. Russia under President Putin, for example, is notorious for restricting the rights of the 
press to criticize the government. Governmental respect for the freedom of speech should be less 
a function of a government’s reach, as with association and assembly, and more closely linked to 
                                                          
43 The difference between having and enjoying a right is outlined by Shue (1980). To “enjoy” a right in this context 
means that, beyond being granted by law, a right is actually used in practice, as intended, in the name of social 
justice.  
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a government’s administrative-extractive capacity. Higher levels of administrative-extractive 
capacity should increase state respect for the right protecting freedom of speech because 
governmental institutions should be relatively adept at providing public goods that lower the 
odds of grievances. Furthermore, the government should have the resources to address and 
incorporate criticism raised by oppositional speech, which should undercut the need for the state 
to violate this right.  
 
Speech SH2: States with high levels of international-power capacity will have lower levels of 
governmental respect for the right protecting freedom of speech.   
 
 As I argue at other points in this dissertation, international-power capacity can have an 
insulating effect on regimes that choose to violate rights. States with power tend to attract 
investment, influence the international economy in their favor, and generally avoid the costs of 
“naming and shaming” that can come with violating rights (Walldorf 2008).44 Furthermore, these 
states are often the target of international terrorism and internal secessionist groups. The security 
concerns surround these threats can often act as a compelling pretext for governments to restrict 
empowerment rights, particularly the right protecting the freedom of speech. Russia and China 
are examples of this as they both engage in wide-ranging censorship and violations of the press 
in order to maintain control over the population and continue policies that could spark outrage 
amongst a properly informed citizenry.  
 
                                                          
44 Walldorf (2008) argues that there are some conditions under which the international community, particularly 
the great powers, will cancel strategic alliances due to human rights concerns. However, these conditions are 
limited and so exceptional that they offer support for the idea that human rights concerns are largely secondary to 
strategic ones.  
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Religion RH1: States with high levels of reach-coastal capacity will have higher levels of 
governmental respect for the right protecting freedom of religion.  
 
 The right protecting freedom of religion is one of the most widely adopted human rights 
in constitutions world-wide, appearing in over 90% of all constitutions (Ginsburg, Elkins, and 
Simmons 2013). Despite this enjoying broad de jure support, however, this right is violated by 
numerous governments in practice. Causes of violations of the right protecting religious freedom 
are legion, and according to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Religion 
and Belief, include factors such as historical tensions between groups, competing claims to 
geographical within a state, and that a religious minority promotes violence and therefore must 
be repressed for the safety of a state’s population as a whole (United Nations, 2012). Religious 
minorities often become scapegoats of governments who feel threatened by political dissent or 
feel that control over state territory is weakening. Therefore, governments in states with high 
levels of reach-coastal capacity will be less likely to engage in violations of the freedom of 
religion than states with low levels. Reach-coastal capacity captures not only the penetration of 
the government into all areas of the territory but also citizens’ faith in governmental regulation 
and institutions all of which are likely to prevent government crackdowns on freedom of 
religion.  
 
Religion RH2: States with high levels of social-cohesion capacity will have higher levels of 
governmental respect for the right protecting freedom of religion.  
 
 The social-cohesion capacity dimension of state capacity includes measures of religious 
fractionalization, ethnic fractionalization, and low levels of rentierism by the government. All of 
these factors should reduce the potential for religious tensions to emerge as the source of 
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grievances and as a source of governmental repression. Therefore, states with high levels of 
social-cohesion should experience lower levels of government repression of the freedom of 
religion.  
 4.4.2 State respect for Freedom of Movement  
 The freedom of movement, both foreign and domestic, is another important component of 
empowerment rights. Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes the 
right to freedom of movement (UN General Assembly, 1948). While this right is often taken for 
granted in free societies, its importance becomes conspicuous in its restriction. The freedom of 
movement has two dimensions. Some states primarily restrict the movement of citizens to travel 
to and from other countries while other states restrict the movement of citizens within a country. 
Movement is often considered a fundamental freedom and States like Myanmar (Burma) and 
North Korea are notorious for restricting the movement of their citizens both domestically and 
internationally.45 The purpose is to control them and avoid the organization of political 
opposition, the spread of ideas counter to the regime in power, and the embarrassment of mass 
defections (Dowty 1989). Movement is often restricted by states who seek to exert harsh control 
over their citizens. A method of movement restriction often involves requiring citizens to carry 
papers that designate where they can travel or work.  
 
Domestic Movement DMH1: States with greater levels of administrative-extractive capacity 
will have higher levels of governmental respect for the right to domestic movement than states 
with higher levels.  
 
                                                          
45 Myanmar (Burma) has received a score of “0” signaling “no respect” for both Domestic and Foreign Movement 
since 1989 by the CIRI Human Rights Data Project (CIRI). North Korea has never received anything but a 0 for all 
years included in the CIRI database.  
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 One of the principle reasons freedom of domestic movement is restricted within a state is 
because the government feels that the movement of populations will carry with it the movement 
of threats, either from peaceful political opponents or from violent home-grown terrorists. 
Another reason to restrict domestic movement is that governments seek to segregate minority 
groups they fear will undermine majority control, or create tensions. Often these reasons are used 
as political pretext to hinder the movement of political opposition or to preserve control over a 
particular industry or labor force by the political elite (Weiner 2009).  Governments in states 
with higher levels of administrative-extractive capacity should be able to ameliorate these fears 
by using their institutional capacity to monitor only those individuals they are concerned about, 
and by providing the public goods that lessen grievances of political opposition.  
 
Domestic Movement DMH2: States with greater levels of coercive-rentier capacity will have 
lower levels of governmental respect for the right to domestic movement than states with higher 
levels.  
 
 A state capacity type that could increase restrictions on the freedom of domestic 
movement is coercive-rentier capacity. As discussed throughout this dissertation, coercive-
rentier capacity couples the potential for serious grievances owing to high levels of corruption 
and economic inequality with a state that has the ability to repress citizens. This makes it more 
likely the government will seek to control the population rigidly, in an attempt to undermine the 
ability of coherent political opposition to form. Furthermore, in states that engage in rentierism, 
governments are likely to prioritize controlling certain industries that have to do with primary 
commodities, therefore restrictions on domestic movement will be more likely to maintain 
control over the labor force in these industries.  
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Foreign Movement FMH1: States with higher levels of international-power capacity will have 
lower levels of governmental respect for the right to foreign movement than states with lower 
levels.  
 
 As argued throughout this dissertation, one of the principle consequences for states with 
large amounts of international power is that they are more likely to be engaged in international 
power politics, which includes military conflicts. States involved in military conflicts often 
become the targets of espionage and foreign terrorist groups. Therefore, governments in these 
states will attempt to restrict the foreign movement of their citizens because they fear foreign 
movement will allow their citizens to participate in activities that might damage the state. 
Furthermore, given that protecting territorial sovereignty is still one of the primary components 
of the modern international system, governments in states engaged in military conflicts will 
focus more intensely on this goal, and will use the conflict as a pre-text to violate rights to 
foreign movement (Harvey and Barnridge 2007).  
  
Foreign Movement FMH2: States with higher levels of social-cohesion capacity will have 
lower levels of governmental respect for the right to foreign movement than states with lower 
levels.  
 
 One variable that is often linked to instability and violent uprisings within a state is the 
presence of a large minority group diaspora just over the border (Collier and Hoeffler 2000; 
Fearon and Laitin 2003). Governments in these states may have reason to fear that members of 
ethnic groups with large diasporas living outside the country are more likely to leave in an effort 
to get military training, or to agitate in the neighboring country in an effort to destabilize the 
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region to open up space to gain political influence and control for their ethnic group. States with 
high levels of social-cohesion capacity will have less to fear from this potential threat to political 
stability, therefore the incentives for the government to restrict the right to foreign movement are 
lower in these states.  
 4.4.3 State respect for Electoral Self-Determination and Workers’ Rights.  
 Both electoral self-determination and workers’ rights are crucial to empowerment, but 
they stand at different points on the spectrum when it comes to how deeply they reflect state 
commitment to empowerment. Electoral self-determination is perhaps the minimal standard for 
democracy, and thus, empowerment. The debate over the importance of elections in defining 
democracy is well developed, and many argue it represents but a first step on the continuum 
toward high quality democracy. That said its relationship to respect for other human rights is 
mixed which is further evidence of the danger of using elections as a proxy for deeper 
conceptualizations of democracy (Richards and Gelleny 2007).  
 Workers’ rights on the other hand, sit at the opposite end of the spectrum in terms of 
representing a deep commitment to empowerment. Workers’ rights allow workers to participate 
“in the determination of their wages, hours, and working conditions” (Gross 2002, 480).  This 
infusion of democratic principles into an often hierarchical and contested realm of activity, work, 
is indicative of a society with deeply entrenched egalitarian values and protections. In many 
ways they embody what O’Donnell (1996) refers to as “horizontal accountability” in society as 
well as in government, a fundamental component of consolidated democracies. Workers’ rights 
then reflect a deep commitment, to not just procedural democracy, but also to democratic values. 
Although they the right to electoral self-determination and the worker’s rights reflect different 
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dimensions of empowerment and the depth of democracy, state capacity types should influence 
state respect for them.  
 
Electoral Self-Determination SDH1: States with high levels of administrative-extractive will 
have higher governmental respect for the right to electoral self-determination than those with 
low levels.  
 
 Elections are often one of the first elements to appear in a state as it transitions from an 
authoritarian regime to a more democratic regime (Brownlee 2009). States with higher levels of 
administrative-extractive capacity are more likely to reach the levels of wealth required for these 
transitions to take place because they are able to attract foreign investment and also levee and 
collect taxes from domestic sources. In states with this type of capacity the government is more 
likely to want to bring the people into the political process than to shut them out to ensure that 
social capital is used to continue to grow and diversify the economy, which will provide the 
government with more resources (Evans 1995). Elections are a first step in doing achieving this 
goal.  
 
Electoral Self-Determination SDH2: States with high levels of coercive-rentier capacity will 
have lower governmental respect for the right to electoral self-determination than those with 
lower levels.  
 
 Governments in states with high levels of coercive-rentier capacity will have lower 
incentives to respect the right for electoral self-determination. Governments that engage in 
rentierism are often fearful of allowing the population to engage in the political process because 
the political elite’s power rests almost complexly on their ability to exert absolute control over 
the natural resources in the state (Karl 1997; Ross 2004). The costs of losing power through 
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popular elections are too high and therefore states with high levels of coercive-rentier capacity 
will work to repress this right as long as possible.  
 
Worker’s Rights WH1: States with high levels of both administrative-extractive and reach-
coastal capacities will have higher governmental respect for the right to workers’ rights than 
those with low levels.  
 
 Unlike conducting elections, respecting worker’s rights is a much more complex and 
difficult task even for consolidated democracies. Internationally recognized worker’s rights 
include the rights at work to association, to organize and collectively bargain, no compulsory 
labor, a minimum age of employment for children, and acceptable conditions of work including 
minimum wages, hours, and occupational safety and health.46 Enforcement of these rights often 
face significant hurdles as the state must have extensive monitoring, the ability to impose 
sanctions against powerful economic interests—a particularly difficult task in developing 
countries—the ability to resist pressure from international markets to lower work standards, and 
finally, the appropriate education so workers know their rights and can claim them.  
 Indeed enforcing worker rights domestically is often so difficult that advocates 
emphasize the role developed countries like the United States must play in forcing developing 
countries to adhere to international labor standards (Compa 2002; Alston 2004). Given this 
difficulty it is likely that states with higher levels of administrative-extractive capacity will 
improve worker rights as it is the type of state capacity most closely related to governmental 
oversight and institutional capability.  
                                                          
46 These are the rights included under the category of “worker rights” in the CIRI human rights data which are 
based on the 1984 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
(Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2013, 65). For more on the GSP see Compa and Vogt (2001). 
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Worker Rights WRH2: States with higher levels of coercive-rentier capacity will have lower 
levels of respect for worker rights than states with lower levels.  
 
 Governments in states with high levels of coercive-rentier capacity are less likely to 
respect worker rights. Governments with high levels of coercive-rentier capacity rule by 
monopolizing a natural resource and in repressing any organized political opposition. Worker 
rights to assemble, organize, and collectively bargain are often seen as the beginnings of 
potential political opposition or even revolution, therefore states that fear opposition use their 
coercive capacity to brutally end attempts of workers to unionize. An example of this is the well 
documented killings by paramilitary groups of Coca-Cola bottling plant employees attempting to 
organize in countries such as Guatemala (Blanding 2010).  
 
4.5 Alternative Hypotheses 
 In addition to state capacity, there are numerous other factors that are thought to 
influence state respect for empowerment rights. As discussed earlier in this chapter, regime type 
is probably factor most likely to influence state respect for empowerment rights. Empowerment 
rights like freedom of association, speech, religion, and electoral self-determination are 
considered fundamental elements of democracy. Therefore it is unsurprising that work on this 
subject finds a strong relationship between indicators of democracy and respect for 
empowerment rights (Cole 2015).   
 One modification to the regime type hypothesis is that the relationship between regime 
type and empowerment rights is not linear. Some find that states stuck in transition between 
authoritarianism and democracy are more likely to restrict certain empowerment rights than 
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states that are fully authoritarian or consolidated democracies. This is particularly true for 
transitional states experimenting with elections (Mansfield and Snyder 2007; Aleman and Woods 
2014). Therefore, that higher regime coherence may lead to greater respect for empowerment 
rights is an important potential alternative hypothesis.  
 Another condition strongly associated with a reduction in state respect for physical 
integrity rights is ongoing violent civil conflict or civil war. As Hafner-Burton (2013) notes, 
ongoing civil conflict is arguably one of the most well-established causes of human rights 
violations. States experiencing civil conflict tend to be at their weakest and most threatened 
creating a doubly strong incentive to violate human rights. Weak states are unable to protect their 
citizens from the harms that can occur during civil conflict by both government forces and rebel 
forces alike (Englehart 2009). Though few studies have looked at this specifically in the context 
of state respect for empowerment rights, it is likely that it will have a negative effect on state 
respect for all human rights.  
A state’s level development or wealth along with its population is also potentially linked 
to the level of governmental respect for empowerment rights. Wealth is a well documented 
associate of more robust democracy (Lipset 1959; Inglehart 1997) which, by definition should 
improve respect for many empowerment rights. Large populations are also often thought to lead 
to greater levels of human rights violations because diversity larger populations often raise the 
costs of a state taking action and can also make the government’s control over a territory more 
tenuous and repression more likely (Henderson 1993; Herbst 2000).47  
                                                          
47 Although, numerous studies use the same set of controls across a number of different rights (Poe, Tate, and 
Keith 1999; Hafner-Burton 2008; 2014; Cole 2015). I recognize that a number of these rights could be influenced 
idiosyncratically by various factors. Worker rights, for example, are often thought to be improved by increased FDI 
(Neumayer and de Soysa 2006) and by the presence or absence of restrictive developmental loans that impose 
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4.6 Data and Methods   
 As with the investigation of the role state capacity plays in state respect for physical 
integrity rights, measures of the rights in question come from the CIRI Human Rights Data 
Project (henceforth referred to simply as “CIRI”) (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). However, in 
this case justifying this choice is much easier since CIRI provides the only comprehensive set of 
measures of empowerment rights. Empowerment rights include the rights to the freedoms of 
speech, association, religion, foreign movement, domestic movement, electoral self-
determination, and work protections. Certainly other measures of all of these individual 
empowerment rights exist, however, they do not exist in one comparable dataset where the 
conditions under which scores are created is similar across rights. As with each physical integrity 
right, scores for the seven empowerment rights are all coded 0 for “no respect”, 1 for “partial 
respect”, and 2 for “full respect”.   
The indicators used to control for alternative hypotheses are discussed at greater length in 
chapter three. These include an indicator of ongoing civil conflict from the PRIO/UCDP Armed 
Conflict Database (Gleiditsch et al. 2002; Themnér and Wallensteen 2014), an indicator of 
regime type from the Polity IV project (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2013), an indicator of 
regime coherence which is simply a squared version of the Polity IV regime type score, and the 
natural logs of GDP per capita from the World Development Indicators (WDI) and population 
from the Correlates of War (COW) project (Singer and Small 1994).  
4.6.1 Estimation Technique 
To test the hypotheses of the relationship between state capacity and empowerment rights 
a random-effects ordered logistic model with lagged dummy variables of the dependent variable 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
neoliberal structural adjustment policies on states (Arat 2002). I return to this idea in the conclusion and argue that 
more tailored models of state capacity and empowerment rights are necessary in the future.  
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and standard errors clustered by country is used. The advantages of this approach are described 
in greater detail in chapter three (see section 3.4.1). Ultimately, this estimation technique 
provides the best controls for heterogeneity, autocorrelation, serial correlation, and 
heteroskedasticity, all common problems that can bias results when analyzing cross-national 
time-series panel data.  
 
4.6 Results and Discussion 
 This section includes a description of the analysis of state capacity and empowerment 
rights. I start by explaining the implications of the results of this analysis for the general 
hypotheses on state respect for empowerment rights (empowerment rights hypotheses H1-H5). I 
then move on to discuss what the findings indicate with respect to the two hypotheses for each 
individual empowerment right. I also discuss how the inclusion of state capacity in the model 
influences the effect of other factors hypothesized to affect governmental respect for 
empowerment rights.  
 The results of the random-effects ordered logistic model are presented as odds ratios in 
Table 4.1. The values in each column reflect the effect that each independent variable has for 
each empowerment right listed at the top of that column. Odds ratios above 1 indicate an 
increase in the independent variable of 1 standard deviation increases the probability a 
government has  higher levels of respect for the given empowerment right. Odds ratios below 1 
indicate an increase in the independent variable lowers the probability a government has higher 
levels of respect for the given empowerment right.48  
                                                          
48 An odds ratio of exactly 1 indicates the variable has no effect on the probability of higher or lower respect for a 
given right.  
 
 
158 
 
 Table 4.2 summarizes the hypotheses by listing state capacity factors and their expected 
effects on physical integrity rights in general and individually. If higher levels of a state capacity 
dimension are hypothesized to improve state respect for a right or rights the table reads 
“positive” under “expected effect.” If it says “negative” then higher values on that state capacity 
dimension is expected to decrease respect for the right or rights under examination. If the state 
capacity dimension is statistically significant for the level of state respect for multiple rights, or 
exerts a large influence over state respect for a single right, it receives a “strong confirm.” If the 
state capacity dimension is statistically significant but works in the opposite direction of the 
expected effect, for at least one right, it may receive either a “mixed” or “weak reject” depending 
on the strength of the effect. Finally, if the right is only significant for state respect of one right 
and/or exerts small influence over state respect for a right then it receives a “weak confirm.”   
Table 4.3 depicts the percentage (as opposed to odds) change one standard deviation 
increase in each independent variable has for the probability of an increase in state respect for 
each physical integrity right. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the relative increase in odds of a 
standard deviation increase in the statistically significant dependent variables for the level of 
state respect each physical integrity right. This figure provides an easy way to identify which 
independent variables exert the largest influence over state respect for each physical integrity 
right.  
 The results shown in Table 4.1 indicate that the state capacity types play an important 
role in explaining government respect for most empowerment rights and also that the level of the 
different state capacity types helps to predict which rights a government will choose to respect 
and violate. Indeed, every type of state capacity is significant for at least one empowerment right. 
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That said, some state capacity types are, in general more influential across the range of 
empowerment rights than others.  
 Turning now to the general hypotheses summarized in Table 4.2. In contrast to the 
findings on physical integrity rights in chapter 3, there is no one type of state capacity type that is 
strongly associated with respect for empowerment rights in general. The findings results in Table 
4.1 suggest at best mixed support for the first general empowerment rights H1, that 
administrative-extractive capacity would have a positive influence on empowerment rights. 
Administrative-extractive capacity, which is so influential and positively associated with higher 
levels of governmental respect for all four physical integrity rights, is much less so for 
empowerment rights. Administrative-extractive capacity is only statistically significant for two 
rights, freedom of foreign movement and worker rights and it is negative for one and positive for 
the other, meaning at best this type of capacity has a complex relationship with empowerment 
rights.  
 The results in Table 4.1 show that empowerment rights hypothesis H2, that international-
power capacity has a negative relationship with respect for empowerment rights, enjoys weak 
support. International-power capacity is only statistically significant and negatively associated 
with government respect for one right, religious freedom. That said, as Table 4.3 and Figure 4.1 
show, the influence of international-capacity is large relative to other statistically significant 
variables as one standard deviation increase in international-power lowers the probability of the 
level of governmental respect being in a higher category by 65.72%. Concretely, this means that 
all things being equal, China and Russia are 65.72% less likely to have full respect for religious 
freedom than India who is one standard deviation lower on the international-power dimension of 
state capacity.  
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Table 4.1: Results of the Random Effects Model of State Capacity and Empowerment Rights¹ 
(Presented as Odds Ratios of a 1 Standard Deviation Increase in X) 
 
VARIABLES 
Association Speech Religious 
Freedom 
Domestic 
Movement 
Foreign 
Movement 
Electoral Self-
Determination 
Worker's Rights 
Past Respect = 0 0.094*** 0.226*** 0.264*** 0.057*** 0.083*** 0.253*** 0.165*** 
 (0.003) (0.022) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.008) 
Past Respect = 1 0.338*** 0.428*** 0.417*** 0.179*** 0.233*** 0.465*** 0.397*** 
 (0.027) (0.051) (0.032) (0.008) (0.007) (0.049) (0.038) 
Past Respect = 2² - - - - - - - 
        
Civil Conflict = 1 1.070 1.011 1.053 1.170 0.913 1.037 1.078 
 (0.382) (0.255) (0.293) (0.350) (0.237) (0.281) (0.289) 
Regime Type³  2.263*** 2.672*** 1.451** 1.761*** 1.902*** 4.861*** 1.704*** 
 (0.025) (0.032) (0.023) (0.018) (0.020) (0.032) (0.019) 
Regime Coherenceª 1.358** 1.176 1.199 1.416*** 1.499*** 1.247 1.034 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) 
Wealth (ln GDP pc) 1.111 0.914 1.011 1.057 1.366 1.501 0.915 
 (0.261) (0.200) (0.182) (0.176) (0.218) (0.235) (0.175) 
Population (ln) 0.432* 0.182*** 1.210 0.657 0.866 1.043 0.664 
 (0.159) (0.127) (0.240) (0.125) (0.173) (0.261) (0.184) 
Administrative-Extractive 0.834 1.493 1.315 1.244 0.571* 1.315 1.989** 
 (0.318) (0.476) (0.372) (0.362) (0.168) (0.415) (0.621) 
International-Power 1.489 1.927 0.343*** 0.769 1.261 0.668 0.688 
 (0.519) (0.903) (0.132) (0.172) (0.370) (0.304) (0.185) 
Coercive-Rentier 0.508*** 0.337*** 0.886 0.477*** 0.881 0.651 0.957 
 (0.131) (0.108) (0.141) (0.087) (0.169) (0.206) (0.220) 
Reach-Coastal 1.306 1.346* 1.395** 1.108 1.099 1.119 1.269 
 (0.217) (0.208) (0.196) (0.124) (0.125) (0.165) (0.207) 
Social-Cohesion 1.093 0.978 0.951 1.128 1.633*** 1.153 0.951 
 (0.156) (0.169) (0.131) (0.123) (0.177) (0.164) (0.148) 
Table 4.4 Continued on Next Page       
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Table 4.1 Continued        
cut1 0.001* 0.000*** 0.085 0.000*** 0.007* 0.226 0.003* 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.264) (0.001) (0.021) (0.763) (0.008) 
cut2 0.041 0.001* 1.492 0.053 0.475 13.063 0.124 
 (0.151) (0.004) (4.613) (0.124) (1.338) (44.147) (0.382) 
sigma2_u 1.589 2.366*** 1.888** 1.000 1.000 1.738** 2.313** 
 (0.632) (0.784) (0.488) (0.000) (0.000) (0.414) (0.902) 
Observations 1,355 1,356 1,329 1,356 1,306 1,356 1,354 
Number of Countries 100 100 99 100 100 100 100 
Robust Standard Errors In Parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
¹Random Effects Model with Standard Errors Clustered by Country. 
²Dropped due to Collinearity 
³Higher values = More Democratic 
ªHigher values = More Democratic or more Autocratic 
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Table 4.2: Implications of Results for Hypotheses of 
State Capacity and Empowerment Rights 
HYPOTHESES 
Expected  
Effect Results¹ 
Empowerment Rights H1: Administrative-Extractive Capacity Positive Mixed 
Empowerment Rights H2: International-Power Capacity  Negative Weak Reject 
Empowerment Rights H3: Reach-Coastal Capacity  Positive Strong Confirm 
Empowerment Rights H4: Coercive-Rentier Capacity Negative Strong Confirm 
Empowerment Rights H5: Social-Cohesion Capacity Positive Weak Confirm 
Association AH1: Reach-Coastal  Positive No Effect 
Association AH2: Coercive-Rentier   Negative Strong Confirm 
Speech SH1: Administrative-Extractive Positive No Effect 
Speech SH2: International-Power Negative No Effect 
Religion RH1: Reach-Coastal Positive No Effect 
Religion RH1: Social-Cohesion  Positive No Effect 
Domestic Movement DMH1: Administrative-Extractive Positive No Effect 
Domestic Movement DMH2: Coercive-Rentier Negative Strong Confirm 
Foreign Movement FMH1: International-Power Negative No Effect 
Foreign Movement FMH2: Social-Cohesion Positive Strong Confirm 
Electoral Self-Determination SDH1: Administrative-Extractive Positive No Effect 
Electoral Self-Determination SDH1: Coercive-Rentier Negative No Effect 
Worker’s Rights WH1: Administrative-Extractive Positive Strong Confirm 
Worker’s Rights WH1: Coercive-Rentier Negative No Effect 
¹Strong confirm = statistically significant for multiple rights with large effect 
 Weak confirm = statistically significant for two or fewer rights with small effect  
 Mixed = statistically significant for multiple rights but expected causal direction varies equally.  
Weak Reject = statistically significant for multiple rights but with the opposite expected 
influence for a majority of them.   
 No effect = Hypothesized variable is not statistically significant for any rights or for a specific right.  
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Table 4.3: Percentage Change in Probability of an Increase in 
State Respect For Empowerment Rights¹ 
Variable 
Freedom of 
Association 
Freedom of 
Speech 
Freedom of 
Religion 
Freedom of 
Domestic  
Movement 
Freedom of 
Foreign  
Movement 
Electoral  
Self 
Determination 
Worker’s 
Rights 
Past Respect = 0 -90.64 -73.39 -73.60 -94.27 -91.68 -74.70 -83.47 
Past Respect = 1 -66.21 -57.27 -58.21 -82.05 -76.74 -53.53 -60.28 
Past Respect = 2²        
Civil Conflict = 1 
    
   
Regime Type³ 126.28 167.42 45.14 76.12 90.23 386.09 70.45 
Regime Coherenceª 35.80 
  
41.64 49.90   
Wealth (ln GDP pc)    
 
   
Population (ln) -56.78 -81.85  
 
   
Administrative-Extractive 
    
-42.92  98.92 
International-Power   -65.72 
 
   
Coercive-Rentier -49.19 -66.27 
 
-52.32    
Reach-Coastal 
 
34.63 39.48 
 
   
Social-Cohesion 
  
  63.30   
¹Percentages based on a 1 standard deviation change in the value of the dependent variable. Values only included for significant variables.  
²Dropped due to Collinearity. 
³Higher values = More Democratic. 
ªHigher values = More Democratic or more Autocratic. 
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 Reach-coastal capacity is also less influential for empowerment rights than it is for 
physical integrity rights, though as the results in Tables 4.1 and 4.3 illustrate, its relationship is 
less complex since it is positively associated and statistically significant for two rights, those 
protecting freedom of speech and freedom of religion. This offers weak confirmation for 
empowerment rights hypothesis H3, that reach-coastal capacity would have a positive influence 
on empowerment rights in general. A one standard deviation change in reach-coastal capacity 
increases the probability of a government having a higher level of state respect for the rights 
protecting the freedoms of speech and religion by 34.63% and 39.48% respectively. This 
suggests that countries like Japan and New Zealand are 34.63% and 39.48% more likely to have 
full respect for these rights than are the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, or Israel who are 
all a full standard deviation lower on this dimension of state capacity.  
 The dimension of capacity that is most impactful to state respect for empowerment rights 
is coercive-rentier capacity. As Table 4.3 illustrates, coercive-rentier capacity is statistically 
significant for three different rights including the rights protecting freedoms of association, 
speech, and domestic movement. Furthermore, coercive-rentier capacity is negatively associated 
with government respect for all three of these rights. These results indicate strong support for 
empowerment rights hypothesis H4, that higher levels of coercive-rentier capacity would have a 
negative impact on governmental respect for empowerment rights. As Table 4.3 and both Figures 
4.1 and 4.2 show, coercive-rentier capacity has the largest negative influence on state respect for 
freedom of speech, followed by freedom of domestic movement and freedom of association 
respectively. More specifically, a one standard deviation increase in coercive-rentier capacity 
lowers the probability of government respect being at a higher level by an average of 55.9%. 
This means that the government of Syria during the 80s and early 90s was an average of 55.9% 
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less likely to respect these three rights than the government of the United Arab Emirates during 
the same period. Moreover, Syria is an average of 111.85% less likely to respect these rights than 
the government of Qatar, a state that is 2 standard deviations lower on this dimension of state 
capacity than Syria.  
 The results in Table 4.1 show weak support for empowerment rights hypothesis H5, that 
social-cohesion capacity will have a positive effect on state respect for empowerment rights. The 
only right that social-cohesion is statistically significant in predicting is the freedom of foreign 
movement, though its influence is relative strong with a standard deviation increase raising the 
probability of a higher level of governmental respect by 63.3%. That social-cohesion capacity is 
not particularly important to empowerment rights supports a growing consensus in both the civil 
conflict and human rights literature that ethnic and religious diversity will only matter under very 
specific circumstances (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Walker and Poe 2002). This relationship 
between governmental respect for foreign movement and social-cohesion capacity is discussed 
below in greater detail.  
 Finally, as with physical integrity rights, the inclusion of the state capacity types in the 
models of governmental respect for all seven empowerment rights help illuminate the influence 
of other variables theorized to influence state respect for empowerment rights. These include 
ongoing civil conflict, regime type, regime coherence, wealth, and population. The results in 
Table 4.1 show that regime type is statistically significant for all of the empowerment rights, 
with more democratic countries being more likely to have higher levels of governmental respect 
for all seven rights. As Figures 4.1 and 4.2 depict, with the exceptions of the rights to domestic 
movement and freedom of religion, regime type is the most influential variable in predicting the 
level of state respect for empowerment rights. Given the emphasis on the importance of 
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democracy to human rights fulfillment in the literature (Goodhart 2005) and, as noted above, the 
fact that many empowerment rights are by definition democratic, this finding makes sense. Still 
the fact that state capacity still helps better explain how states respect these rights confirms the 
baseline assumption underlying this analysis, that even in democracies there is an empowerment 
rights gap and state capacity can help explain this gap. The exception that seems to prove this 
rule is the only right that appears immune to the influence of state capacity—electoral self-
determination. For this right regime type has by far the most influence in predicting the 
probability of state respect for this right. 
 Another notable result with implications for the alternative hypotheses is that wealth no 
statistically significant relationship with governmental respect for empowerment rights. Wealth 
is often linked to deepening democratization (Inglehart 1997; Catterberg and Inglehart 2002) but 
when state capacity is accounted for its influence is non-existent.  
  4.6.1 Freedom of Association 
 Table 4.2 summarizes the hypotheses that are specific to each empowerment right. The 
first hypothesis related to freedom of association, AH1, is that reach-coastal capacity will be 
positively associated with higher levels of respect for this right. The results indicate that reach-
coastal capacity has no effect on respect for this right. The logic for this hypothesis, described 
above, is that states with greater reach would be less inclined to violate the right to association 
because they would not be worried about groups gathering in locations they lacked control to 
form some sort of political opposition or outright rebellion. Despite this non-finding, the fact that 
regime coherence was significant shows that states with institutional stability have less to fear 
from respecting the right citizens to association so the logic of this hypothesis might still hold.  
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 Hypothesis AH2, that coercive-rentier capacity would have a negative influence on 
governmental respect for the right to association, is supported by the findings presented in Table 
4.2. A one standard deviation increase in coercive-rentier capacity lowers the probability of a 
government having higher respect for this right by 49.19%. Examples of countries that have 
experienced this effect include the former Soviet Republics like Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary 
who all saw a 1 standard deviation decline in their coercive-rentier capacity throughout the 90s 
and 2000s and a corresponding rise in state respect for freedom of association. These countries 
support the idea that states with lots of coercive power, and potential for rentierism, experience 
higher incentives to repress the population and attempt to undercut any momentum political 
opposition might gain through rallies, meetings, or other forms of group protest.  
 4.6.2 Freedom of Speech 
 Two forms of state capacity are statistically significant in explaining the level of 
governmental respect for the right protecting the freedom of speech, coercive-rentier capacity 
and reach-coastal capacity. This finding offers no support for the hypotheses SH1 and SH2 that 
both the administrative-extractive and international-power dimensions of state capacity would be 
statistically significant in explaining governmental respect for the right protecting freedom of 
speech. Recall, it was expected that international-power would make states disinclined to allow 
freedom of speech because of potential war protesters. One possible explanation for this non-
finding is that governments in states with high levels of international-power feel less threatened 
by the population due to their high levels of power relative to society making them feel 
repression is unnecessary. That administrative-extractive capacity is not associated with 
governmental respect for the right to free speech might be explained by the fact that governments 
in states with this type of capacity use the monitoring capacity to both repress this right and 
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respect this right in equal measure. Certainly some states with high levels of institutional 
capability will use that to target leaders of opposition movements, but theses states may also be 
so effective at providing public goods that they undercut serious opposition that needs to be 
restricted.  
 That coercive-rentier capacity is statistically significant and negatively associated with 
governmental respect for the right to freedom of speech fits with the finding that it is also 
negative for the right to association. Political elites in states with high levels of coercive-rentier 
capacity will feel empowered to use that to crush political opposition rather than risk losing their 
control over government and the resources from which they are extracting rents. As Table 4.3 
shows, a 1 standard deviation increase in this dimension of state capacity lowers the probability 
of higher levels of governmental respect for the right to free speech by 66.27%. This means that 
governments in states like Greece or Bulgaria in the 1990s are 66.27% more likely than 
governments in states like Libya or the United Arab Emirates.  
 Reach-coastal capacity, on the other hand, has a positive influence on governmental 
respect for the right to free speech. A potential explanation for this is that governments in states 
with high levels of reach have little to fear from their populations as they are good at providing 
public goods that reduce the levels of grievances. These states also have high levels of contract 
intensive money (CIM), which suggests higher levels of faith in government regulation and 
financial institution (Clague 1999). This also might undermine the sources of elite-challenging 
speech the government might find threatening. As Figure 4.1 shows, the influence of reach-costal 
capacity is not that large in comparison with regime type or even coercive rentier, but a 1 
standard deviation increase still increases the probability of higher levels of respect by 39.48%. 
A country like Bulgaria, for example, highlights this relationship. During the early 90s Bulgaria 
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had high levels of reach-coastal capacity (mostly reach, given that Bulgaria is landlocked) and 
full respect for the right to free speech, however, as its reach declined through the 90s and into 
the 2000s state respect for the right to free speech declined as well. This is likely related to the 
economic troubles the former Soviet countries experienced, and as the government’s control over 
the country dwindled, political elites felt more threatened by oppositional speech and engaged in 
repression more often. This pattern holds for other former Soviet countries like Romania, 
Ukraine, and Hungary. In the end, this finding demonstrates the importance of governmental 
control in explaining state respect for the right to free speech, but the type of control matters 
greatly. Coercive control impacts the right to speech negatively, while reach control is good for 
the right to free speech. 
 4.6.3 Freedom of Religion 
 The only state capacity type that is significant in explaining governmental respect for 
freedom of religion is international-power capacity. As Table 4.3 shows, a 1 standard deviation 
increase in international-power capacity lowers the probability of a higher level of governmental 
respect by 65.72%. This result means that both hypotheses (RH1 and RH2) related to 
governmental respect for the right to freedom of religion enjoy no support as both the reach-
coastal and social cohesion dimensions of capacity are not statistically significant in the model. 
That social-cohesion is not statistically significant is particularly surprising given that a lack of 
diversity would presumably remove any reason for the state to undermine religious freedom. 
However, this non-finding might suggest support for the notion that social cohesion can cut both 
ways. In other words, when a high level of social cohesion is present in some states this will lead 
to a respect for freedom of religion, while in other states this will lead to brutal repression of 
very small minorities. Some posit what I call a “Goldilocks” theory of diversity, that too little 
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and too much is bad, but somewhere in the middle is just the right for ensuring that compromises 
are made to protect religious and ethnic minorities (Collier and Binswanger 1999; Elbadawi and 
Sambanis 2000).  
  One possible explanation for the finding that higher levels international-power lead to 
lower levels of respect for freedom of religion is that these states tend to be larger and have a 
high degree of religious diversity that might challenge the ability of the state to mobilize 
resources for war. States like China, Russia, India, Iran, and Iraq all score highly on this 
dimension of state capacity and have low levels of respect for the right to freedom of religion. 
This finding supports the often over-looked theory that powerful nations seek to forge a 
nationalistic identity to make the use of state power abroad easier (Newman 2000).  India, for 
example, has increased its international-power capacity by nearly a full standard deviation since 
1981 and has experienced a corresponding general decline in respect for freedom of religion.49   
 4.6.4 Freedoms of Domestic and Foreign Movement 
 The relationship between the different dimensions of state capacity and the freedoms of 
domestic and foreign movement highlights how different capacities influence how governments 
choose to respect and violate empowerment rights. These findings related to these two rights also 
demonstrate an underlying assumption of this project—that state capacity types are unlikely to 
be positive for all human rights or negative for all human rights, rather each state capacity type 
can enable a government to respect or violate rights depending on numerous other factors.  
 Coercive-rentier capacity is statistically significant and negatively associated with 
governmental respect for the right to domestic movement which confirms hypothesis DMH1. As 
                                                          
49 India’s CIRI score for freedom of religion has moved in fits and starts, but from 1981-2000 its average score was 
1.25 or just above “some respect”. During that period India had “full respect” for the right to freedom of religion 9 
times. However since 2000, which has seen India increase its international-power score the most, its average score 
for freedom of religion is only .5 or between “no respect” and “some respect”. 
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Table 4.3 illustrates, a standard deviation increase in coercive-rentier capacity lowers the 
probability of higher levels of governmental respect for the right to domestic movement by 
52.32%.  That states with high levels of coercive-rentier capacity would seek to restrict 
movement fits with existent theories on how governments deal with potential threats. As 
described in detail in other parts of this dissertation, high levels of coercive-rentier capacity in 
states both produce grievances and lowers the costs for engaging in repression. Restricting 
domestic movement is likely a fundamental strategy of repression for these states. As Figure 4.2 
shows, outside of past levels of respect for this right, coercive-rentier capacity only lags behind 
regime type in its impact on the probability of the level of governmental respect for the right to 
domestic movement.   
 The results in Table 4.1 show that two different dimensions of state capacity are related 
to governmental respect for the right to foreign movement. These are the social-cohesion and the 
administrative-extractive dimensions of state capacity. Social-cohesion capacity is strongly 
associated with improved state respect for the right to foreign movement. Indeed a one standard 
deviation increase in this type of state capacity raises the probability of higher governmental 
respect by 63.3%. This means that states like Greece, Italy, and Tunisia, who all score at the top 
of this dimension, are significantly more likely to respect this right than Turkey, Uruguay, or 
Thailand, who, while still high, are one standard deviation lower. This finding supports 
hypothesis FMH2, which is based on the idea that social-cohesion will be positively related to 
respect for this right because these states do not fear a minority group coming and going and 
perhaps coordinating with a nearby diasporas to form political opposition. Jordan, Uzbekistan, 
and even Slovakia are all examples of states with mixed to poor records on respect for the right 
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to foreign movement and all have low levels of social-cohesion and problematic diasporas near 
their borders.  
  Administrative-extractive capacity is also statistically significant in explaining the level 
of governmental respect for the right to foreign movement. This finding is somewhat surprising 
given the powerful positive influence administrative-extractive capacity has on respect for all of 
the physical integrity rights analyzed in chapter three of this dissertation. That said, to restrict 
foreign movement states require the ability to track citizens, issue papers, and generally account 
for who is in the country. Certainly administrative-extractive capacity is a necessary capability to 
performing these functions, given it includes a measure on the collection of domestic taxes. This 
result again highlights that different governments can use the same type of capacity to both 
respect and violate different rights. Countries with relatively high levels of administrative-
extractive capacity that do restrict foreign movement include former Soviet Republics like 
Hungary, Ukraine, Croatia, and Slovakia. Authoritarian regimes with high levels of this 
dimension of state capacity, like China, also violate this right consistently.  
 4.6.5 Electoral Self-Determination 
 Electoral self-determination is the one right, of both physical integrity rights, and 
empowerment rights, that resists the influence of all the dimensions of state capacity. This means 
that both hypotheses SDH1 and SDH2, described in Table 4.2, have no support. As the results in 
Tables 4.1, 4.3, and Figure 4.2 show, electoral self-determination is explained entirely by past 
levels of respect for this right and regime type. Given that this represents the minimal standard of 
democracy, and is part of the Polity IV measure of regime type, it is not surprising this is the 
case. That said, as many have noted, holding elections is the least a state can do on its way to 
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deeper, fully consolidated democracy that respects other human rights (Richards and Gelleny 
2007).  
 4.6.6 Worker Rights 
 The results in Table 4.1 show that administrative-extractive capacity is statistically 
significant and positively associated with governmental respect for worker rights. This result 
confirms hypothesis WH1, and suggests that the difficulty of enforcing worker rights makes 
states with high levels of administrative-extractive capacity uniquely able to respect these 
rights.50 As Table 4.3 shows, the influence of administrative-extractive capacity on the 
probability of governmental respect for these rights is large, with a standard deviation increase 
raising the probability of higher levels of state respect by 98.92%. This means that states like 
Germany, Japan, and France, who are at the top of the administrative-extractive dimension of 
state capacity, are almost twice as likely to have full respect for this right than states like Greece 
or the Czech Republic, which are one standard deviation lower on this dimension of state 
capacity.   
 Notable exceptions include the governments of the United States and the United 
Kingdom, who despite being high on the administrative-extractive dimension of state capacity, 
often have either only some respect or no respect for these rights. The United Kingdom in 
particular, experienced an interesting shift over time from “full respect” in the 80s, to “no 
respect” in the 90s, and back to “full respect” in the 2000s. Correspondingly, the UKs 
administrative-extractive capacity trend mirrored this pattern. The only other statistically 
significant variable is regime type, though as Figure 4.2 illustrates its influence is less than 
                                                          
50 In the CIRI database, from 1981-2010 worker rights had the second lowest percentage of years with “full 
respect” after freedom of speech (27% vs 30% respectively). Worker rights also experienced the highest 
percentage of “no  respect” (33.7%) during the same period. This highlights the difficulty many states, even 
democratic ones, have respecting these rights.  
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administrative-extractive capacity. This is further evidence that democracy, while extremely 
important, is no panacea for empowerment rights, and must be coupled with different state 
capacity types to maximize governmental respect for these important rights.  
 
4.7 Conclusions 
 This chapter set out to test hypotheses about the relationship between state capacity types 
and empowerment rights. First and foremost, even when state capacity is included in the model 
political democracy remains very important to in explaining governmental respect for all of the 
empowerment rights. Second, it is important to emphasize that the type and level of state 
capacity does matter in explaining governmental respect for governmental respect of 
empowerment rights. Coercive-rentier capacity is the most problematic dimension of state 
capacity for empowerment rights. This fits with theories about how incentives lead governments 
to select repression as a viable option. For governments in states with a large amount of 
coercive-rentier capacity, repression is less costly owing to their large coercive abilities, and 
threats and grievances are high as a consequence of rentierism. It is important to note, however, 
that this finding contrasts with the non-effect of coercive-rentier capacity in predicting state 
respect for most physical integrity rights in chapter three. Clearly repressing behaviors protected 
by empowerment rights is the preferable option for these governments, an important finding.  
 Third, administrative-extractive capacity actually cuts both ways for empowerment 
rights, allowing governments to restrict the right to foreign movement, while allowing them to 
respect the worker rights. On balance administrative-extractive capacity still appears better for 
human rights in general, but in the wrong hands it has potentially negative consequences. This 
finding highlights one of the core assumptions underlying this dissertation, that all the 
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dimensions of state capacity simply allow states to take actions, and do not inevitably lead to 
normatively good outcomes.  
 Fourth, while the hypotheses describing expectations about the general relationships 
between capacity and empowerment rights were mostly confirmed, the right specific hypotheses 
enjoyed at best mixed support. However, these findings should not be taken as evidence that 
state capacity is unimportant to governmental respect for empowerment rights. Instead, the 
results presented in this chapter underline how much is yet to be done in the study of why 
governments or violate empowerment rights. Particularly, researchers should look at the rights 
individually and develop better models with potentially different controls for each right. Often 
these rights are conceptually aggregated together into some measure of quality of democracy, but 
it is in better understanding when states respect the really difficult rights, like worker rights, that 
we will expand our understanding of the associates of deep, high quality democracy.  
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Conclusions 
 
 Perhaps more than any other concept in political science, state capacity has achieved an 
ethereal status insomuch that so many recognize its importance while, at the same time, claim 
they are unsure exactly what it is. Thus, the main goal of this dissertation was the development 
of a multidimensional conceptualization and measure of state capacity that would contribute 
towards the research program attempting to close this knowledge gap. Beyond the original 
conceptualization and measure of state capacity was a pilot test of sorts examining the 
relationship between state capacity and human rights; allowing us a better understanding of 
patterns of government respect for a range of human rights, particularly physical integrity rights 
and empowerment rights. My findings suggest that the level of governmental respect for each 
right studied is indeed influenced by the level and type of state capacity upon which governments 
can draw.  
 The empirical analyses in the dissertation suggest several important lessons, for policy 
makers and activists alike, concerning how to best confront human rights challenges facing 
states. Below, I enumerate some of the central lessons from this study and offer some directions 
for future research.  
Lesson 1: State Capacity Is Multidimensional 
 I was able to empirically confirm that state capacity is multidimensional, offering support 
for what others have long-suspected, but few have rigorously tested (Skocpol 1985; DeRouen 
and Sobek 2004; Young 2009). Critically, this lesson contradicts much of the work described in 
chapter one of this dissertation: that state capacity rests on one dimension, the quality of state 
institutions (Hendrix 2010; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Or, that capacity can be captured 
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using one or two proxies, such as wealth (Fearon and Laitin 2003) or taxes collected (Fauvelle-
Aymar 1999). In chapter two, I factor analyze seventeen indicators often linked to state capacity 
by previous research. What I find is that state capacity has five core dimensions, which I name 
administrative-extractive, international-power, reach-coastal, coercive-rentier, and social-
cohesion. I argue that each of these dimensions of state capacity is important to a state’s ability 
to take a particular action, and the level of each of these types of state capacity will influence 
both how governments make decisions and take action in their respective states.  
 To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that moves beyond simply looking at 
domestic government capacity (government vs. society) by incorporating the important idea of 
international autonomy, or power, into a conception of state capacity. Finally, my 
conceptualization also accounts for the fact that there are some things states can control and 
some things states cannot control, like its geography, natural resources, climate, and ethnic and 
religious diversity. In these regards, states must play the hand they are dealt and, certainly, some 
states use what they have more effectively than others, even given that their options are 
constrained by these realities.   
 Another important contribution this dissertation makes to the state capacity literature is 
that by using factor analysis to discover the different dimensions of state capacity, I 
simultaneously test numerous theories about how different attributes of states interact to form 
the basis of a state’s ability to take action.  For example, the administrative-extractive dimension 
of state capacity includes indicators of high quality institutions and indicators of favorable 
geography including temperate climate conditions, as well as proximity to major trading hubs. 
Geography is often linked by economists and political scientists to both economic growth and 
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political development (Krugman 1991; Gallup and Sachs 1999; Diamond 1997; Acemoglu and 
Robinson 1999). My findings are supportive of this body of work.  
 It is often argued that large and powerful states behave differently both domestically and 
internationally, (Mearsheimer 1996, 2001; Bueno De Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller 1992; 
Senese and Vasquez 2008) so including an international dimension of state capacity allows for 
better understanding of the behavior of powerful states. Specifically, including an international 
dimension of state capacity in future research might help develop understandings of the so-called 
“two-level game” governments must play with respect to their international and domestic 
behavior (Gourevitch 1978; Putnam 1988).  
 The factor analyses also confirmed the idea that the concept of institutional reach is 
important and also has geographical associates, specifically large amounts of coastal territory. 
The discovery of reach-coastal state capacity fits with the concept in international relations of 
“infrastructural power” developed by Mann (1993) and tested by others like Fortin (2012). 
Including an indicator of this type of state capacity in future analyses will help to better 
understand how different elements of institutional “control” over territory influence 
governmental behavior, particularly when contrasted with the administrative-extractive 
dimension of state capacity.  
 Coercive and rentier capabilities are associated in the factor analyses, and this fits with 
current theories of how rentier states emerge and operate (Karl 1997; Ross 2004). This finding 
supports the idea that governments who extract rents are likely to view internal struggles for 
political power as a zero-sum game, and to build up a large coercive apparatus to maintain 
absolute control over the sources of revenue.  
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 Finally, despite not being highly correlated, high levels of both religious and ethnic 
homogeneity, and low levels of rentier capacity, form the final dimension of state capacity. This 
social-cohesion dimension of state capacity fits with existing theories of how greater levels of 
homogeneity lower the state’s level of political upheaval, civil conflict, and poor economic 
growth (Horowitz 1985; Sambanis 2001; 2004). That rentier capacity is negatively associated 
with the social-cohesion dimension also highlights one of the key causal mechanisms linked to 
why fractionalized societies have challenges homogenous societies do not; that is that ethnic and 
religious groups will attempt to use social divisions to achieve greater control over state 
resources (Horowitz 1993).   
Lesson 2: Respecting Complex Rights Requires Complex Institutions 
 Respect for rights requiring dramatic cultural shifts in how governmental and corporate 
agents interact with citizens necessitates institutions with high levels of technical capabilities and 
resources. For example, chapter three’s analyses show that the level of administrative-extractive 
capacity on which a government can draw is the most influential variable in explaining respect 
for the right prohibiting torture. As Cingranelli and Richards (1999) note, the right prohibiting 
torture is widely violated by states often regardless of regime type, level of development, or a 
number of other hypothesized factors. They claim the reason for this is because refraining from 
torture often requires the oversight of numerous levels of military, law enforcement, and 
intelligence agents, as well as the ability to incentivize dramatic culture shifts at all levels of 
government-society relations. Indeed, the fact that all physical integrity rights are often 
dependent on many levels of government changing their behavior, it is no surprise that 
administrative-extractive capacity is the only dimension of state capacity that is statistically 
significant and positively associated with governmental respect for all four rights.  
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 The importance of the sophisticated institutional capabilities captured by the 
administrative-extractive dimension of state capacity is further highlighted by the finding in 
chapter four, on empowerment rights. In this case, administrative-extractive capacity is only 
statistically significant and positively associated with governmental respect for workers’ rights. 
As with respecting the right prohibiting torture, respect for worker rights requires high levels of 
government oversight and regulatory capability. Workers’ rights include the assurances of the 
freedoms of workers to association, to organize and collectively bargain, to no compulsory labor, 
to a minimum age of employment for children, and to acceptable conditions of work including 
minimum wages, hours, and occupational safety and health. These rights have proved so difficult 
for developing states to respect, many advocate that developed countries with strong institutions 
must take it upon themselves to enforce these rights in developing countries (Compa 2002; 
Alston 2004).  
 Lesson 3: No Dimension of State Capacity Is Universally Good  
 While it might be tempting to think that some dimensions of state capacity could exert a 
positive influence on governmental respect for all human rights, my findings suggest that such an 
expectation is incorrect. For example, the two dimensions of state capacity most associated with 
strong, technically advanced, and efficient governmental institutions -- reach-coastal capacity 
and administrative-extractive capacity -- have a negative influence on governmental respect for 
some rights. Reach-coastal capacity, while positive (leading to greater respect) for the rights to 
free speech and free religion, is negative (leading to less respect) for the rights to political 
imprisonment and disappearances. Administrative-extractive capacity is negatively associated 
with the right to freedom of foreign movement.  
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 The mixed effect of both of these dimensions of state capacity highlights that sometimes 
a technically-proficient government with high quality institutions can use that capacity to repress 
its citizens rather than respect their rights. All too often, governments might use their strong 
institutions to monitor their citizens, leading to unfortunate ends when it comes to respect for 
some human rights. This could be a sign of the phenomenon named “governmentality” by 
Foucault (1980). A number of works in the study of international relations have focused on the 
powerful effect of the sovereign state system and its ability to enforce compliance on citizens in 
both violent and non-violent ways (Larner and Walters 2004). While not always a bad thing, the 
restrictions on the freedom of movement allowed by greater institutional capacity warrants 
further investigation.  
 Similarly, the social-cohesion dimension of state capacity, when statistically significant 
(a rare occasion) has mixed results for rights respect. Social-cohesion improves state respect for 
the right to foreign movement but lowers state respect for the right protecting against political 
imprisonment. The negative effect of social-cohesion capacity has on rights respect may be 
explained by the effect of the so-called “tyrannical majority” (Davenport 2007) on political 
opposition. As well, this finding also fits with studies that find there might be a perfect level of 
diversity that creates incentives for groups to compromise rather than simply oppress small 
minorities (Collier and Binswanger 1999; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000).  
 In the end, the fact that no dimension of state capacity is always positive in its influence 
on human rights indicates the need for further research on finding thresholds above or below 
which different dimensions of state capacity might be good or bad news for governmental 
respect for different rights. Furthermore, while beyond the scope of this dissertation, there may 
be potential interaction effects between different elements of state capacity and other control 
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variables that influence when a dimension is more or less likely to lead to increased 
governmental respect for different rights.  
Lesson 4: When Influential, International-Power and Coercive-Rentier Capacity Are Bad 
For Human Rights.   
 
 All things being equal, higher levels of the international-power and coercive-rentier 
dimensions of state capacity are bad for human rights. Specifically, international-power is 
negatively associated with governmental respect for the right prohibiting disappearance and the 
right to freedom of religion. Coercive-rentier capacity is negatively associated with respect for 
the rights to freedoms of association, speech, and domestic movement, and the right prohibiting 
political imprisonment. There are several potential explanations for these findings.  First, power 
is often viewed in a negative light by scholars and advocates of human rights (Ignatieff 2005; 
Mertus 2004; Walldorf 2009). One argument is that power causes governments to place national 
and international security interests above respect for human rights. These states are more often 
involved in conflicts, charged with maintaining international peace and stability, and their 
governments might use this as a pre-text for engaging in human rights violations of their citizens 
who protest against their actions. States with power also often become the target of both 
domestic and international terrorists and use this threat as a pre-text for violating the rights in the 
name of domestic security. Finally, international power also has an insulating quality that creates 
an environment of impunity for government officials who order human rights violations. 
Governments can use their involvement in international conflict to create a rally-around-the-flag 
mentality to avoid criticism. These governments can also resist any pressure from the 
international community to change their behaviors and prosecute wrong doing at the highest 
levels of government.  
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 Second, the coercive-rentier dimension of state capacity changes the decision-making 
calculus of leaders for the worse because it couples power over citizens with little accountability. 
Higher levels of coercive-rentier capacity means that states can more easily crush political 
opposition than states with low levels of this dimension of capacity. It also means that the costs 
of incorporating political opposition are often high, given the desire of political elites to continue 
extracting rents from the state’s natural resources. Ceding power to opponents will result in a 
corresponding drop in rent-seeking behavior. Finally, these states often view political power as a 
zero-sum game since political opposition will often demand greater distribution of resource 
wealth. The governments of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Eritrea, Bahrain, Burundi, and Syria are all 
examples of entities that exhibit these tendencies.  
Lesson 5: Democracy and Wealth Are Not Panaceas for Human Rights  
 Higher levels of democracy and wealth are widely thought to be the most important 
factors towards improving a government’s human rights practices. States with higher levels of 
democracy are assumed to be capable of incorporating political opposition, making repressing 
unnecessary (Tilly 2003; 2006). Further, leaders in a democracy can be held accountable so the 
costs of repression act as a disincentive (Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Bueno De Mesquita 
2005). Wealth is thought to make respect for human rights more likely because wealthier states 
are often more democratic, and/or wealth undermines one of main sources of political 
grievances, poverty, that can necessitate repression (Poe and Tate 1994).  
 While democracy was found in this dissertation to be the most important factor in 
explaining state respect for empowerment rights, its influence varied among particular 
empowerment rights. For example, democracy is most influential in explaining state respect for 
the right to electoral self-determination and least influential in explaining the right to freedom of 
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religion and workers rights. This finding offers support for the idea that majorities in a 
democracy can sometimes restrict the rights of labor or religious minorities, a potential problem 
noted by Donnelly (1999). Particularly for freedom of religion it appears international power 
might exacerbate the effects in some countries of the tyrannical majority. States like France, the 
United Kingdom, and India, all score highly on this dimension and have mixed records on 
respecting religious freedom.  
 For physical integrity rights, the effect of democracy is much murkier when state capacity 
is included in an analysis. Democracy is only significant in explaining the respect for the rights 
prohibiting political imprisonment and extrajudicial killings. Moreover, democracy has opposite 
effects on respect for these two rights: negatively associated political imprisonment and 
positively associated with respect for extrajudicial killings. This finding, coupled with its non-
effect for torture and disappearances, suggests that some democracies are permissive when it 
comes to violating physical integrity rights. This might be because of a tyrannical majority 
feeling threatened by a minority political group and thus supporting violations.  
 On balance, democracy is certainly good for human rights, though the findings here 
suggest it is no panacea for government repression. Ultimately, more work should be done to 
examine how democracy interacts with other factors in explaining governmental respect for 
human rights.  
Lesson 6: Better Data, and More-Tailored Study of Each Individual Human Right, are 
Necessary. 
 
 There are numerous ways to potentially improve our understanding of how state capacity 
influences respect for human rights. First, the different dimensions of state capacity should be 
continually refined by developing more-complete data sets. As always, missing data and the 
temporal limitations of available data can bias results. While my data cover nearly 100 states that 
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encompass 85% of the world’s population, for many of the years between 1981 and 2010, there 
are still many gaps that should be filled in as sources of raw-data improve.  
 Second, knowing that different combinations of explanatory factors lead to different 
predicted outcomes of respect for different human rights emphasizes the need for more-specific 
analyses of respect for each, individual human right. Many quantitative studies, for example, use 
the same set of control and explanatory factors for each right (Poe and Tate 1994; 1998; 
Davenport 1995; Cingranelli and Richards 1999; Richards and Gelleny 2001; Young 2009; 
Englehart 2009; Cole 2015). This dissertation does the same, as this approach is useful for work 
seeking to establish general patters in state respect within a new context, such as here with state 
capacity. However, beyond establishing general patterns, it is probable that there is important 
variation in what factors explain state respect across a variety of rights. That there are likely to be 
unique factor sets associated with particular rights is often explored in qualitative work, and 
more quantitative work should follow suit.  
 Similarly, there are still relatively few quantitative studies that disaggregate physical 
integrity rights and empowerment rights, for individual analysis. My finding that associates 
differ for almost every right reinforces that doing disaggregated analysis is important to 
understanding the policy patterns of governments with regards to respect for human rights. 
Moreover, while there is a large extant literature on government respect for physical integrity 
rights, empowerment rights remain understudied. Growing our understanding of respect for 
empowerment rights should be an important goal of the general human rights research program 
in political science, as knowing something about the pattern and sequence of state respect for 
these rights could help shed light on important issues such as democratic transitions, democratic 
peace theory, and post-civil conflict institution building.  
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  Finally, more work should be done linking state capacity to specific policies designed to 
improve government respect for human rights; particularly, how the international community and 
domestic actors can work together to improve the relevant dimensions of state capacity when 
there is a problem with a government respecting a particular right or set of rights. Continuing to 
examine the important concept of state capacity is crucial to bridging the gap between theory and 
practice for human rights, an important endeavor for scholars and policy-makers alike.  
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Chapter 2 Appendix  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.1A: Countries Included in the Full Factor Analysis 
Albania Dominican Republic Kenya Portugal 
Algeria Ecuador Korea, Republic of Romania 
Argentina Egypt Kuwait Senegal 
Armenia El Salvador Kyrgyz Republic Singapore 
Australia Estonia Latvia Slovak Republic 
Austria Ethiopia Lebanon South Africa 
Bangladesh Finland Lithuania Spain 
Belarus France Malaysia Sri Lanka 
Belgium Gabon Mexico Sudan 
Benin Georgia Moldova Sweden 
Bolivia Ghana Mongolia Switzerland 
Bulgaria Greece Morocco Syria 
Cambodia Guatemala Mozambique Tajikistan 
Cameroon Haiti Nepal Thailand 
Canada Honduras Netherlands Togo 
Chad Hungary New Zealand Trinidad and Tobago 
Chile India Nicaragua Tunisia 
China Indonesia Norway Ukraine 
Colombia Iran Oman United Kingdom 
Congo, Dem. Republic of Ireland Pakistan United States of America 
Congo, Republic of Israel Panama Uruguay 
Costa Rica Italy Papua New Guinea Venezuela 
Cote d'Ivoire Jamaica Paraguay Zambia 
Croatia Japan Peru Zimbabwe 
Czech Republic Jordan Philippines 
Denmark Kazakhstan Poland 
 Summing the population figures from the COW database in 2008 for these 102 countries amounts to 6 
billion people or 85% of the total world population 
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